Analysing self-regulation:Its cognitive and emotional foundations and links with social understanding in early child development by Pala, Cansu
  
 
ANALYSING SELF-REGULATION: ITS COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL 




Fatma Cansu Pala (B.A. M.Sc.) 
 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF LANCASTER UNIVERSITY 

















I declare that the thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially 























Self-regulation is the term referring to a set of abilities that we employ in order to engage in 
everyday activities. Yet its operational definition is difficult, since it involves several 
component skills, like the inhibition of prepotent responses and a need to control emotions. 
These skills each show rapid development in the preschool period and this thesis explores 
how the regulatory processes in cognitive and emotional domains unfolds. I start with a 
conceptualization of cognitive and emotional regulation, suggesting that the literature is 
beset with problems of differential labelling and measurement. For example, ‘Inhibitory 
Control’ (IC) has been claimed as unitary by some but involves two processes –Conflict and 
Delay – by others. The bridge between cognitive-regulation (CR) emotion-regulation (ER) 
has been less well researched and it stretches our conception of the link between regulation 
of thought, behaviour, and feelings. The assessment of emotionality has been approached 
from various angles such as the discrepancy between the control of positive or negative 
emotions and comprehension of emotionality. In 5 studies (with 421 children in total), I 
tested the association between cognitive and emotional processes in the development of 
self-regulation. A grasp of mental states and emotions was found to be associated with the 
regulation processes in both domains. The final three experiments attempt to explain the 
effect of ‘understanding’ over the ability of control in both domains. The direct 
observations of ER, which evokes both positive and negative emotionality, revealed 
inconsistent findings in terms of the associations that ER shared with IC. In contrast, an 
understanding of emotionality (EU) as found to relate consistently to conflict-inhibition and 
mental-state understanding. A scale was developed to cover the middle ground between ER 
and EU and is called SURE (a Scale of Understanding of Regulation of Emotions). Studies 
4 and 5, which employed this measure, showed that the children were able to make 
prospective attributions of ER for story characters starting from the age of four. Children’s 
iv 
performance in this task was related to the control over their behaviour in rule-based 
situations (e.g. conflict-inhibition tasks). To observe children’s control of emotionality, a 
novel measure was developed to assess their internalization of the necessity of control in a 
cognitively demanding task, which focuses on emotional changes. It is suggested that future 
research should investigate different forms of understanding of emotions and cognitive 
processes in more detail. 
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"You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only 
one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing (Schopenhauer, 
1841/2005, p.24)" 




Chapter 1 - Rationale 
Analysing Self-Regulation: Its Cognitive and Emotional Foundations and Links with 
Social Understanding in Early Child Development   
Being human is being accountable for one’s behaviour and thoughts (Tomasello, 
2014). To claim that individuals are accountable for their actions and consequences, the first 
crucial question that comes to mind is that ‘are those individuals in control of their actions?’ 
This is an age-old problem that many philosophers and religious doctrines dealt with under 
the concept of the ‘will’. Each draws different conclusions on the limitations of the 
controlling ‘self’. There is a longstanding assumption that being aware of one’s ‘self’ and 
being in control are not only necessary to socialize with others, through engaging in 
reciprocal interaction, but also to achieve immediate and long-term goals to have a 
meaningful life.  
Among all the other achievements in early development, young children are mostly 
characterized as being pleasure orientated1; they are thought to like to do things whenever 
they want to, not considering others’ needs or wishes. This kind of description of early 
childhood might not be fair to children who, even when very young, demonstrate altruistic or 
helpful behaviour (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006).  Despite their emerging 
cooperative skills, the ability to remain calm when mum is not allowing them to go to the 
supermarket wearing their princess dress, or resisting the temptation of eating sweets before 
dinner, are still difficult. If these characteristic assumptions of young children prevail, should 
we still study their ability to control themselves? Thus, the old question can be reformulated 
                                                          
1 Although it is not the purpose of this thesis, this kind of a description of a child may remind us of the 
explanations of human nature in most Western philosophical accounts (the doctrine of original sin and in e.g., 
Hobbes’ philosophy). By pleasure-oriented, I only try to point out the child’s eagerness to explore the world 
through his/her ‘needs’ in the early years of life.  
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as ‘when and how do young children start to control their actions?’  Children develop skills 
to regulate their responses in the face of many different and demanding situations throughout 
the preschool years (Bronson, 2000). They do this in spite of the view profile that early 
childhood is characterised by pleasure- orientated and immediate, if not solipsistic, world 
views. The adaptation of those skills that makes the control of actions possible is defined 
under an umbrella term of ‘self-regulation’ (Calkins & Fox, 2002; Mischel et al., 2010; 
Posner & Rothbart, 2000; Sokol & Muller, 2007).  
The analysis of this umbrella term is necessary because the regulation of desires and/ 
or needs is not only limited to early childhood. It is a struggle that everyone faces when they 
need to exercise this skill in their daily lives. Some might find smiling difficult when they 
come across a disliked colleague, whilst others might struggle to prioritise the chores that 
they have in hand. Most of the time separating cognitive demands from emotional ones is not 
easy. Therefore, it is inevitable that many authors have employed the label of ‘self-
regulation’ from the literature on the control of thoughts and actions, and another term, 
‘executive function’, from studies on emotional development.  There is a dichotomy between 
emotion and cognitive faculties in the literature. Despite their interaction, explaining them 
separately is practical for both the research and discussion in this thesis. The dichotomy is 
based on the fact that the developmental research has treated the growth of the abilities 
regarding emotion and cognition as separate constructs. This is not a necessary split, and the 
nature of each aspect of self-regulation might be investigated using the similar methodologies 
but without pointing out the commonalities among them. To avoid an in principle distinction 
I would like to address the question of how to approach the goal-directed nature of self-
regulation.  
 A child is the ‘regulator’ of the inputs from the social surrounding and outputs that 
she or he displays to the same social surrounding. Preschoolers’ growing understanding of 
  Chapter 1-Rationale  
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himself or herself as a social agent is tied to their understanding that they are part of a social 
network. As processors of their needs and desires, they may have to adapt to the social 
network in order to tackle challenges that they face. Considering any challenge as a task in 
hand, ‘choosing a strategy’ would be the first step. One way of doing this would be to use 
avoidance as a strategy, but this could be a poor plan of action if completion of the task is 
rewarded. The second challenge of self-regulation concerns ‘engaging’ with the chosen 
strategy. When the task in hand is not pleasurable, but the strategy is to work on it, engaging 
with the chosen strategy requires self-regulation. If the task at hand is tempting/ pleasurable, 
it might be difficult to engage with the strategy of then avoiding the temptation. The third 
challenge for self-regulation often involves ‘maintaining’ the chosen strategy throughout the 
task in hand. This requires remembering rules or imagining the desired outcome, which might 
be difficult due to the increased cognitive demand such a working memory or inhibitory 
control. Each one of these steps can be applied to challenges that are high in emotional or 
behavioural demands.   
In childhood, self-regulation can be observed for external needs in the early years, 
such as the caregivers’ holding and rocking an infant to soothe, but I am interested in the age 
that children start to reveal their intrinsic motivation to regulate their actions and feelings. 
The discrepancy between intrinsic or extrinsic motivation to self-regulate continues in each 
developmental period from infancy to adulthood. 
Internalization of self-regulation strategies cannot be considered as a sign of 
maturation because individuals’ motivation might be based on their needs for ‘autonomy, 
competence and relatedness’ (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2000, p.71). Each of these motivational 
needs help to explain the theories on the life-span development of self-regulation. Previously 
mentioned steps of self-regulation strategies ‘choosing’, ‘engaging’ and ‘maintaining’ were 
labels that were borrowed from adulthood literature.  
  Chapter 1-Rationale  
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A framework that has been proposed by Baltes (1997, p. 371) focuses on an 
individual’s ability to adapt to the social environment by following three strategies ‘selection, 
optimization, and compensation’.  Similar to the early occurrence of SR, adults also start with 
the necessary process of making a choice based on the limitations of their time and resources. 
In the cases of either children or adults, the accuracy of the formulation of such a strategy, or 
the flawlessness of the execution of this strategy, sparks a question that I will address in the 
next subsection. Selective Optimization with Compensation (SOC) in self-regulation explains 
the processes of control for setting goals and achieving them according to the developmental 
deadlines.        
In a given self-regulatory dilemma, a young adult may, for example, like to exercise 
to maintain a healthy life-style but finds it very hard to go for a run instead of having a drink 
with friends. This dilemma occurs because both behaviours satisfy particular goals, and times 
may conflict. For example, the social exchange with friends also meets this person’s 
motivation to relate to his or her peers and going for a run may fulfil the goal of healthy 
living but maybe difficult to pursue in the face of easier goals. Self-regulation processes 
continue for a ‘grown-up’ who has to select a strategy by optimizing it based on the resources 
one possesses (such as time and energy). The compensation comes when the strategy may 
require an adaptation for minimizing the cost and maximizing the gains. The three steps 
Baltes suggests as SR strategies for life-span development involve both cognitive and 
emotional elements. Regarding the step of optimization, Heckhausen, Wrosch, and Schulz 
(2010) introduce a similar theory in which to explain two processes that an individual must 
pursue. These involve changing, firstly, the environmental conditions and, secondly, adapting 
their goals or desires to the particular environment. Life-span theories of control deal with 
more complex dilemmas than the ones that we might want to address with young children 
and their complexity makes it more difficult to pinpoint the emotional or cognitive demands 
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of the various challenges. Thus, adult self-regulation is claimed as intentional. Developed 
cognitive abilities lead the processes of goal-setting, planning the future, and allocation of 
both resource and expectations (see review of McClelland, Ponitz, Messersmith, & Tominey, 
2010). From childhood to adolescence, the control of behaviour goes through a phase that has 
been claimed to depend more upon gut feelings, intuitions and affect than the analytical 
thinking, which was described by Piaget (1968). From adolescence to adulthood, both 
analytic and heuristic decision making processes are intertwined. In applying strategies that 
are inclined to be more analytical in adulthood, the neurological deficits in the frontal lobe 
have been considered to have an effect on both choosing a strategy and its execution (Shallice 
& Burgess, 1991).  
Turning next to the motivational underpinnings of self-regulation, how strategies are 
formulated and identifying where the problem occurs can be traced to two categories that are 
the ‘execution’ of the strategy or the ‘formulation’ of control. Shallice and Burgess (1991) 
described the organization of behaviour in imitating daily activities, citing patients with 
frontal damage. Their conclusion focused on the bridge between intentionality and memory. 
These patients seemed to arise from their difficulty to recall their retrospective intention 
during multiple subgoal tasks. In planning or choosing a strategy to fulfil SR, the 
maintenance of the intention that sparks the action in the first place appeared to significantly 
contribute to self-regulatory difficulty. When trying to complete psychological tasks, they 
required social reinforcement throughout because their motivation tended to fade, because the 
intention indeed fades.  
Children produce various strategies to cope with the challenge or remaining 
motivated. For example, in a situation a child was asked for an immediate versus a delayed 
but bigger reward, deciding on receiving the immediate reward might appear as a minimal 
gain but it is maximized for reducing the time that each child will invest in this reward. The 
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theories regarding children’s potential perseverance in inhibitory tasks will be examined in 
detail later in this chapter (also in Chapter 2) but when the findings derived from Shallice and 
Burgess (1991) are taken into consideration, the performance of children and their SR can be 
depicted in terms of the maintenance of intentions. The need to persist on a task provokes an 
explanation from memory, which will be addressed in the section 1.3 when addressing 
executive functions. In terms of the labelling goal formation, the early developing capabilities 
of the prefrontal cortex might be sufficient for young children to formulate the best outcome 
strategy for themselves. However, they might struggle more with keeping the chosen strategy 
in mind and follow it through in order to cope with a prolonged delay period. Thus, ‘goal 
execution’ might be considered as the label for the difficulty of children and/or patients with 
frontal lobe damage when they have been challenged with a SR task.  
Researchers have examined self-regulation at each of the three stages of choosing, 
engaging and maintaining. Based on those explanations and that stage they were observing, 
psychologists tend to label their findings differently. This chapter aims to set the scene for 
how various self-regulation challenges in young children’s development are experienced 
together. Although they often observe or measure the acquisition of self-regulation as an 
outcome of developing control of cognition and emotions, some researchers suggests ‘trait’ 
like explanations of this set of skills. However, the majority of researchers follow Vygotsky’s 
(1978) claim in Mind and Society, that the necessity of such control is internalized by the 
child as the higher mental processes matures with the support of growing interpersonal 
relations. 
Before continuing with an analysis of the development of self-regulation in early 
childhood, I will pause to describe how I became interested in the issues explored in this 
thesis. I started with an analysis of the philosophical background to the concept we call ‘self-
regulation’ that is used today but which for a much longer period has been discussed under 
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the name of ‘will’. My attempts at a brief analysis of the philosophical debates was derived 
from a close reading of James Russell’s (1986, 1996) thesis on the integration of children’s 
ability to control their experiences through developing early ‘agency’. Russell’s analysis was 
nested in Schopenhauer’s perspective on the will, suggesting a unique relationship between 
cognition and intentionality. For a comparison between the Kantian and Schopenhauerian 
explanations over the ability of regulating the behaviour through a mentalist or a holist 
(emotional-integrative) view, I invite the reader to address the account presented in Appendix 
1.1. The philosophical analysis presented in the appendix explores the integration of an act of 
control and the mental faculties responsible for our action. I decided to keep this starting 
point apart from this, more psychological, chapter in order not to overcomplicate the thesis 
presented here. 
To summarise Appendix 1.1: Schopenhauer’s description of ‘will’ constitutes the 
knowledge of desire itself. As simple as it sounds, an act of regulation depends on the 
awareness of the desire and the need for regulation. In the Kantian explanation of self-
knowledge, intuitions are isolated from affective affiliations. In his critique of Kant, 
Schopenhauer inspires the investigation emotionally charged constructs (e.g. desire, feelings) 
with their cognitive counterparts that can be observed through behavioural assessment. Thus, 
in this thesis the following question was drawn from the philosophy and was attempted to be 
explained in the following chapters: what regulatory mechanism underpins an 
‘understanding’ of both cognition and emotion?.  I will start by defining self-regulation and 
outlining the different terminology in the literature that often leads to problems of comparing 
different accounts. 
1.1 What is Self-regulation? 
Self-regulation entails the integrated control of cognition, emotion, and actions (Bell & 
Deater-Deckard, 2007; Blair, 2002; Calkins & Bell, 2010, Karoly, 1993). The emergence and 
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regulation of emotions is usually considered to be based on cognitive processes which are 
founded on the growth of representation, memory, and language (Kopp, 1982; 1989). From 
analyses of the observable outcomes of self-regulation, a division between the cognitive and 
social-emotional demands is often proposed (Bodrova & Leong, 2006). Even though these 
separate aspects appear to contribute to the same construct, such a separation shows how 
psychologists highlight either cognitive or emotional skills as in the core of self-regulation.  
According to recent findings and evaluations from neuropsychology, when solving a 
problem there is a strong influence of emotionality on our volitional acts and this derives 
from entwined cognitive and emotional skills (Bechara, 2004; Immordino-Yang & Damasio, 
2007). Since self-regulation requires a wide range of ‘emotional’ and ‘cognitive’ skills, each 
of which change rapidly in early childhood development, the conceptualization of this 
construct is not an easy task. Thus, two key issues need to be addressed. First, how can we 
conceptualise the control of behaviour in order to arrive at an operational definition of self-
regulation? Secondly, how can we measure it when it involves developing cognitive to socio-
emotional skills?  
1.2  Labelling Self-Regulation 
In a historical examination, Post, Boyer, and Brett (2006) suggest that Freud’s theory 
is essentially one about the precursors of self-regulation. Some theoreticians have followed 
Freud’s (1915/1957) belief in energy that drives the resolution of the tension between the 
conscious and unconscious mental faculties. He tried to establish equilibrium between the 
demand of the desires and the rule and regulations of life. For Freud, the control of the self is 
the responsibility of another faculty, which lies in between the conscious and unconscious. 
Freud’s division of the needs and regulation as they are represented in mind is very similar to 
the Schopenhauer’s united ‘will’. Freud separates the basic instincts and desires as ‘Id’ from, 
the rules the society, and reality of life, which is the controlling mechanism ‘super ego’. 
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Despite his division of these two processes, Freud (1923) also unifies the tension between 
them within the ‘ego.' The urge and complementary controller mechanism may be presented 
at the unconscious level, but the peacemaker of such tension is much more a conscious 
mechanism (Freud, 1966).  
In the precursory period, Post et al. also mentioned Pavlov’s behaviourist approach on 
control. Smith’s (1992) evaluation of the history of control in Appendix 1.2 introduced that 
the concepts we deal in the context of self-regulation started from an automatic control of 
behaviour, as the behaviourist approaches would offer. The Pavlovian School identified a set 
of external drivers for the development of volitional behaviour, downgraded to conditioning 
(Pavlov, 1927; as cited in Post, Boyer, & Brett, 2006). This contrasts with Freud’s construct, 
the ‘ego’ as a regulatory mechanism. The tension between rich accounts like Freud’s and 
leaner ones like Pavlov’s has permeated the literature over the past century. Wegner and 
Pennebaker (1990) built upon the idea of ‘mental control’. They focussed centrally on the 
logic of control at the centre of mental activity. This idea takes its meaning from Freud’s 
legacy through dropping the analytical explanations but keeping ‘cognitive control’ as a core 
for all behavioural outcomes (e.g. Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959). 
Following from Freudian concepts related to the self-regulation mechanism of repression, 
suppression would be also named as a defence mechanism found its new line of formation. 
The developmental transition from a defenceless and impulsive child to an adult with 
complete ego control was also a part of that approach.  
1.2.1 Self-Control. 
The transformation of an impulsive baby to a self-controlled adult was conceptualized 
by Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez (1989) who used the term ‘self-control’ (or willpower or 
delay of gratification in some cases). Mischel and his colleagues referred to this ability in 
terms of an individual difference. Some people are able to postpone the immediate pleasure 
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for a greater gain, while others find this difficult. The Delay of Gratification Paradigm is one 
of the most well-known experiments in which Mischel et al. (1972) presented children with a 
desirable treat (a marshmallow) and gave them the option of immediate gratification or the 
option to wait (up to 15 minutes) to get a bigger reward (two marshmallows). This type of 
choice task was very influential from the start, and variations of this procedure have been 
adapted by many others. For example, Hongwanishkul et al. (2005) devised a choice task 
similar to the Mischel’s paradigm using different objects (e.g. stickers, pennies) and varied 
the quantity of the reward (e.g. 1 now versus 4 later). The conclusion drawn by Mischel was 
that children who showed resilience to the immediate reward and waited for a bigger prize 
were demonstrating self-control. Recently, Mischel and his colleagues (2010) revealed some 
findings from a longitudinal study which suggested life-long individual differences based on 
the ‘will power’ which was demonstrated in early childhood. They showed that the children 
who preferred a delayed reward in the preschool period scored higher performance in their 
standardized university entrance test, achieved much higher academic success, and had better 
social-cognitive and emotional coping in the adolescence (Mischel et al.,1988). In adulthood, 
their preschool choice to delay or take the marshmallow predicted higher academic 
achievements, higher self-worth, better coping with stress and less addictive behaviour 
(Ayduk et al., 2000).  
Mischel’s paradigm was very innovative in the late 60s, and the variations on the task 
still predict later individual differences. His team seemed to show that the ability to postpone 
a desired object or an activity, in the face of an immediate pleasure, was a mark of ego-
resilience. The findings from ‘delay of gratification’ tasks were generalized to explain an 
overall performance of cognitive (e.g. executive functions) and/or emotional (e.g. effortful 
control) regulatory skills (see section 1.2.3 for effortful control). Mischel’s experiment had 
the effect that ‘self-control’ was initially associated with the ability to ‘delay’ gratification. It 
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focussed attention on a child’s ability to postpone a pleasurable activity, but does only ‘delay’ 
represent or capture the development of self-regulation?  
In a more recent study, Moffitt et al. (2011) also used the term, self-control, in a 
longitudinal study  (from the  Dunedin Study2) in which they based the self-control 
performance in observational data from parent, teacher and self- reports. Like Mischel, they 
also found that self-control in the first decade of life predicted income, saving behaviour, 
financial security, security, prestige (in job), physical and mental health, substance use and 
lack of criminal activity in adulthood. They suggested that, in regard to the power of 
prediction, early self-control had the same predictive power as general intelligence and 
family socioeconomic status. They suggested executive function underlies self-control of 
“impulsivity, conscientiousness, self-regulation, delay of gratification, inattention 
hyperactivity, executive function, willpower, intertemporal choice” (p.1).  However, their 
study was not clear about the assessment of children’s performance in those overlapping 
constructs.  Although Moffitt et al. (2011) stated that self-regulation is a component of self-
control; they did not define how those constructs related to each other. The cognitive demand 
of self-regulation is addressed within the executive function framework in section 1.3 of this 
chapter after the labels of ‘temperament’ and ‘effortful control’ are introduced.  
The behavioural outcome of self-control is a reflection of inner mechanisms like any 
other psychological construct, but analysis of any developmental origins has been approached 
in terms either of cognitive or emotional development. On one hand, observing children’s 
reactions toward immediate or delayed rewards tends to lead to an analysis of self-regulation 
in cognitive terms. This line of thought tends to lead to analyses of individual differences that 
also make overarching predictions for later in their lives. On the other hand, other researchers 
                                                          
2 The Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study (also known as the Dunedin Study) is an in-
depth study of human health, development and behaviour which was conducted by following the lives of 1037 
babies born between 1972 and 1973 in Queen Mary Maternity Hospital, Dunedin, New Zealand.  
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define a regulatory skill in terms of behavioural reactivity during infancy. This research has 
pushed explanations towards accounts of temperament and emotional displays.    
1.2.2 Temperament. 
In the early 1980s, Rothbart and Posner introduced a temperament-based approach to 
the study of self-regulation. Temperament was proposed as an explanation for children’s 
means of coping with conflict and as an indicator of the ability to regulate emotional arousal. 
Prior to the development of higher mental faculties that might be responsible for volitional 
decision-making, Rothbart suggested that temperament reveals individual differences of 
emotionality, activity and attention. Based on the evidence from infants aged 3-12 months 
(Rothbart & Hwang, 2005), three dimensions of temperament were proposed as surgency 
/extraversion, negative affect, and effortful control (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Each 
of these dimensions represents observable reactions of a very young child. Surgency 
/extraversion refer to: “activity level, smiling and laughter, (high) intensity of pleasure, 
impulsivity, shyness, and positive anticipation” (Rothbart & Rueda, 2005, p.2). Negative 
affectivity is represented by the display of emotions such as “fear, anger, and sadness” along 
with the way to cope with those such as display of “discomfort and soothability”. These two 
dimensions were found to be in strong relationship with effortful control, as assessed in tasks 
of “attentional shifting, attentional focusing, inhibitory control, low intensity pleasure, and 
perceptual sensitivity”. It is clear that each of Rothbart’s dimensions is loaded with both 
affective and cognitive demands. The observations in surgency/ extraversion (which are 
usually summed to form a construct ‘positive emotionality’ in early development) and 
negative affect have been proposed as predictors of more complex control of action 
(‘effortful control’) in later development.    
Children even as young as 10 months old are able to show longer attention during 
play (during a pleasurable activity) and also show less negative emotionality towards aversive 
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stimuli (Kochanska, Coy, Tjebles, & Husarek, 1998). Kochanska, Murray and Harlan (2000) 
reported in a longitudinal study that sustained attention in infancy (at 9 months) was the 
essential component in later successful effortful control. Attention control as part of effortful 
control observed in stroop-like tasks (which I will refer under section 1.3 for executive 
functions) was claimed to be the underlying mechanism, a contributing element of emotional 
regulation (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000); even when it 
was measured concurrently and over time (Kochanska et al., 2000)..   
An infant who struggles to regulate emotionality would be claimed to be displaying a 
‘trait’ but in later childhood similar behaviour might be explained by insufficient attentional 
control, or that their temperament-control that they may be lacking (i.e., due to individual 
factors) (Calkins, 1994). Among others who studied individual factors in emotional 
regulation or effortful control, Fox and Calkins (2003) used the labels of internal and external 
factors to explain the development of the control of emotionality. External factors can be 
summarized in terms of the social support that the child received from his parents, whereas 
internal factors refer to the developing cognitive abilities that serve as an aid for controlling 
emotions (Fox & Calkins, 2003).  Although they share the same label in this categorization, 
they used abilities like attention or inhibition control to justify a change in other constructs 
such as temperament. Kochanska has also emphasized the relationship of the child with 
others in her analyses of child’s compliance, and the development of conscience fits to justify 
this category (Kochanska, 1991; Kochanska, & Aksan, 2006).  The term ‘effortful control’ 
was put forward as the mechanism responsible for the inhibition of salient responses It is 
addressed in detail in section 1.4 (particularly its overlapping features with executive 
functions and how it has also been used to explain emotion-related regulation of behaviour).  
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1.2.3 Effortful Control.  
In studies of the child’s ability to gain a control over her or his behavior, for example 
Rothbart, Derryberry and Posner (1994) used effortful control and self-regulation 
interchangeably. They reported that “inhibitory control, attentional focusing; low-intensity 
pleasure and perceptual sensitivity” (p.86) are internally operated behaviors. Since they also 
refer here to attention mechanisms that are described, the term ‘effortful control’ has also 
been used to refer sustaining and manipulating cognitive demands (e.g. alternating attention 
to different stimuli). Prior to Rothbart’s explanation of attention systems in development, 
Luria (1973) made a distinction between early and later developing systems that children 
possess. He considered that early, involuntary attention is based on biological development. 
The maturation of such involuntary systems would facilitate the later development of the 
voluntary attention, or higher mental functions. Posner and Rothbart (1998) followed Luria’s 
distinction but, contrary to his explanation, they suggested that a complex interaction between 
biology and socialization shapes both the involuntary and voluntary attentional systems.  The 
emergence of attention based- effortful control is observed at the ages of between 6 and 12 
months where its growth has also been associated with the anterior attention network 
(Rothbart, Derryberry, & Posner, 1994).   
Kochanska and her colleagues focused on the issues of social-emotional development 
of children whose age ranged between 2 ½ to 6 (Kochanska, Murray & Coy, 1997; 
Kochanska et al, 1996) in their analysis of developmental origins of effortful control. Their 
sample was older than Rothbart’s (mostly infant) studies. Their operationalization of effortful 
control was based on the assessments from age–appropriate batteries to capture the changes 
that occur throughout from late toddlerhood through the preschool period. They used 
‘inhibition control’ to refer to effortful control to fit in with their conceptual approach. An 
explanation for the change of terms is that the second term captures the dual requirements of 
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regulation behaviour as inhibiting and also sustaining the behaviour, and they wanted to focus 
only on the act of inhibition. Kochanska, Murray, and Harlan (2000) describe Rothbart’s term 
as too close to other constructs within the regulation of behaviour and emotion, which can be 
active or passive. They also claim that although they locate the construct between 
temperament and motor behaviour, it also intervenes between these constructs. A child’s 
ability to slow down at on-going activity (e.g. trying to walk a more slowly) and ability to 
lower their voice (e.g. whispering when asked) were examples of motor-control tasks, and 
there was ‘inhibitory’ demands in the core of these tasks called to assess effortful control 
(Kochanska et al., 2001).  
Both Kochanska and Rothbart refer to effortful control to mean a combination of 
emotional and behavioural regulation. However, the way that they kept the cognitive process 
intact within the process deserves to be mentioned. Their weighting of affective systems as 
individual differences will lead me to look at a different account which is the executive 
functions account. Including emotional regulation, one of the main highlights of Kochanska’s 
approach to effortful control, is that her grip on this construct includes all the range of 
domains of functioning, including cognitive, social, emotional, motor, and behavioural 
performance. Both Rothbart (Rothbart, Derryberry, & Posner, 1994) and Kochanska used the 
term effortful control to cover the two aspects of the self-regulation, which are inhibitory and 
excitatory. The excitatory aspect can be summarized as the initiation and maintaining of a 
subdominant option whereas inhibition refers clearly to a suppression of a prepotent action.  
Kochanska (Kochanska et al., 1996; 1997; 2000) places greater emphasis on the role of 
emotions. In her task development, she respects Rothbart’s placement of the effortful control 
in the broad context of a comprehensive temperament framework. Therefore, Kochanska 
acknowledges the early affective response development, such as fearfulness or guilt 
proneness. In addition, she also addresses the child’s compliance to the parent’s agenda in 
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different settings. In doing so, she adds another dimension, the active engagement of the child 
with the environment, as in reciprocal social relationships.  The contrast between ‘DO’ or 
‘DON’T’ commands face the child with input that challenges the primary affective systems. 
In one study Kochanska et al. (2001) presented different tasks for children from the ages of 
14, 22, 33, and 45 months. Even the older children struggled more on the DO contexts.  The 
performance in the DON’T context was correlated with a measure entitled ‘committed 
compliance to parent’ and also fearfulness.  
Both Kochanska and Rothbart developed their behavioural and parent-reported 
measures of effortful control within the same theoretical perspective. Kochanska divides 
effortful control into five capacities where the core quality of suppressing a dominant 
response exists in each component as in regulation of motor, vocal, emotional, and cognitive 
responses and how long each is sustained. The capacities pertain to ‘delaying, slowing down 
motor activity, suppressing or initiating the activity to signal, effortful attention and lowering 
voice’ (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000, p 11). The test battery for each domain of 
abilities that focussed on effortful control was taken as a composite profile for self-regulation 
(Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001). These tasks that have been developed to tap each 
capacity demonstrated highly coherent underlying consistency.  
The battery to explain underlying constructs of the effortful control (Kochanska et al., 
2000) also has been demonstrated to be associated with children’s development of conscience 
(Aksan & Kochanska, 2004), and it has be shown that it is related to individual differences in 
child’s particular emotionality. By certain emotionality what it meant is their finding of 
fearfulness or guilt-proneness of a child that was again associated with the child’s effortful 
control performance. This will be revisited in the chapter when I consider emotional-
regulation section specifically. Clearly, the literature behind the label effortful control 
embraces both cognitive and emotional demands of a situation that requires self-regulation to 
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be exercised. One aim of this chapter is to analyse each aspect of the construct. The unique 
association between the emotional and cognitive aspects of control is reported in the further 
each individual study that follows. 
1.3 Executive Functions –or Cognitive Aspect of Self-Regulation  
Executive function (EF) skills also form part of the self-regulation processes although, 
here, terms like inhibitory control or delay inhibition are used. EF was defined as ‘general 
process control mechanisms that modulate the operation of various cognitive sub-processes 
and thereby regulate the dynamics of human cognition’ (p.50) by Miyake et al, (2000).  These 
are goal-directed, planned, inhibited behaviours and used synonymously with self-regulation 
by some developmental psychologists (Blankson et al, 2013; Sokol et al., 2010; Lewis et al, 
2009; Carlson & Wang, 2007). The executive function skills were reported to be dependent 
on prefrontal neural systems, particularly the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) (e.g. Cole, Usher, & Cargo, 1993; Pennington, & Ozonoff, 1996). These areas 
are associated with the emotional reactivity, the stress response and the autonomic function 
(for review Miller & Cohen, 2001). ACC is recognized for its association with processing 
both emotional and cognitive information and is thought to be where the affective and 
cognitive systems are situated (Blair, Zelazo, & Greenberg, 2005). EF is also an umbrella 
term that has been widely used in the past two decades in search of children’s cognitive-
control, the occasions listed where such control occurred, exercised or needed. As Diamond 
(1999) noted it occurs in: “(1) novel tasks and situations that require (2) concentration, (3) 
planning, (4) problem solving, (5) coordination, (6) change, (7) conscious choices among 
alternatives, or (8) overriding a strong internal or external pull ” (p.70).  Thus, EF embraces 
and represents the co-development of working memory, attentional flexibility, inhibitory 
control, planning, and goal-direction (Pennington, 1997; Welsh et al., 1991). Goal-directed 
activity and impulse inhibition are bound to self-regulation by the definition of its nature.  
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To exercise self-regulation by choosing a strategy to tackle a task (most require 
regulation), engaging in the chosen strategy and maintaining it, the skills that contribute EF 
need to be employed. Russell (1996, p.209), referred to “the ability to program and regulate 
the behaviour, specifically to program and regulate the judgements one is asked to make 
about situation”. He argues strongly that such ‘executive functioning’ is so profound that it is 
an aspect of agency – how we become aware of ourselves as agents.  Between the ages of 3 
and 6, crucial improvements emerge in the ability of inhibitory control (Diamond & Taylor, 
1996; Frye et al., 1995; Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Kochanska et al., 1996; Reed, 
Pien, & Rothbart, 1984). This is the ability to suppress an impulsive response, or to delay this 
response when the task requires it (Diamond, 1999). Inhibitory processes can be simply 
defined as stopping a prepotent response or suppressing an impulse. Such control can be 
simple or complex dependent on the demand it makes (Garon et al., 2008) which may require 
Delaying a response or tackling a Conflict, respectively (Carlson & Moses, 2001).  The 
separate demands within IC will be addressed in further detail in Chapter 2 when reporting 
Study 1 which specifically focuses on the dynamic within the inhibitory skills.  
Here, the frameworks that explain EF as a unitary construct will be discussed because 
their explanations can also be used to explain self-regulation. Zelazo and his colleagues 
proposed the cognitive complexity and control (CCC) theory which depicts EF as a unitary 
construct (Zelazo & Frye, 1997, 1998; Zelazo & Muller, 2002). According to their theory 
executive skills occur through the ability to engage in increasingly complex representation of 
information. Such abilities change during preschool years, particularly the ability to grasp 
hierarchical or embedded rules. The CCC theory (Zelazo & Frye, 1997, 1998) argues that in 
order to shift from first rule to the second rule when the requirements of an activity change. 
Children must first realize that both (pre- and post-switch) rules apply to the same situation, 
and then they should construct a higher order, an embedded ‘‘if – if – then’’ rule for choosing 
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the post-switch rule compared to pre-switch rules. A perseverance seen in three-year-olds in 
such activities is attributed to failing to formulate and use a higher order rule.  
Children represent and use this higher order rule purposefully from the age of four, 
and they can come flexibly to choose between two different sets of rules. In the Dimensional 
Change Card Sort (DCCS) task, children are presented with some cards that share at least one 
dimension (i.e., colour or shape).  Young children’s performance in this task has revealed 
some systematic age-related change, as in 3-year-olds’ perseverance on the same rule (e.g., 
sort by colour) even when they were asked to sort out the cards according to a different 
dimension (sort by shape). By 4-and 5-year-old participants follow the dimensional change 
rule and sort the cards according to the new set of rules (for a review, see Zelazo et al., 2003).  
Miyake et al.’s (2000) explanation for the executive problem is ‘shifting’ and they 
argue that this as a core executive skill. Their definition of this term concerns the ability to 
shift between different set of rules, mind sets or tasks. It requires both working memory and 
inhibition. A shifting error, described by Anderson (2002), occurs where the new still shares 
one aspect of the first rule. Such overlap seems to identify children’s limitations in the 
working memory. To observe the weight on the different demands of the switch rule 
flexibility Rennie, Bull, and Diamond (2004) reduced the behavioural (or attentional) 
demands of the DCCS task by matching the target and sorting cards along only one 
dimension. A target card contained a different shape on it than the sorting cards but was 
matched on colour. For example, a blue car and a red flower were used as targets, but the 
sorting cards were blue umbrellas and red stars. With such stimuli the child would sort them 
according to colour without getting confused by the shapes. In the switch condition, the target 
cards were a green boat and a yellow bird and the sorting cards did not match the colour but 
only matched the shape of boats and birds. When they reduced the attentional inhibition 
demand of the task, almost all children managed to switch to the second rule. Young 
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children’s perseverative errors may thus be due to lack of their attention control or both the 
combination of action and attention control.  
The developing ability under the banner of ‘inhibitory control’ (IC) constitutes the 
cognitive aspect of self-regulation. I will be exploring whether the primary driver of self-
regulatory processes is ‘inhibitory control’ and how distinct demands of inhibitory skills 
behave as regulatory mechanisms. The assessment of IC and its distinctive demands will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter 2, since Study 1 aims to clarify these dynamics prior to 
including emotional-regulation within my empirical framework.   
1.4 Emotional-Regulation: The Emotional Aspect of Self-Regulation  
Emotion-related regulatory behaviour is most likely to be described as a socialization 
process because of the importance of the effect of emotional reactions on others and vice 
versa. Emotional regulation is one of the terms that can be used for the inhibition of a 
proponent emotional response. Limiting its description to ‘inhibition’ would be to consider it 
as a simple dimension of other executive function skills. As reported earlier in this chapter, 
the term ‘effortful control’ has been used to explain the underlying mechanisms of both 
emotional- and cognitive-regulation (Rothbart & Bates ,1998), and both assume a fixed, even 
simplistic, explanation of temperament. They proposed that an attentional network is 
employed in how the regulation of both emotionality and mental control develops (similar to 
an EF explanation). Their summary of the findings overlaps with the accounts of Cole et al., 
(2004; 2008), Saarni (1984) and Kochanska et al. (2007; 2009) who focused on changes in 
the ability of emotional regulation on different age groups. All these authors claim that 
emotional aspects are important in the manifestation of self-regulation. Such an emotion-
based explanation assumes that the affective skills are the crucial driver (as mentioned before 
in sections of 1.2.1 and 1.2.2). Such claim has been made under the labels of ‘temperament 
and ‘effortful control’ which have been used interchangeably with self-regulation.  The 
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model of Campos, Frankel, and Camras (2004) describes emotion regulation as a process of 
generating an emotion in addition to managing emotions that have already been generated.  
Management of emotions may be required since the situations they have been elicited 
in may or may not match with the expectations of social norms or individual relationships. 
Cole and his colleagues (2004) similarly proposed that the emotion regulation concept should 
be considered as a problem solving tool, which involves the organization of attention, activity 
and overcoming of complications with strategic, determined means.  Evidence from 4-and 6-
year olds has demonstrated that expressing and understanding emotions were significantly 
related to the abilities that requires online control of emotions like responding to a 
disappointing event or keeping a secret (Carlson & Wang, 2007). 
Campos et al. (2004) defined the main driving forces of emotion regulation in terms 
of mastering the understanding of emotions and emotionality. In their unitary explanation, 
they argued that both regulation and emotion co-occur in development from the outset. By 
this they meant that there is very high variability in emotion and its regulation, and these two 
processes are key indicators of the flexibility of human problem-solving ability. Campos et 
al. (1978) created an emotion-eliciting situation with infants at the age of 2 to nine months, 
the visual cliff. A visually deceiving glass floor with a deep fall illusion (deep and shallow 
cliffs under the glass) was used, and infants were placed in a position where they were 
required to crawl across on this floor. They reported that, when getting close to deep side of 
the cliff, infants younger than 7-9 months showed decelerating heart rate (suggesting 
attention), whereas toddlers older than 9 months showed accelerating heart rate, apparently 
showing that they sense the danger. This has been interpreted as a bio-behavioural shift by 
Campos.  
Developmental achievements in infancy cannot be directly related to toddlers’ 
behaviour in different setting, but Campos (1994, 2004) suggests that the monitoring function 
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mediates between the identification of feelings and expressions of emotional information in 
ways comparable to those of infants who experience disquiet. The Strange Situation is one 
such example, where a child’s coping with the absence of a parent is emotion-eliciting and 
requires a goal of emotional stability. The skill of modulating the level of emotional arousal 
in a stressful situation can also be described purely in terms of emotional regulation (Saarni, 
Mumme & Campos, 1998).   
The ability to cope with negative affect and its control goes through drastic changes in 
the first year of year life (Eisenberg, Fabes, Murphy, Maszk, Smith, & Karbon, 1995) and it 
continues to develop at the age of 6 (Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000). Rothbart’s 
approach depicts attention systems as the driver of emotion development but the ability to 
develop these skills (effortful control) is constrained by the infant’s temperamental 
characteristics (Rothbart et al, 1989). Posner and Rothbart (2000) claimed that attentional 
control is a neurological foundation. According to their explanation, as the anterior and 
posterior attention mechanisms mature, children gain increasing control of their emotions and 
actions. At the same time an increasing ability to organize input from the environment leads 
to the capacity for sustaining a calm state of mind, delaying gratification, accepting change 
and creating an appropriate cognitive and behavioural response to an environmental cue 
(Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2004). In a stressful situation, young infants may turn their head 
as an act of shifting attention from a stressful situation or try to kick or pull with their legs 
and arms to avoid stress. Children have used the strategies such as disengaging from negative 
emotionality and self-soothing which are also categorized as self-regulatory skills (Rothbart, 
Ziaie, & O’Boyle, 1992).  
The emotional trajectory of Kochanska’s predictions of temperament and conscience 
was focused on the certain emotions that child experiences such as fearfulness and guilt-
proneness (1995, 1997). She found a relation between the early emotionality and the later SR 
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performance; according to her approach the negative emotionality of child in infancy such as 
highly fearful children were better at the internalization of moral values when they received 
gentle maternal discipline. Children were expected to continue to obey the rules when there 
was a strong temptation for them to cheat in a game and no surveillance was available from 
the experimenter who specified the importance of not violating the rules. The fearful 
characteristics of children were assessed by their being exposed to a novel (strange) situation, 
with a fairly scary mask, in a laboratory setting at around age 2-3 years.  
Instead of children’s experiences with certain emotions as such as guilt or fear; the 
goal of this thesis is to explore an emotion-based explanation of regulation that acknowledges 
the necessity of understanding social norms for manipulating one’s emotions (Saarni, 1984; 
Cole, 1986; Liebermann et al., 2007).  Saarni studied older children and her emotional-
competence theory is fundamentally different, as she approached children’s emotional 
abilities in socially constructed and emotionally manipulated situations. She also did not rely 
on parental reports of the child’s experiences. Bridges, Denham and Ganiban (2004) 
conducted a detailed review of ER assessments in the literature. To identify the difficulty of 
defining the construct and suggest that authors’ inferences are often simply due to the chosen 
measurement methods that the select or create. The example of Saarni’s research, above, 
closely matches Bridges et al.’s analysis. Cole, Martin, and Dennis (2004) adapted Bridges et 
al.’s approach to acknowledge the methodological problems in this area. However, they felt 
that there is a resolution to the problem that methods appear to drive theory in the area. They 
argued that emotions must be understood in terms of their functions. Accordingly, when ER 
is identified as a as a tool, it would be expected to regulate arousal, so the inability to hide 
true emotions or desires would be considered as a failed attempt of ER. Keeping in mind that 
creating emotion-inducing situations for young children is going to be hard, to explore 
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children’s changing control over their emotionality, it is necessary to link such ability to goal-
directed behaviours as observed in IC.  
It has been claimed that, at around three years of age, children’s ability to mask their 
feelings is related to their performance in a deception task (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 
1989). Lewis et al. (1989) found that preschoolers peeked at a toy that they were instructed 
not to look at and they verbally denied their misdeed. Children who verbally deceived the 
experimenter also controlled their emotional displays, such as smiling more and appearing 
more relaxed. This result is a little surprising given that children’s understanding of others’ 
mental states or emotion is assumed to be under development at that age (see next section).  
They can deceive in order to achieve a goal even though this demands a level inhibitory 
control that they may have problems with (see section 1.3). The advanced manipulations of 
emotions seen in Lewis et al.’s (1989) study suggest that the studies in this thesis should 
consider not only the regulation of negative emotionality but also of positive emotionality as 
well. For example, a child who cannot contain his or her excitement with new activity in the 
classroom may not deliver the performance that she or he could have. I turn to such issues in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
Affective responses are necessarily inseparable from their context. For example, think 
about your own emotional reaction to a frustrating situation and how different your reaction 
would be whether you were with a close friend or an acquaintance/colleague. For adults as 
well as children, the audience of an emotional display may play a critical role. We therefore 
need to assess how a child attempts to control his or her display of emotions in a situation 
with a stranger. Carlson and Wang (2007) approached ER in a similar way as Saarni’s 
paradigm. Their study is one of the few recent analyses of the critical role of ER in relation to 
cognitively driven explanations such as the executive functions. Although Carlson and Wang 
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(2007) used various measures of emotionality, the significant relationships they reported 
mostly relied on the parental reports of ER rather than online assessments.  
To summarise the structure of what follows in my theoretical analysis in later 
chapters: the reader will become aware that I started by homing in on children’s ER in 
relation to their execution of emotional display rules which are claimed to be related to both 
emotional development and the internalization of social demands. Saarni’s Disappointment 
Paradigm is addressed in more detail in Study 2 which deals with the regulation of negative 
emotionality and its relations with inhibitory control and social understanding. Study 3 shows 
a move towards the ‘understanding’ of the child of emotions. It introduces the literature on 
emotion-comprehension and its influence on the performance of both aspects of self-
regulation.  
From a more applied perspective, a child who is unable to mask to true emotions may 
also fail emotional-regulation and this might lead to the development of negative social, 
emotional, and behavioural outcomes such as risk behaviours such as impulsivity or a lack of 
‘school-readiness’ (Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser 2000). Although, the underlying 
mechanism of for controlling emotionality may be in evidence from infancy to toddlerhood, 
the starting point for this work is milestone of a child’s ability to regulate the arousal of 
emotions successfully. This will allow us to investigate what lies behind any ‘failure’ to 
regulate emotionality or show emotions that may be not socially appropriate, as is often in 
evidence in the preschool period. The child needs to synthesize the rules of omission and 
commission by internalizing social values and norms.  
Thus, instead of parental report, the initial aim is to explore, within similar 
circumstances, children mask their true emotions for the sake an adult that they have only just 
met and with whom they have not developed a close emotional bond. The assessment of ER 
is particularly addressed in terms of its certain qualities, concerning the control of negative or 
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positive feelings. For example, the regulation of positive emotionality is addressed in more 
detail in Study 3 which includes the assessment of children’s ability to control their reactions 
when facing an exciting situation. We continue to add the comprehension of emotionality in 
the coming chapters. Studies 3 and 5 examine this dimension. 
1.5 Social Understanding 
A more in-depth analysis of the literature on Social Understanding will be presented 
in the next chapter when I introduce the first study of this thesis. However, I would like to 
mention three key reasons for the inclusion of social understanding in the search of self-
regulation here, in brief. Social understanding (SU) concerns children’s grasp of different 
perspectives that people might have and includes a range of mental states like desires, 
feelings and beliefs.  The well-known name for mental representation is ‘theory of mind’. 
However, I adopt the term social understanding since it does not imply a theoretical 
orientation (e.g. simulation vs. theory approaches) and refers to a range of social skills that 
serve as a possible stepping stone to self-regulation. These skills encompass emerging self-
awareness and perspective taking and they accommodate the notion of ‘agency’ that underlies 
a grasp of one’s own and other’s needs (Russell, 1996). According to this view, the child’s 
‘agency’ may be depicted as a prerequisite for the emergence of executive control. The term 
agency refers to child’s ability to control his or her experiences; so using it assumes an 
inevitable link between our grasp of the self and the cognitive aspect of self-regulation 
(Russell, 1996). Russell’s view differs from the perspective of most authors of the field, like 
Carlson and Moses. These rely on an individualistic perspective. As mentioned before, 
Zelazo et al. (1997) examine issue of control from a problem solving perspective and 
suggested that control necessitates analysing skills into four sub-skills: problem 
representation, planning, execution (intending and rule use), and evaluation (error detection 
and correction). Children’s ability to represent an abstract problem in their mind is very 
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similar to how they grasp others’ ideas, feelings and beliefs. In the planning stage, children 
have to search the available knowledge reserve or listen to given instructions. Execution 
requires the need to keep memory strength in mind to retain information and the ability to 
apply a rule, or two opposing rules, in order to solve a task. It also may require inhibition of 
other distractions. Evaluation is the realization of that the task is finished, and problem is 
solved by detecting or correcting the errors. The performance of 3-year-old children in both 
executive function and social understanding tasks have been shown to be poorer than 4-and 
5- year olds (e.g. Frye et al., 1995; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003; for a review Moses & 
Tahiroglu, 2010).  
1.6 Summary of Thesis 
This chapter has introduced the reader to the labels that have been used to refer to 
different aspects of self-regulation and their findings that are relevant to cognitive and 
emotional development. I have tried to show that some accounts of the construct suggest that 
self-regulation has been described/defined using a diversity of terms. Some accounts treat 
emotional and cognitive control as being two sides of the same process, while others focus 
exclusively on the latter.  Each chapter in this thesis will focus on a specific relationship to 
examine the dynamics within SR. I would like to give a summary of coming chapters and 
studies that will tackle the relationship between ‘inhibitory control’ and emotional-regulation 
in a consecutive order.  In the next chapter, Study 1 focuses on the discrepancy among 
inhibitory demands and their association to social understanding within a small Turkish 
sample. In Chapter 3, a cross-cultural Study 2 compares Turkish and British children’s 
inhibitory skills with their emotional-regulation in a negative situation. In Chapter 4, Study 3 
widens the assessment of emotional-regulation by measuring positive emotionality and 
emotion-comprehension. The strong relationship between EU and in Study 3 sparked an idea 
of a different assessment of emotion-regulation. The Scale of an Understanding of the 
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Regulation of Emotions (SURE) is developed to measure children’s understanding of 
emotional-regulation and is reported in Chapter 5. Finally, Study 5 was designed to bring 
each construct that was used in the previous studies together to examine the relationship 
between online measurement of regulatory behaviour and the complementary skill of 
‘understanding’ self-regulation, in both its cognitive and emotional aspects.  
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Chapter 2 - Reciprocal Links between Social Understanding and Cognitive 
Regulation 
As Chapter 1 laid out, the constructs that constitute self-regulation will be unpacked 
in a step-by-step manner and in this chapter the understanding of cognition (social 
understanding) in relation to the regulatory skills in cognitive domain will be addressed. 
Before entering the complex area of emotion, the inter-relationship between the cognitive 
domain and its assessment will be discussed.   
The ‘regulation’ in cognitively demanding tasks and ‘understanding’ of others’ minds 
represent key changes in cognitive development, often characterised as the 3-4 shift (e.g., 
Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The relationship between 
these skills has been extensively studied within developmental psychology in the past two 
decades compared to other aspects of self-regulation (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001; Perner & 
Lang, 1999; Russell, 1996). There are two reasons that I started the exploration of self-
regulation within CR and SU which is a well-studied connection in developmental 
psychology literature.  
Firstly, I believe that addressing whether social understanding ignites the 
development of cognitive regulation, or vice versa, is necessary because the role of 
‘understanding’ over ‘regulation’ remains unclear. Although theories on the development of 
both cognitive-control and social-understanding have found one responsible for the other’s 
emergence, the qualities that lie within inhibitory control was reported to differ in terms of 
their association to understanding (Carlson & Moses, 2001). Secondly, the conceptualization 
of cognitive-regulation requires a clarification in terms of its assessment. Thus, the literature 
of social understanding and why it might help children to regulate their behaviour in 
cognitively demanding conditions is presented in this chapter. The construct of cognitive-
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regulation is unpacked here and Study 1 was conducted with 39 Turkish preschool children 
whose performance in social understanding and cognitive-regulation is reported.  
2.1 Assessment of Social Understanding 
As the “understanding of others’ mind” broadens, the competence of representing 
another’s desire, belief, and emotions, is also known as the ‘theory of mind’. However, the 
interactions that an individual shares with other people lies at the core of understanding one’s 
own or others’ minds. Social Understanding (Henceforth SU; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; 
Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Fernyhough, 2008) is the term that is preferred in this thesis.  A 
growing understanding of one’s own and others’ mind is fundamental to engaging with the 
social world. Children come to distinguish between accidental and intended behaviours, 
between wishes and reality, between plans and outcomes, between truth and deception. In this 
respect, the understanding of mind is part of a larger understanding of human action, our 
everyday or common-sense psychology (Harris, 1989). 
Social understanding, henceforth SU, embodies the three following qualities; [1] 
one’s ability to see him/herself as the beholder of mental representations; [2] the ability to 
understand that other individuals are entitled to their own mental representations; [3] the 
ability to alter actions based on the understanding of others’ different mental representations 
(e.g. Astington,1993; Perner, 1991). From an early age, children start to appreciate that a 
person’s desire or belief of a situation might differ from the reality (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001). The literature that I refer to regarding SU is one of the most studied areas of 
developmental psychology in the past thirty years. For measuring children’s recognition of 
beliefs (or epistemic states) as the reason for an action, now well-known ‘unexpected change’ 
task was introduced by Wimmer and Perner (1983).  In this task, a puppet protagonist- Maxi 
hides his chocolate in one location (e.g. in a blue box) prior to leaving the room. When he is 
absent, his mother places his chocolate in another location (e.g. in a red box). Children were 
   Chapter 2-Study 1 
31 
 
asked on behalf of Maxi where he should look for his chocolate.  The correct response (i.e. 
looking for it in the blue box) indicated the recognition of Maxi’s belief that mismatched the 
reality. Children’s appreciation of Maxi’s lack of information about the change of events was 
reported to emerge between the ages of 4 and 6 years.   
Perner, Leekam and Wimmer (1987) contributed to the methodology with the 
‘unexpected content’ task which demonstrated children’s attribution of false belief of their 
own mental states. Children were presented with a well-known package of an object (e.g. a 
candy box, a crayon box, a band-aid box) but not containing the known object (e.g. 
containing a pencil instead).  The performance difference between 3- and 4- year - olds 
suggested that younger children were unable to refer to their earlier false belief in this task.  
Older children, on the other hand, were able to admit their mistaken belief that they reported 
earlier. Despite the popularity of the false belief performance to measure such mental 
representational skills, it has been considered a rather narrow test of the understanding of the 
mind (Astington, 2001; Chandler 1988). As a result, a measure of others’ intentions, beliefs, 
desires, emotions and knowledge was scaled in a developmental sequence by Liu and 
Wellman (2004). In their developmental progression, they claim that children’s desire 
reasoning is one of the earliest emerging abilities of SU which is followed by the 
understanding of belief and emotions.  
According to the earlier findings from Bartsch and Wellman (1989), children as 
young as 2-year-olds were able to pass reasoning tasks when others’ desires were in question 
but they fail to pass in the belief tasks. Although there are conflicting theoretical explanations 
for the source of the ability, false belief performance was found to be in consensus in the 
meta-analysis of 178 studies of Wellman et al. (2001). Children were able to pass false belief 
tasks, reflecting on both self and others, by the age of 4 or 5 year-olds (e.g., Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Harris, 1994; Leslie, 1994; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 
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1990; Wellman & Liu 2004). Thus, understanding of desire emerges before false belief 
understanding and a grasp of conflicting emotions emerges even later. According to this 
scale, in Study 1, I only employed the false belief tasks. Later studies though will present a 
wider assessment of understanding of emotions (Chapter 4) and meta-understanding of 
emotionality in social situations (Chapter 5).   
For the psychological qualities that play a part in the development of SU, there are a 
few theories that I need to mention, to clarify the position of SU in development of self-
regulation. So far, the inclusion of SU in explaining self-regulatory skills may sound like an 
overambitious prediction. However, the theories defining how children are able to pass false-
belief tasks have been used to guide the search for this relationship. From infancy to 
toddlerhood true voluntary control of behaviour and self-regulation emerge in a more active 
way (Kopp, 1982). In the first 2 years of life, children develop a grasp of orienting attention 
from others (Reddy, 2003). This can be seen in terms of emerging attentional abilities but it is 
also the beginning of the child’s recognition of his or her own impact on other people. Recent 
theoretical analysis suggests that the ability to make a distinction between first-person 
experiences and third person observations is required for self-consciousness (Reddy, 2003). 
In addition to expanding an awareness of one’s social surroundings, the development of 
regulatory skills goes through a change in the preschool years. The quality of this change has 
been based on the child’s more general achievements in understanding symbolic 
representations (Bronson, 2000).  Parallel changes in the ability to understand others and gain 
better control of self are generally observed at a similar stage of development around ages 3 
to 5.   
Since most of the studies have focused on children’s better control under the lens of 
executive functions, two conflicting but intertwined explanations are in place. Young 
children’s poor performance in the false belief tasks were claimed to stem from the limited or 
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yet-not-emerged skills of cognitive control (e.g. Russell, 1996; Carlson & Moses, 2001). In 
contrast, children’s better performance on being able to build an accurate mental 
representation was claimed to be the key to their better performance in executive function 
tasks (e.g. Perner, 1998; Perner & Lang, 1999). ‘Executive functions’ are considered to be 
multifaceted, consisting of three core components: Inhibitory control (IC), Working memory 
and Cognitive flexibility (i.e. shifting). Each of these components has been used to explain 
children’s shortcomings in false belief tasks (these components were addressed in Chapter 1).  
In a false belief task, the child is required to suppress his or her own perspective or 
true knowledge about the situation in order to give a correct response. Thus, a lack of IC may 
prevent children from suppressing their own perspectives. This assumption was supported by 
longitudinal findings in which early cognitive-control performance was found to predict later 
false belief performance (e.g. Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Hughes & Ensor, 2008). 
Another assumption was that children’s limited working memory prevented preschoolers 
from recalling the protagonist’s newly acquired perspective and led to the failure of the false 
belief task (Davis& Pratt, 1995; Gordon & Olson, 1998).  Limited working memory and/ or 
IC were reported as  responsible for  failing false belief tasks based on correlational findings 
(e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, Moses, & Brenton, 2002; Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 
1995; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003; Hughes, 1998; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002).  
The alternation of the demands of both IC and WM were applied to false belief tasks 
to demonstrate the specifics of their contribution to SU. The increasing WM demands made it 
harder for 4 year-olds to pass the false belief task (Leslie & Polizzi, 1998).  Nonetheless, in 
order to lower WM demand, Freeman and Lacohée (1995) simplified the response from 
verbal expression to the selection of a picture and showed that children were able to pass a 
false belief task earlier.  However, rather than identifying a direct link between WM and SU, 
the association of IC and SU was explained through the combination of WM and IC (e.g. 
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Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). Carlson and Moses (2001) 
acknowledged that the association that IC shared with SU was dependent on the demands of 
IC tasks. The IC tasks with low WM demand required the child to inhibit an inappropriate 
response for a period of time. They were categorized as Delay tasks and were found to be 
associated with SU. However, when other factors were taken into account, SU performance 
was not predicted by the Delay performance.  
On the other hand, tasks that combined both inhibitory and WM demands required the 
child to hold (at least) two conflicting responses. One of those responses would be natural to 
the child such as imitating or labelling what she or he sees and this is considered as a 
dominant response. A task that requires the child to suppress an initially dominant response 
(e.g. imitating an action) and elicits an instructed respond (i.e., not imitating) creates a 
conflict between those salient and less salient responses. The performance in what are 
categorized as Conflict tasks was found to be a predictor of SU performance. In the next 
section, the assessment of Conflict and Delay will be addressed.  
Although studies conducted in Western cultures found more robust parallels in the 
development of three executive components and  social understanding, some of the evidence 
from other cultures demonstrated an early emergence of  IC (Oh & Lewis, 2008) or SU 
(Lucas, Lewis, Pala, Wong, & Berridge, 2013) performance.  The performance of children 
from Eastern Asian cultures in the executive function tasks is reported to be more advanced 
in the  early  years of development compared to children from Western cultures (e.g. Lewis, 
Koyasu, Oh, Ogawa, Short, & Huang, 2009) According to evidence from Oh and Lewis 
(2008), the performance of 3.5- and 4-year-olds Korean children in working memory and 
false belief tasks was similar to age-matched British children, although Korean children 
performed at ceiling in IC and shifting tasks. Similarly, Chinese preschoolers also 
outperformed their peers from the United States in IC and shifting tasks (Lan, Legare, Ponitz, 
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Li & Morrison, 2011; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). Sabbagh et al. (2006) 
proposed a possible genetic explanation for children’s advanced performance, yet they 
admitted that the difference might be grounded on a culture that promotes respect and 
compliance to the authority figures (e.g. elderly and/ or parents) and highlights the value of 
self-regulation (e.g., Chen et al., 1998; Tobin, Karasawa, & Yeh, 2009).  Lucas et al. (2012) 
also reported that Chinese preschoolers were advanced in their performance in IC and 
shifting tasks compared to age – matched British and Turkish children.   
From a cultural perspective, Turkish culture stands on a transitional state between the 
individualistic values of the West and collectivistic values of the East (see Kagitcibasi, 1995). 
Moreover, the use of evidentiality markers in the Turkish language might help children to 
grasp skills like source monitoring which promote an early success in false belief tasks 
(Aksu-Koc, Balaban, & Alp, 2009; Aksu-Koç, 2009).  Prior to the cross-cultural comparison 
on both emotional and cognitive self-regulation performances in Turkish and British children 
(Chapter 3), Study 1 aimed to replicate the findings reported on the relationship between SU 
and IC.   
2.2 Inhibitory Control (IC) 
Even though IC has been introduced earlier in this chapter in terms of its relation to 
SU, the issue of its assessment ought to be addressed. Two categories of IC have already been 
introduced above. Garon, Bryson, and Smith (2008) categorized the conflict tasks as 
assessments of complex response inhibition and the delay tasks as simple response inhibition. 
As one of the earliest examples of a Conflict task, children as young as two and a half were 
found to be good at following a single instruction in Luria’s light bulb task (1961). In this 
task, children were asked to squeeze the bulb when the signal light was on but not to squeeze 
it if the light was off or a different coloured light was flashing. Although young children were 
good at following the first half of the instruction, they persevered when the light was off or 
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different.  Around the age of 5, children were able to inhibit their action and also act 
according to the second half of the instruction - not squeezing when the signal light was off. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Mischel’s Marshmallow test was one of the most well-known 
delay tasks.  In the last two decades, though, many more tasks of IC were designed and 
longitudinal findings on the development of IC from 8-months to school age were provided 
(Kochanska et al., 1996; Kochanska, Murray, & Coy, 1997; Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 
2000; Kochanska, Tjebkes, & Forman, 1998). Kochanska and her colleagues are responsible 
for the various tasks that have been widely used in the literature. Carlson (2005) also 
provided a recent review of the tasks that have been used to assess IC in preschool children 
with cross-sectional data.   
2.2.1 Assessment of Conflict 
As described in the example above, in a Conflict task the child is asked to inhibit his 
or her naturally salient response to the situation and alter his/her response according to a 
certain rule that she or he needs to represent in mind. The tasks that are commonly used in the 
assessment of Conflict performance of preschoolers were presented with the references to 
their developers in Table 2.1. What is presented here is a brief summary of the key tests that 
have been employed to assess these skills. Not only is the demand of WM in these tasks 
moderate (e.g. representing the rule in mind through the task), but also the verbal demand is 
moderately high in Conflict tasks. For example, Strommen (1973) used the” Simon Says” 
game that requires the child to understand complex verbal instructions. Compared to Luria’s 
dual ‘squeeze or not squeeze’ response conflict, there are fewer motor responses to be 
engaged or inhibited in the Simon Says task.  While the experimenter is engaging in motor 
actions such as ‘clapping hands’ or ‘touching nose’ in front of the child, the latter’s natural 
response would be to imitate the experimenter’s gestures. According to the rule of the game 
though, the child is supposed to respond only when the experimenter says ‘Simon says’. If 
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the experimenter does not use this expression, the child is supposed to remain still and not 
perform the gestures. Simon Says was reported as a difficult task to pass even for 4-and 5 –
year-olds (Carlson, 2005). The children were supposed to refrain from performing an action 
that an adult demonstrates and articulates as an instruction simultaneously. Children were 
supposed to listen to the cue and act accordingly but in face of visual and verbal stimulation, 
a short cue must be difficult to catch.  A similar but simpler initiation-suppression task, the 
Bear/ Dragon Game was developed by Reed, Pien, and Rothbart (1984). Children are asked 
to comply/ do the commands that are given by the Bear puppet but, refrain doing the ones 
given by the Dragon puppet. The studies that employed this task report age differences from 
3 to 5 years (e.g. Carlson, 2005; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, 
Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Cole & Mitchell, 2000; Diamond, 1991). Carlson (2005) 
specifically reports the changes occurring at the age of 3. The success rate of passing this task 
is 51% for the younger 3- year-olds whereas, 76% of the older 3-year-olds are successful.  
The Stroop-like tasks are less verbally exacting but are demanding of the children’s 
understanding of semantics in terms of engaging a game. In the Reverse Categorization task, 
Carlson, Mandell and Williams (2004) report an improvement on the performance of sorting  
small and large items into conflicting boxes (i.e. putting small items into a bucket with a large 
items label and vice versa) from age 2 to 3. Tasks like Grass/Snow and Day/Night mark a 
performance difference between 3-and 5-year-olds. In the Grass/Snow task, when the 
experimenter says, ‘Grass’,  a child is instructed to point to the white mat and when the 
experimenter says, ‘Snow’, a child is supposed to point to the green mat. Children are unable 
to pass this task until around the age of 4.5 years (e.g. Carlson, 2005). In a similar task, 
Day/Night, children are presented with two sets of cards one depicting the sun and the other 
depicting the moon and stars.  The prepotent response of the children would be to call out 
what they see on the cards but what is expected from them is to do the opposite.  In a 
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longitudinal analysis, children’s performance was reported to improve significantly from 3.5 
to 7 years (Diamond et al., 1997). 
Table 2. 1 
The List of Tasks for  Assessment of Conflict Performance of  Preschool Children   
 Salient Response  Desired Response Reference 
No. of 
Citation 
Simon Says Imitate every 
action  
Only imitate the 
actions that starts 
with ‘Simon Says’ 
Strommen (1973) 64 
Bear/Dragon Do all moves both 
Bear and Dragon 
instructs  
Do only what 
Bear instructs and 
Do not do what 
Dragon instructs 
Reed et al. (1984) 206 
Day/Night Label the cards 
according to the 
pictures on them. 
(e.g. call ‘Day’ 
when see the 
‘Sun’ card) 
Label/Name the 
cards as the 
opposites of the 
pictures on them 
(e.g. call ‘Day’ 
when  they see the 
‘Moon’ card 
Gerstadt et al. (1994) 834 
Standard DCSS Sorting the cards 
according to the 
previous rule  
Sorting the cards 
according to the 
new rule 
Frye et al. (1995); 
Zelazo et al. (2003)  
697/605 
Whisper Shout the name of 
the cartoon 
characters on the 
cards  
Whisper the name 
of the cartoon 
characters on the 
cards 
Kochanska et al. (1996) 617 
Hand Game Imitate the hand 
gestures of E’s 
(e.g. gesture a fist 
when E was 
making a fist) 
Do the opposite of  
E’s hand gesture 
(e.g. gesture a fist 
when E was 
pointing an index 
finger)  
Hughes (1998), from 
Luria et al. (1964) 
470 
     




2.2.2 Assessment of Delay  
The tasks that require suppressing the response altogether, or postpone it for a period, 
are named as Delay tasks. Common procedures used to assess preschoolers’ performance are 
presented in Figure 2.2. There are two types of delay tasks. One of them observes the waiting 
period and how the child copes with the frustration of the situation. The performance is 





Look for the 
previous location 
of the reward 
 
Look for the new 
location of the 
reward 
 
Zelazo et al. (1998) 
 
74 
Shape Stroop Point at  the large 
shape for sorting 
the large items  
Point at  the small 
shape for sorting 
the large items 
Kochanska et al. (2000) 981 
Spatial Conflict Press the key on  
the same side as  
the target  
Press the key that 
is opposite the 
target 
Gerardi-Caulton (2000) 251 
Grass/Snow Point at the same 
colour with the 
cue word (e.g. 
point at the  green 
mat when the E 
says ‘Grass’) 
Point at the 
opposite colour as 
the cue indicates 
(e.g. point at the  
green mat when 
the E says 
‘Snow’) 
Carlson & Moses (2001) 1168 
Reverse 
Categorization 
Sort the items 
using  matching 
labels (e.g. 
placing the baby 
animals in baby 
bucket) 
Sort the items 
using  conflicting 
labels (e.g. 
placing the baby 
animals in 
mommy bucket 
Carlson, Mandell, & 
Williams (2004) 
360 
Less is More To gain the bigger 
reward, pointing 
at the bigger 
reward  
To gain the bigger 
reward, pointing 
at the smaller 
reward 
Carlson, Davis, & Leach 
(2005) 
136 
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The observation of the child’s coping during the delay time can be unstructured such as in 
Mischel’s (1971) Delay of Gratification paradigm (DoG).  In DoG, the child is offered one 
marshmallow now but if she or he waits until the experimenter is back then she or he would 
receive two marshmallows instead. The participant has a bell to stop the waiting period and 
call for the experimenter to have one marshmallow. The interpretations of how the 
preschoolers cope with the delay are based on how much attention children pay to the reward 
in front of them. The time was increased when the child’s attention was not focused on the 
consummatory properties of the reward, but when the child’s focus was on the reward the 
time of waiting was decreased (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel & Moore, 1973). 
However, early studies did not provide any insight to age differences. Children’s ability to 
wait before ringing the bell increased during the preschool years (Atance & Jackson, 2009). 
In a cross-sectional sample, Carlson (2005) reported that half of the 2-year-olds were able to 
delay around 20 seconds but at the age of 3 children were mostly likely (85%) to wait around 
a minute. At the age of 4, children (72%) were able to wait for the treat up to 5 minutes.  The 
difficulty of the task was mostly determined by the naïve interpretation that all kids love 
sweets. The other properties of DoG that need to be mentioned are that the children are in 
charge of their choice of waiting or not and they can end the waiting whenever they want. 
The experimenter leaves the child alone with the temptation. The three varying properties of 
the task (presence or absence of the experimenter, the type of the reward and its size) seem to 
influence the child’s performance.  
A more structured version of this task was called Snack Delay and was developed by 
Kochanska et al. (1996). In their version, children were asked to wait until the experimenter 
ends the waiting period which varied from 10 seconds to half of a minute. McCabe and 
Brooks-Gunn (2007) modified the task by adding a 60 second trial. The evidence from the 
structured version of Snack Delay task was similar to the DoG findings in which Kochanska 
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et al. (1996; 2000) reported an improvement of the performance from the ages of 22 to 56 
months. McCabe and Brooks-Gunn measured the performance in a 10-point scale, based on 
how children behave during the delay period trial (i.e. moving towards, and/or touches the 
treat). They found that from the sample of 116 children whose ages ranged from 3 to 5, only 
32% of them demonstrated high levels of performance, with a maximum of 10 points (out of 
10), 68% of the children demonstrated some evidence of not being able to cope with the 
frustration of waiting and the average score out of four trials was 7.5. Snack Delay tasks are 
conducted with structured waiting periods involving the experimenter in the same room with 
the child having no control over when the delay is going to be ended. The Gift Delay task 
was also developed by Kochanska et al. (1996). There are two versions. In the Gift 
Delay/Wrapping version, children are asked not to peek in the experimenter’s direction while 
it is getting wrapped for around 60 seconds. In the Gift Delay/Bow version, children are 
asked not to touch their wrapped present until the experimenter comes back with a bow to put 
onto it. Performance in both Gift Delay tasks is very similar to Snack Delay task with regard 
to the age changes witnessed (Kochanska et al., 1996).  
Instead of observing coping throughout a delay period or measuring the length of 
waiting, the ‘choice’ tasks are another way of assessing the Delay performance. The 
Choice/Delay Task takes the child’s preference between an immediate smaller reward and a 
delayed larger reward into account. The number of times that the child chooses the delayed 
reward over the trials is used as the dependent variable. Lemmon and Moore (2001; 2007) 
demonstrated that from 3 to 5 years, children tend to choose delayed rewards more frequently 
as they grow older.  At the age of 4, children were more likely to choose delayed rewards and 
they reflected an understanding of the size differences between immediate and delayed 
choices (Lemmon & Moore, 2007). An alternative, nine- trial Choice/Delay was adapted 
from Thompson, Barresi, and Moore (1997) by Prencipe and Zelazo (2005) with three 
   Chapter 2-Study 1 
42 
 
different sizes and type of rewards. Three type of reward are stickers, pennies, and sweets. 
Three different sizes of delayed rewards were 2 later, 4 later, and 6 later, all compared to 1 
now.  In a study comparing the performances of 3, 4, and 5-year-olds, Hongwanishkul, 
Happaney, Lee, and Zelazo (2005) reported that the youngest group was less likely to choose 
a delayed reward compared to the older children who were more likely to prefer a larger-
delayed reward. The performance of 3-year-olds was found to be significantly different to the 
older children (Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005; Hongwaniskul et al., 2005) but the performance did 
not differ between the 4-and 5-year-olds.  
Both waiting and choice tasks were differed in their application but both demonstrated 
similar findings on the age differences. As mentioned earlier, Study1 aims to demonstrate the 
disassociation within the IC, through their (Conflict and Delay) relation to SU. The 9 trial 
Choice/Delay task appeared to be more practical compared to ‘waiting’ Delay tasks as it took 
a shorter time to administer. In Study 1, only a Choice/Delay task is employed to represent 
the delay demand of IC.  
STUDY 1 
  This study mainly aimed to replicate the previous finding of Carlson and Moses 
(2001) that IC is diverse in its demands and is associated closely with SU. As mentioned 
above the evidence from cross-cultural studies demonstrates that Turkish children differ from 
their Western peers in terms of their performance in false belief tasks. Prior to addressing the 
cultural differences on the relationship of cognitive-and emotional- regulatory mechanisms, 
the purposes of Study 1 are, firstly, to demonstrate the predictive relationship between 
Conflict and False Belief performance. Figure 2.1 summarizes the connections that are 
explored in Study 1. It measures both Conflict and Delay-inhibition but the prediction is that 
only the former will show a relationship. Both Inhibitory Control measures were used in 
order to do some preparatory work towards the later studies (see Chapter 3). Secondly, by 
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including tasks of WM and Shifting in addition to IC, the role of conflict inhibition can be 
compared with that of other closely related executive skills. 







Thirty-nine Turkish (24 male) children participated in the study. To capture the 
mental transition (e.g. Russell, 1996), 3- and 4-year-old children were randomly sampled 
from a nursery school in Bursa that serves mostly to the middle- and upper-middle class 
families. Their age ranged from 2 to 5 (M = 49.8 months, SD= 8.2, range: 28-60 months). 
Through sampling, slightly younger or older children than the age groups intended were 
recruited (two 2-year-old (34 months) and one 5-year-olds with (60 months)).Parental 
consent was obtained through the school administration.  Children were also asked for their 
consent/ willingness to start or continue before every task. One further child was removed 
from the analysis having failed to complete the experiment.  
Procedure 
 Children were tested individually in a quiet room of their nursery. Tasks were 
administered in a fixed order. The false belief tasks (5) were administered in the first place. 
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The IC measure comprised of both Conflict and Delay dimensions. All tasks within a 
category were counterbalanced among their own category to avoid carry-over effects.  
Conflict Measures  
In the Day/ Night Task (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994), participants have to 
inhibit their quick tendency of responding to what they see. The children were presented with 
16 cards that had a picture of the sun on 8 of them and the picture of the moon on 8 of them. 
The children were given the instruction that they have to say ‘night’ when they see the picture 
of the sun, and they should say ‘day’ when they see the moon in the picture. Each child had 
two practice trials and 16 test trials. Each correct response was scored with 1 point. The 
practice trials were counted as well; a minimum score was zero and the maximum was 16.    
In Snow /Grass task (Carlson & Moses, 2001), children were presented with two 
square sheets of paper one was plain green and one was plain white. Then children were 
asked what colour grass and snow is. If they were wrong about pairing the colours with 
objects, they were given training about the colours and the object matter. They were then 
instructed about the game which was to point to the colour that was not named.   The 
experimenter E said: “In this game, I want you to point to the green sheet when I say snow 
and I want you to point to the white sheet when I say grass. “When the child had understood 
the instruction, the task started with two test trials, which were followed, by 16 test trials in a 
pseudo-random order. 
Delay Measure 
The Delay of Gratification-Choice task was an adaptation of Hongwanishkul et al., 
(2005) which was originally developed by Thompson et al. (1997). Three types of rewards 
(stickers, pennies, and candies) were presented with three types of choice. Children were 
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presented with each item with the following choices: “[1] Would you prefer to have one (e.g. 
sticker) now or two (e.g. stickers) later?, [2] Would you prefer to have one (e.g. penny) now 
or four (e.g. pennies) later?, [3] Would you prefer to have one (e.g. candy) now or  six (e.g. 
candies) later?”  There were two practice trials with non-test choices. Those were “one now 
or one later” and “one now or eight later”.  In these practice trials, the demonstrator, E, 
demonstrated the preferences.  In the first practice trial, a neutral choice of “one now or one 
later” was demonstrated and E made a random choice. In the second practice trial, E showed 
preference towards the more rewarding delayed choice by choosing “eight later” in the “one 
now or eight later” choice. In the test trials, E presented the objects and explained the 
choices. Then she asked the child, ‘Which one do you prefer?’ If the child preferred an 
immediate reward, she or he was allowed to eat the candy, stick the sticker or put a penny in 
a penny box. If the child chose a delayed reward, the rewards were collected in special 
envelope for later by E. There were nine trials. The preference toward delayed rewards was 
scored as 1 point. The preference toward immediate rewards was scored as 0.  
Social Understanding (False Belief) Measures 
There were 5 false belief tasks: two unexpected content, two unexpected transfer and 
one appearance-reality false belief task. These were very similar versions to Wimmer and 
Perner’s procedure (1983; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), with one major change. By 
changing the way the key test question[s] were asked, an alternative version of each false 
belief task was developed. One group of children was exposed to the questions with a direct 
evidentiality marker –DI and the other group was exposed to the indirect/general knowledge 
deduction marker –DIR. In one set of  each unexpected transfer and content false belief tasks, 
the test question included a mental verb (THINK) while in the other  it was asked with an 
action verb (LOOK FOR and SAY). Test questions were presented with different 
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evidentiality markers. Turkish and English versions of test and control questions are provided 
in Appendix 2.1.  
In Unexpected Content Task (1), children were presented with a ‘Band-Aid box’, 
which contains a wooden butterfly instead of band-aids. E showed the box to participants and 
asked the question, ‘what is in the box?’ She then opened the lid and took out a wooden 
butterfly. The participant was then asked two test questions. The first question referred to the 
false belief of a third party: ‘If (friend’s name) came over here now and I showed him the 
box, what he would say was inside, before I open it?’ The correct response was ‘band-aid’. If 
the child identified a false belief she scored 1 point. The second question referred to the 
respondent’s previous false belief: ‘What did you first think was inside the box?’ The correct 
response was again ‘band-aid’, if that child acknowledged his or her previous state of mind. 
An incorrect answer such as ‘a butterfly’ or ‘toy’ scored zero.  The order of the questions was 
counter balanced via Latin Square.  
In the second unexpected content task (2), children were presented with a ‘colouring 
pencil box’, which contained a teaspoon instead of colouring pencils. E showed the colouring 
pencil box to participants and asked the question, “what is in the box?”. She then opened the 
lid and pulled out a teaspoon. The participant was then asked two test questions. The first 
question referred to the false belief of a third party: “If (friend’s name) came over here now 
and I showed him the box, what he would say was inside, before I open it?”. The second 
question referred to the respondent’s previous false belief: “What did you first think was 
inside the box?’’ The correct response was ‘pencil’, showing that the child acknowledged his 
or her previous state of mind. An incorrect response was ‘a teaspoon’ as it was not 
acknowledging the prior false belief about the content of the box.  
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In the Unexpected Transfer Task (1), the researcher used two puppets to present a 
scenario (named Puppy and Cow). Each puppet owned a container with a distinctive shape, 
which were their toy boxes. E enacted a short scenario for the children using the boxes and 
dolls. Puppy (one of the puppets) was seen to place a toy car in her container, and then ‘goes 
out’ to play. Cow (the second puppet) moves the toy car from Puppy’s container to its own 
container (e.g. a box or a purse) while Puppy is away. The participants were then asked a test 
question: ‘Where will Bunny look for the ball?’ and two control questions: a memory 
question ‘Where did Bunny put its ball in the beginning?’ and a reality control question 
‘Where is the ball really?’ The correct response for the test questions was Puppy’s container. 
If the children pointed to the changed location, they were not acknowledging the Puppy’s 
false belief about the situation and their response was considered incorrect.  
 In the second unexpected transfer task (2), the researcher used two puppets (Bunny 
and Duck) to present a new scenario. Each puppet owned a container but in different shapes, 
which are their toy boxes. The researcher enacted a short scenario for the children using the 
boxes and dolls. Bunny (one of the puppets) was seen to place a toy clock in her container, 
and then she ‘goes out’ to play. Duck (the second puppet) moves the toy clock from Bunny’s 
container to its own container (e.g. a box or a purse) while Bunny is away. The participants 
were then asked a test question: ‘Where will Bunny look for the ball?’ and two control 
questions: a memory question ‘Where did Bunny put its ball in the beginning?’ and a reality 
control question, ‘Where is the ball really?’  
Additional Executive Function Measures  
The Dimensional Change Card- Sort task was used to measure children’s flexibility 
in between two different sets of rules. The task was adapted from the original paradigm of 
Frye, Zelazo and Palfai (1995). In this task, a set of 16 test cards was presented which consist 
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of 8 red flowers and 8 blue umbrellas. Two target cards (blue flower and red umbrella) were 
demonstrated, each matching the test cards in only one dimension, colour or shape. Children 
were firstly invited to play the ‘colour’ game as the pre-switch rule phase.  In the colour 
game, participants were asked to sort the test cards according to colour: red flowers (test 
card) put in the tray under the red umbrella (target card) and blue umbrellas (test card) put in 
the blue tray under a test card showing a blue flower. After two practices and 14 test trials, 
the game was changed (to the shape game): participants were asked to sort test cards 
according to shape in this post-switch rule phase: red flowers were put in the (blue) flowers 
tray, blue cars put in the (red) cars tray. There were two practice trials to test participants’ 
knowledge of colour and shape, followed by 14 test trials during which their performances 
were recorded.  Every correct placement of the test cards was scored with one point and the 
accumulated score out of 16 trials (the first two practice trials were counted as well) was 
taken into analysis. 
The Eight- Boxes Task was used to measure children’s ability of working memory and 
was adapted from Diamond, Prevor, Callender, and Druin (1997). Eight identically shaped 
but differently designed boxes were placed on the table. One sticker was placed in each box, 
in front of the child. In preparation, the boxes were displayed on the table. The experimenter 
asked the child to open the lids of all the boxes. She let the child put one of the stickers into a 
box. She also asked for the child’s help to close all the lids of the boxes. Every time the child 
picked out the sticker from the box, an empty box was mixed up with the other boxes. The 
array of boxes was scrambled for approximately 7-8 seconds by the experimenter before 
every trial. The challenge was to remember which boxes they had already opened, and then to 
choose a box that still had a sticker in it. Each child was given 16 trials to find all the stickers. 
The number of trials a child needed in order to find all the stickers was recorded. A smaller 
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number of trials that a child needed indicated a better performance. For children who could 
not find all of the stickers in 16 trials, 1 point was added to their score.  
Table 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics for all variables by age  
 
Measures Min Max      Overall 
 
Mean       SD 
3-year-olds 
 
Mean       SD 
4-year-olds 
 
Mean         SD 
 
Day/Night Task  1 16 13.97 3.01 13.07 3.71  14.54   2.40  
 
Snow/Grass Task 8 16 14.72 2.18 14.07   2.71  15.13    1.70  
     




0 8 5.05 2.54  3.13 2.75    6.25  1.48  
DCSS (Switch)  0 16 12.03 6.04 10.06   6.28  13.25 5.67  
 
Eight Box (trials) 8 17 12.00 3.70 14.60 2.95 10.38 3.19  
 
Results 
The design of Study 1 was set up to investigate False Belief and its relation to the 
separate demands of Inhibitory Control within a sample of Turkish preschoolers. Each task in 
Study 1 was first analysed for the effect of age. In Table 2.2, the mean scores for both age 
groups are presented and they will be explained further below.   
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Comparisons by Age and Gender 
Conflict Measures  
The Day/ Night Task. At the end of 16 trials, a total score was calculated. A correct 
response in each trial would result in a maximum score of 16. The minimum score would be 
0. As presented in Table 2.2, the mean scores of both age groups were near to the ceiling. To 
diminish the effects of this negative skew, the performance was transformed by Square Root. 
The analysis of variance by Age X Gender was conducted using this new (transformed) 
measure and revealed no effect of age, gender, or their interaction in the Day/Night 
performance, F (1, 39) = 2.01, p=.17, p
2= .05; F (1, 39) = 2.56, p=.12, p
2= .07; F (1, 39) = 
.33, p=.57, p
2= .01.  
The Snow/Grass Task. Following 16 pseudo-random trials, the maximum score 
obtained was 16. Similar to the Day/Night task, the performance of both age groups was near 
ceiling in the Snow/Grass. The scores were transformed by Square Root. The analysis of 
variance with Age X Gender revealed no significant effect of none of the dependent 
variables, F (1, 39) = 2.27, p=.14, p
2= .06; F (1, 39) = .002, p=.96, p
2= .00 F (1, 39) =.004, 
p=.95, p
2= .00. 
Delay Measure  
The Delay of Gratification- Choice Task. The child’s choice of the larger, delayed 
reward was scored as 1 point. The choice of smaller, immediate reward was scored as zero-
point. Through nine trials, the maximum score which can be obtained was 9 and a minimum 
score was zero. Unexpectedly, the mean performance of 3-year-olds was higher than their 
older peers (please see Table 2.2). An analysis of variance by Age and Gender was 
conducted. The same procedure from Hongwanishkul et al. (2005) was used but their finding 
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of the main effect of age on performance was not found, F (1, 39) = 1.75, p=.19, p
2= .05.  
Similar to their findings, neither the effect of gender F (1, 39) = .06, p=.81, p
2= .00, nor the 
interaction between age and gender were significant F (2, 39) =.49, p=.49, p
2= .01. 
False Belief (Social Understanding) Measures 
In all tasks, children’s correct response of acknowledging the puppet’s false belief 
was scored as 1 point.  The incorrect responses were scored as zero-point. The self and 
others’ false belief answers were tested separately for age, type of verb used and 
evidentiality. The questions were put into two groups of evidentiality markers: –DI and –
DIR; in any of the false belief questions. There was no effect of evidentiality markers on false 
belief performance as the t-test analysis suggested, so the analysis is not reported here.  
The Unexpected Content Tasks. There were two unexpected content tasks and they 
contained both self- and others’- false belief questions. The questions were asked with a 
mental verb (e.g. THINK) in one of the tasks, and in the other one, questions were asked with 
an action verb (e.g. SAY).  In Task 1 (Mental verb), a chi-square test for association showed 
a significant association between age and self-false belief performance, χ2(1) = 9.78, p < .01, 
Cramer’s V = .50. The same analysis with others’ false belief also showed significant 
association χ2(1) = 6.50, p < .01, . V= .41. As Table 2.3 illustrates 4-year-old preschoolers 
were significantly above chance on self-false belief measure with a ‘mental verb’: P <.001.  
In Task 2 (Action Verb), a chi-square test for association showed significant association 
between age and self-false belief performance, χ2(1) = 17.81, p < .01, V= .68. The same 
analysis with the other’s false belief also showed significant association χ2(1) = 6.62, p < .01, 
V,=.41. As Table 2.3.1 illustrates, in the task with ‘action verb’, 4-year-olds in both self- and 
others’ false belief measures were significantly above chance: P<.001  




Number of children who responded to Unexpected Content FB 1 (THINK) 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)   P 
Self    3 Right  6 40 0.61 
 Wrong 9 60 
   4 Right 21 88 0.00 
Wrong 3 13 
Others    3 
  
Right 2 13 0.01 
Wrong 13 87 
   4 Right 13 54  0.84 
Wrong 11 46 
 
Table 2.3.1 
Number of children who responded to Unexpected Content FB 2 (SAY) 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)  P 
Self    3 Right 5 33 0.30 
 Wrong 10 67 
   4 Right 23 96 0.00 
Wrong 1 04 
Others    3 
  
Right 5 33 0.30 
Wrong 10 67 
   4 Right 18 75  0.02 
Wrong 6 25 
 
The Unexpected Transfer Tasks. There were two unexpected transfer tasks and both 
only included the others’ false belief question. In Task 1 (Mental verb), a chi-square test for 
association was not significant between age and the other’s false belief performance, χ2(1) = 
1.24, ns. Tables 2.4 illustrates that children’s performance in this task with the mental verb 
was at chance for both age groups. In Task 2 (Action verb), a chi-square test for association 
showed significant association between age and others’-false belief performance, χ2(1) = 
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10.23, p < .01., V = .51. The 4-year-old preschoolers’ were significantly above chance on this 
measure when the question was asked with an action verb: P <.001, as Table 2.4.1 displays.  
Table 2.4 
Number of children who responded to Unexpected Transfer FB 3 (THINK) 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)   P 
Others    3 Right  6 40 0.61 
 Wrong 9 60 
   4 Right 14 58 0.54 
Wrong 10 42 
 
Table 2.4.1 
Number of children who responded to Unexpected Transfer FB 4 (LOOK) 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)  P 
Others    3 Right  8 53 1.00 
 Wrong 7 47 
   4 Right 23 96 0.00 
Wrong 1 04 
 
The Appearance –Reality Task. There was only one task and it had both self- and 
other’s false belief questions asked with a mental verb (THINK). A chi-square test for 
association showed significant association between age and self-false belief performance, 
χ2(1) = 9.78, p < .01, V= .50. The same analysis with others’ false belief also showed 









Number of children who responded to Appearance-Reality FB 5 (THINK) 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)  P 
Self    3 Right  6 40 0.61 
 Wrong 9 60 
   4 Right 21 88 0.00 
Wrong 3 13 
Others    3 
  
Right 9 60 0.61 
Wrong 6 40 
   4 Right 17 71  0.64 
Wrong 7 29 
 
Total False Belief Score. Children’s answers in each of the questions above 
aggregated to generate a total false belief score. In Table 2.2, children’s score out of 8 was 
presented and it shows that the younger children’s mean score was half of the mean score of 
the 4 year-olds. The analysis of variance of Total False Belief Score was conducted by Age 
and Gender and the results are displayed in Table 2.6. Age had a significant main effect on 
the children’s overall false belief performance. Neither gender, nor the interaction between 
age and gender had an effect on the false belief performance.  
Additionally, children’s performance in ‘action’ and ‘mental’ verb version of tasks 
was aggregated to create a sub-total score. A repeated measure ANOVA was conducted with 
those verbs to examine a possible difference because previous analysis showed that 4-year-
olds tend to perform better with ‘action’ verbs. There was a statistically significant effect of 
verb type (i.e. action or mental) on children’s false belief performances, F (1, 35) = 8.13, p < 
.01, p
2= .19. Due to the advantage that ‘action verbs’ may give to children in false belief 
tasks, in the future studies, ‘mental verbs’ will be used.  
 




Univariate Analysis of Variance of Total False Belief Performance by Age and Gender 
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 86.53 1 19.87 .36 .00 
Gender .30 1 .07 .00 .80 
Age * 
Gender 
3.78 1 .87 .02 .36 
Note:  R Squared = .38 (Adjusted R Squared = .33) 
 
Additional Executive Function Measures  
As mentioned earlier, although IC was defined as a core cognitive aspect of self-
regulation in this thesis, two other components of executive function, as suggested in the 
literature, were included in Study 1. The aim was to identify key constructs to be used in the 
further studies. Those executive skills were ‘shifting’ and ‘working memory’.  
For ‘shifting’, a summary of children’s performance in the Dimensional Change 
Card- Sort (DCCS) task was presented in Table 2.2. The mean score of 3-year-olds in this 
task was lower than the 4-year-olds’ performance. The analysis of variance showed no 
significant effect of children’s age on the DCCS performance, F (1, 39) = 2.68, ns, p2= .07.  
To assess ‘working memory’, children’s performance in the Eight- Boxes Task was 
determined by the number of trials they needed to find the stickers. Each trial was scored as 1 
point. Children were allowed 16 trials to locate 8 stickers. The maximum possible score was 
17, and the minimum score was 8. Finding the stickers in fewer trials was the desired 
performance. Therefore, higher scores indicated a worse performance. Table 2.2 displays the 
mean scores for trials and shows that 4-year-olds required fewer trails than their younger 
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peers. The analysis of variance also showed that children’s age had a significant effect on 
their working memory performance, F (1, 39) = 17.16, p<.01, p2= .32. 
Although, the performance in these executive skills was not central to the questions 
addressed in Study 1 they were included in the correlation analysis that is reported below. In 
Table 2.5, a correlation matrix showing the DCCS and the Eight-Box tasks and all the other 
measures is shown. The literature would propose unity in at least moderate correlations 
among the executive functions of inhibition, shifting and working memory (Miyake et al., 
2000). However, such relationships were not found in this small sample. Along with the 
Day/Night task (Conflict), working memory and shifting were correlated with false belief 
performance, which was consistent with previous studies. This suggested shared 
developmental pathways between executive functions and false belief understanding. Study 1 
focuses on the contribution of social understanding measured by false belief to self-
regulation; therefore the correlations shared with working memory and shifting were used 
predicting the false belief performance.  
Correlation Analysis 
Table 2.7 allows us to address the key question of Study 1, whether conflict or delay 
inhibition shares more underlying developmental pathways with social understanding. It 
shows the link with false belief was limited to one task-Day/Night. Although the Snow/Grass 
task was very similar in demand and used successfully in previous studies (e.g. Sabbagh et 
al., 2006; Carlson & Moses, 2001), it failed to show any associations with the other complex 
response inhibition /conflict task and false belief. A near ceiling performance in Snow/Grass 
is worth noting but the lack of associations may also be a result of the small sample used.  
Another point was that the lack of association between Conflict and Delay 
performance. Although the relationship between Conflict and SU was significant, Carlson 
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and Moses (2001) reported a correlational relationship between Delay and SU. The 
correlational findings from Study 1 replicate their effect for Conflict and SU relationship but 
not for the Delay. A regression analysis was conducted to provide the insight predicting the 
false belief and conflict inhibition performance prior to the inclusion of the emotional aspect 
in the next studies.    
 
Regression Analysis 
The relationships between the Conflict Inhibition in the Day/Night task and the SU 
were examined in hierarchical multiple regression models. The analysis with the delay 
inhibition was not presented here due to the lack of its association with the other constructs3.  
                                                          
3 None of the hierarchical multiple regression models to predict delay performance was 
significant.  
Table 2.7 









































False Belief     -     
Day/Night Task   .41**    -    
Snow/Grass Task   .27  .03    -   
Delay Score  -.00  .23 -.17    -  
DCCS (Switch)   .32*  .27  .09  .13 - 
Eight Box (Trial)  -.43** -.23 -.01 -.06 -.30 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01. 
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Predicting Conflict Inhibition. A three step hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
was conducted to predict conflict inhibition performance (the Day/Night task). First false 
belief was loaded, then two sets of background variables, namely age and the three other EF 
variables: WM, set shifting and delay. Table 2.8 presents three models which were generated 
in this analysis and each was statistically significant. In Step 1, false belief performance was 
the only predictor and was also significant. In Step 2, age was aggregated to Model 2 but 
none of the explanatory variables contributed unique variance in predicting conflict 
performance. Model 3 was significant but none of the individual predictors were significant. 
As the regressions suggest, the false belief directly predicts the conflict performance but the 
effect disappears when children’s age was added to the equation.





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Conflict  
                Conflict Score (Day/Night Task) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B    β 
False Belief  .49 .18 .41** .21 .25 .17 .11 .25 .10 
Age (months)    .12 .08 .34 .15 .08 .42 
Delay Score       .29 .15 .28 
DCCS        .05 .08 .10 






3.07* F  
∆ R2               .06 .09 
∆F             2.58 1.49 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01. 
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Predicting Social Understanding (False Belief Performance). A similar strategy of 
aggregating variables into the regression models in previous sections was also used to predict 
false belief performance. Table 2.9 displays the full details of hierarchical multiple regression 
models.  In Step 1, only Day/Night performance was entered as a predictor. Model 1 was 
significant and the conflict inhibition was significant in predicting the false belief 
performance. In Step 2, the addition of age generated a significant model but the statistical 
effect of conflict disappeared at this stage. Model 2 had a higher R2 value, and ∆ R2 suggested 
that the new model was significantly better than the previous one. Ideally, the effect of 
conflict inhibition should have remained significant, but age overpowered its significance. In 
Step 3, delay, shifting and working memory measures were added to the equation and 
generated a significant model. However, Model 3 was not statically better than the previous 
model and age remained the only significant predictor. 





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Social Understanding  
                False Belief Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B    β 
Day/Night .35 .13 .41** .09 .11 .11 .05 .12 .06 
Age (months)    .20 .04 .66** .19 .05 .61** 
Delay Score       .04 .11 .05 
DCCS        .04 .05 .10 






7.96** F  
∆ R2               .35 .03 
∆F             25.76** .74** 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01. 
Discussion 
The aim of Study 1 was to explore the association of IC and SU prior to examining 
the relationship between cognitive- and emotional-regulation. Employing these tasks did not 
produce exact replications of the findings from the literature, including the age differences 
that have been widely reported in Day/Night and Snow/Grass Tasks (e.g. Carlson, 2005). The 
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reason why the age effect failed to be replicated was most likely the small sample size in this 
study. Yet, the correlation and the predictive relationship between Day/Night and False Belief 
was a replication of well-documented evidence (see Blankson et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 
2004; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes & Ensor, 2007). Study 1 also replicated the predictive 
relationship between social understanding and Conflict performance, but this finding only 
related to the Day/Night task and was no longer significant when controlling for age. Thus, 
the future studies in this thesis will search for more robust evidence to replicate the predictive 
relationship between Conflict and SU. In spite of the findings from the Snow/Grass task in 
past investigations (e.g. Simpson & Riggs, 2009; Carlson, 2005), in this study, this well-
known Conflict task failed to show any association with the other Conflict task or false belief 
performance. The performance in the task was near ceiling for both age groups. This task 
required children to give a response in conflict with their pre-existing knowledge of an 
object’s colour and its demand is very similar to the Day/Night task. Yet, the response was 
verbal in the Day/Night and motor (i.e. pointing) in Snow/Grass. In a recent study, using 
Snow/Grass, Carroll, Riggs, Apperly, Graham, and Geoghegan (2012) reported that 
children’s performance was not affected by pointing even though the salient nature of this 
response has long been discussed as undermining children’s IC performance. Another issue 
that emerges from the findings of Carroll et al. (2012) is that they found an age difference in 
children’s performance in this task and it was related to performance in the unexpected 
transfer false belief task. When the raw scores for the same tasks were compared, Turkish 3-
year-olds’ mean score was 4 points higher than the mean scores of younger children in 
Carroll et al. (2012)’s data. Thus, a new task might need to be developed to challenge Turkish 
children with a bodily motor response. This will be developed in the next study.  
The assessment of Delay performance was assessed only by the DoG/Choice task in 
Study 1. Despite previous findings, such as Hongwanishkul et al. (2005), Study 1 did not 
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demonstrate any specific performance difference between 3- and 4- year-olds. This might be 
again due to the small sample size, but Study 1 revealed an intriguing finding of higher scores 
in 3- than 4-year-olds. This odd finding might be due to a fortuitous sampling of some early 
achieving 3-year-olds in this study, but the children came from the same preschool.  
However, in other measures the mean scores of 4-year-olds were higher than the 3-year-olds. 
The unexpected performance of younger children in Delay also might have caused a 
disassociation between the Delay and SU.   
The administration of a Choice/Delay task is shorter, so keeping children interested 
might be easier. This quality was one of the reasons for using it in the study.  However, the 
better performance of the younger children in this study needs to be re-examined in the 
further studies, before conclusions about developmental changes in children’s coping with 
frustration during waiting can be made.  Additionally, the disassociation of Delay demand 
from Conflict and SU raises the question that the type of self-regulation required to Delay 
obtaining a reward may be more a part of an affective system, as claimed in the hot-cool 
systems framework (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Zelazo & Muller, 2002). The motivational 
separation of Conflict and Delay is discussed in Chapter 3 in terms of how emotional-
regulation contributes to self-regulation.  
 The contribution of other executive components within the cognitive-regulatory 
system was explored in Study 1. It was found that ‘Shifting’ and ‘Working memory’ were 
correlated with SU. However, both failed to predict the children’s performance in false belief 
tasks. These executive components, unexpectedly, were not associated with any of the 
Conflict IC or Delay tasks. Considering the small sample size in the analysis above, Study 2 
will utilize these components but if there is a repetition of a lack of association between them 
and other aspects of self-regulation, in the further studies these components will be dropped 
(e.g. Grass/Snow task).  
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 Study 1 was a small scale analysis that aimed to test the separation of Conflict and 
Delay demands of IC in relation to children’s developing understanding of other people. 
There was a finding that alternating evidentiality markers had no effect on children’s 
performance in the tasks in any way. However, asking false belief questions with ‘action’ or 
‘mental’ verbs had an effect on SU performance even in such a small sample. Nonetheless, 
the variance was kept through a general total score, the advantage that ‘action’ verbs may 
cause was considered for the design of future studies. Hence, mental verbs were thought to be 
more valuable for assessing children’s true performance. Based on the clarification of the 
way false belief tasks are going to be assessed, Study 2 in the next chapter will focus on the 
emotional aspect of self-regulation.
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Chapter 3 - What predicts the regulation of Negative Emotions? 
 This chapter follows from the possible disassociation that Study1 reported between 
the two types of measures of IC (delay vs. conflict). It focuses on the core theme of this 
thesis: that is to explore the links with the emotional aspect of self-regulation. The topics of 
cognitive and emotional development tend to be kept separate in research and few studies 
have explored the relationship between these domains with regard to their regulatory 
properties. The assessment of cognitive-regulation (CR) in terms of inhibitory control was 
addressed in the previous chapter. Here I will focus more on the conceptualization of 
emotional-regulation (ER). The definitions of ER that were referred to in Chapter 1 
contradicted one another. As a result it is necessary to re-examine this construct in detail in 
the following paragraphs and simplify it into different elements. In Study 2, only the 
observation of negative emotionality- ER (Negative) - is examined. The investigation was 
conducted with a cross-cultural sample of 83 Turkish and British three to four-year olds 
concerning the relationships between ER (Negative), IC, and SU.  
3.1 Assessment of Emotion-Regulation  
 The definition and measurement of ER is difficult and controversial (Cole, Martin, & 
Dennis, 2004). Thompson (1994) stated one of the most adopted working definitions.  He 
emphasizes that to achieve a goal, the internal and external processes are ‘monitoring, 
evaluating and modifying the emotional reactions’ (p.27). The external processes that 
Thompson refers to are sources outside of the child, which guide and help him / her to 
regulate feelings. The external processes referred to are usually agents in the social network. 
In the early years of life, parents are an external factor for the regulation of emotions such as 
rocking and soothing a crying baby (Fox & Calkins, 2003). As the child’s agency develops, 
the internal processes that are intertwined within the cognitive and socio-emotional skills 
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become more important. Despite the separation of intrinsic and extrinsic processes of ER, the 
extrinsic processes continue to be defined as the part of the socio-cultural norms and 
expectations in the child’s life.  
 In Emotional Competence Theory, Saarni (1999) acknowledges the importance of the 
child’s awareness and internalization of social expectations in order to adjust his or her 
emotional expressions. Saarni (1984) claims that younger children are not successful in 
hiding their true feelings, because they might not comprehend their emotional expressions 
influence other people. When children get older, they get better at masking their true feelings 
by grasping the idea of how they may affect other people’s feelings. Throughout the 
internalization of external norms and societal regulation, the internal process of ER and the 
growth of children’s cognitive abilities appear to be parallel.  In adult studies, the 
performance in cognitively demanding tasks was also found to benefit from ER (Philipps, 
Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002).  
 The mutual effect of ER and CR on particular outcomes such as academic success 
(e.g. Blair, 2002) and problematic or risky behaviours (Hughes, Dunn, & White, 1998) has 
been studied, rather than how two mechanisms interact with each other. Some authors 
singularly link ER to academic success, usually by assessing it via parental reports (e.g. 
Howse, Calkins, Anastopoulos, Keane, & Shelton, 2003; Graziano, Reavis, Keane, & 
Calkins, 2007), whereas some others claim that CR is responsible for the same outcome (e.g. 
Brock, Rimm-Kaufman, Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009). However, the literature on self-
regulation lacks studies that attempt to identify a particular relationship between its emotional 
and cognitive aspects.  
 A developmental cognitive neuroscience perspective suggests an association and co-
functioning of emotion and cognition as part of an intrinsic information-processing system to 
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execute actions (Bell & Wolfe, 2004; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999). Zelazo and Cunningham 
(2007) proposed a bidirectional influence within an interactive model where emotions help to 
organize thinking, learning and actions (emotion as regulating), and cognitive processes are 
necessary to regulate emotions (emotions as regulated). According to their model, ER is a 
corresponding motivational aspect of cognition in conscious, goal-directed problem-solving 
(i.e., executive functions). Either ER or CR may gain priority over the other depending on the 
task at hand. The task in hand might require not showing real emotions, so the problem 
requires one to remember the rules (the activation of working memory) to apply when not 
demonstrating actual feelings. Similarly, the task in hand may induce emotions but to solve 
the task in hand, suppressing those emotions may help the outcome. For example, 
suppressing frustration when making a mistake during the Simon Says (or in alike) game may 
reduce the likelihood of making other errors in the repeated trials.  
 According to Zelazo and Cunningham’s (2007) model (CR involves ER) the 
reciprocal relation between CR and ER depends on the motivational significance of the 
problem. The motivation of problem hinders the demand of the task that needs the child to 
suppress emotionally or cognitively charged responses. The motivational divergence 
mentioned in the model of Zelazo and Cunningham (2007) was reflected as ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ 
pathways within the assessment of IC in the previous chapter.  The ‘cool’ pathway is related 
to the abilities that are associated with dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex (DL-PFC) and 
the ‘hot’ pathway is associated with ventral and medial regions (VM- PFC). IC is responsible 
for goal-directed behaviour, but its sub-functions are difficult to relate to particular domains 
of brain.  The ‘hot versus cool’ explanation is an attempt to include the importance of the 
emotional systems that may be interfering with the Conflict demand of IC. According to this 
explanation, cool measures involve the simultaneous manipulation and maintenance of 
representation (e.g. Baddeley, 1986) such as working memory and flexible rule use. 
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Procedures that are more emotion-neutral and mostly rule-based include the Conflict task 
which, it is claimed, measures the ‘cool’ aspect of executive functions. The ‘hot’ aspect is 
said to embrace the affective systems that interfere with the control of emotionality and 
ability to cope with frustrating situations, as in Delay tasks.   
 The previous studies which reported a relationship between CR and ER, defined the 
CR under the label of effortful control or inhibitory control. Inhibitory control was sometimes 
depicted as a combination of both Delay and Conflict demands, and sometimes either one of 
them was used. However, the specific roles of each of these demands were not mentioned, 
especially in relation to emotional-regulation and that is the gap that Study 2 aims to address 
in this chapter.  
As Chapter 1 highlighted, most of the findings regarding children’s emotionality 
come from temperamental perspectives, which provides evidence for the cognitive skills that 
rely on effortful control.  As highlighted earlier, Kochanska and her colleagues defined 
‘delaying’, ‘slowing-down’, ‘suppressing -initiating activity to signal’, ‘effortful attention’ 
and ‘lowering the voice’ as the subcomponents of effortful control. Many researchers have 
used Kochanska’s battery and thus followed her lead. A possible overuse of this definition 
has been the consequence.   
It is worth noting again that, ‘suppressing -initiating activity to signal’ and ‘effortful 
attention’ tasks are very similar in their demand and were categorized under Conflict in the 
previous chapter. Beck, Carlson, and Rothbart (2007) tested 420 preschool children’s 
performances on a comprehensive cognitive battery and a full-scale temperament assessment. 
They reported that a combination of both effortful control performance and one aspect of 
temperament, extraversion/surgency, predicted relatively advanced executive function. Their 
study is not different to others in respect to the finding of individual differences in 
performance, particularly effortful control which correlated moderately with parent report of 
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child temperament (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; Gerardi-Caulton, 2000; Hongwanishkul, 
Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005; Jones, Rothbart, & Posner, 2003; Kochanska et al., 2000; 
Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2004). They administered only the temperament scales relevant to 
effortful control and mainly relied on parental reports. Although the usefulness of parent and 
teacher-reports is recognized, inter-rater reliability across contexts has been found to be weak 
(e.g., Liew et al., 2004). Additionally, explaining individual differences in terms of 
temperament based on parental testimony might undermine the effect of the child’s 
performance of control as an independent variable. Parental report measures are always one 
step removed from the child skills that are examined here. Saarni’s Disappointing Gift 
Paradigm to measure children’s changing ability to internalize the external regulator of 
emotionality is a very popular task (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004; Raver, 2004). 
Nonetheless, parental reports tend to be used for assessing ER since they appear to reveal 
more significant connections (Eisenberg & Sulik, 2012).  
For example, a recent study conducted on Turkish children’s ER that was assessed 
through parent and teacher reports. This suggested a relationship between CR and ER (Orta, 
Corapci, Yagmurlu, & Aksan, 2013). Although Orta and colleagues measured CR with an 
extensive effortful control battery that included tasks on ‘slowing-down’, ‘delay’, and 
’conflict’, they reported a CR performance that was the composite of those performances. 
The composite CR performance was only related to parents’ reports on ‘emotional-
dysregulation’ of children. The term ‘emotional-regulation’ was used to label the parent’s 
responses on questionnaire items that refer to children’s inappropriate expressions of positive 
and negative emotions according to the social context. The subtotal of the items that measure 
the (parent’s assessment of) appropriate emotional reactions was not related to CR.    
Another very recent study by Blankson, O’Brien, Leerkes, Marcovitch, Calkins, and 
Miner Weaver (2013) explored the CR -ER relationship within a longitudinal study of 3-and 
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4-year-olds. Their analysis reflected the challenges of ER assessment. According to their 
findings from 262 children, the mothers’ report of ER at age 3 predicted CR and SU 
performance a year later. However, online assessments of the child’s ER were related to 
neither CR nor SU. They claimed that that CR or SU were not crucial to the emotional 
processes. However, the battery of CR only consists of one Conflict (Day/Night) and one 
working memory task. Their situational assessment of ER was a frustration paradigm 
‘Locked Box’ (Calkins, 1997) in which children were unable to reach an attractive toy from a 
transparent box. As mentioned above, according to proponents of the ‘hot’ pathway view, the 
lack of a Delay measure might be undermining the CR and ER relationship. The relationship 
between CR and ER may rely on the different demands that inhibitory control presents.   
As one of the few studies which addressed the issue of the potential relationship of 
CR and ER, Carlson and Wang (2007) summarized three possible ways to explain how these 
two aspects might interact. One explanation was that the development of the cognitive -
regulation is the underlying mechanism for the emergence emotional-regulation. The second 
explanation was that the developing emotional-regulation is responsible for the execution of 
‘cognitive-regulation’. The third explanation, on the other hand, was the suggestion that both 
emotional- and cognitive- regulatory abilities are indistinguishable, so the mechanisms 
responsible for each might be one integrated with those of the other.  To examine these 
pathways, they tested 4-and 5-year-old children with tasks that require them to suppress the 
dominant, and activate selectively the subdominant, responses in both cognitive and emotion 
domains. For CR, their battery consisted of the Simon Says, Forbidden Toy, and Gift Delay 
tasks.  These tasks (apart from Forbidden Toy4) were mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Thus, CR was assessed through an IC battery that included tasks measuring Conflict, Delay, 
                                                          
4 Forbidden Toy is a task in which children are not allowed to touch an attractive toy while the experimenter is 
absent from the room. Then children are asked about whether they touched or did not touch the toy.  In my 
attempt to separate the task according their Conflicts and Delay demands, this particular task weighed highly in 
both demands. Therefore, it was left out in the previous chapter.  
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and Deception. Their ER battery consisted of the tasks that require suppression of negative 
(Saarni’s disappointment paradigm, 1984), positive (Secret Keeping Task) emotional 
expressions, emotional understanding, and also parental reports. The extensive investigation 
of Carlson and Wang (2007) revealed that the composite measures of IC and ER were 
positively related even when controlling for age and verbal ability. The strength of this 
relationship varied according to age and gender since the relationship was stronger in girls 
and was only significant in 4-years-olds, not younger children.  They also found a quadratic 
relationship between IC and ER in which an optimal level of IC appeared to be strongly 
associated with ER. Children with low and high levels of IC performed similarly in their 
relation to ER. Their findings were compatible with the temperamental classification of 
Eisenberg and Fabes (1992) which proposes three types of characteristics: under-controlled, 
optimally controlled, and highly inhibited children. Since the aim here is to clarify the 
connection between the processes, rather than the quadratic relationships that they suggested, 
the measurements that Carlson and Wang (2007) used became the focus of my investigation. 
As mentioned before, parental reports of ER tend to predict children’s CR performances, 
whereas direct testing might not. They employed extensive ER and CR batteries but also 
collapsed individual tests into composite scores. So, how the underlying processes relate to 
each other is still unclear.  According to the correlations they reported, children’s 
performance in a task where they were required to regulate their positive emotionality did not 
show associations with the Disappointing Gift paradigm and its correlates, in other Delay and 
Conflict measures.   
As mentioned when reporting Orta et al.’s study above, it was noted that CR 
performance was found to be related to the parents’ reports of negative emotionality. An 
interplay between positive and negative emotionality in terms of regulatory performance 
from infancy to adulthood has been suggested (e.g. Larsen, Hemenover, Norris, & Cacioppo, 
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2003) based on the idea of different neuropsychological mechanisms responsible for the 
dichotomy of positive and negative emotions (e.g. Lane, Reiman, Bradley, et al., 1997). The 
intention here is not to discuss this dimensional emotion model, but to introduce the idea that 
young children’s ability to regulate negative emotions may differ from how they regulate 
positive emotions. Although the control of both is crucial and necessary, the connection they 
share with CR may be different. In predicting the later behavioural inhibitory skills of 
toddlers, Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, and Schmidt, (2001) suggested that considering 
positivity and negativity as separate constructs was beneficial.  
For example, Kieras, Tobin, Graziano, and Rothbart (2005) reported that children’s 
display of positive emotionality when presented with an unwanted present was predicted by 
their performance in tasks that required them to ‘slow-down’ an action. Children who 
performed better in these ‘delay’ tasks were those who showed positive reactions to gifts 
regardless of whether they were desirable or undesirable. However, children who performed 
poorly in those tasks were only able to show positive reactions to a desirable gift. The 
children’s negative displays were not found to be a significant variable in Kieras et al.’s study 
with 62 children whose ages ranged from 3 to 5. The positive reactions they referred to were 
elicited in a situation in which the child had to handle his or her negative emotionality during 
a disappointing event.  Nevertheless, the positive reactions that children showed when a 
desirable gift was given were elicited when the child’s positive emotionality was matched 
with his or her reactions. There are certain situations when the child needs to regulate positive 
emotionality to adapt to the social context, but this is discussed further in the next chapter.   
Another study that used both parental and situational assessment for ER was  
conducted to examine CR and ER and  reported conflicting results between the two 
(Liebermann, Giesbrecht, & Muller, 2007). They tested 60 children whose ages ranged 
between 3 and 5 using ER, CR and SU measures. Their batteries of ER and CR used both 
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situational and parental reports (the Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function for 
Preschoolers; Gioia, Espy, & Isquith, 2003). The ER battery consisted of the Disappointing 
Gift paradigm. The CR battery included Delay, working memory and shifting measures. 
Thus, their IC battery lacked a Conflict task. The composite IC measure failed to predict the 
performance in ER (negative) whereas parents’ reports suggested a significant relationship 
between CR and ER. Their findings also suggested no relationship between ER and SU.  
In contrast to the findings of Liebermann et al. (2007), Jahromi and Stifter (2008) 
reported marginally significant results on the children’s greater performance in a delay task 
and demonstrated fewer negative or aggressive reactions in ER tasks.  In a longitudinal study, 
at the age of 4.5 year-olds, 92 children were tested with the Disappointing Gift and an 
Attractive Toy (children were not allowed to touch or play with when the experimenter was 
absent in the room/ similar to Forbidden Toy in Carlson and Wang’s (2007) study) tasks in 
addition to three Conflict (Three-pegs, Day/Night, Tapping task) and two Delay tasks (Dinky 
Toy and Delay of Gratification). Eighty-six children were tested again at the age of 5.5 years 
on their SU abilities. Those who showed fewer negative reactions in the disappointment 
paradigm also showed higher performance in a delay task. The performance in the Conflict 
tasks at the age of 4.5-year-old predicted SU performance at the age of 5.5 years. However, 
there was no relationship between emotional-regulation and false belief performance. In 
addition to the insight from Carlson and Wang (2007), who found that IC was related to ER, 
keeping with ‘hot’ system assumption, Jahromi and Stifter reported an association between 
ER and Delay. Since ER and CR can be very wide in their descriptions and their situational 
assessment or parental reports may suggest different relationships, Study 2 was designed to 
tap two gaps that were overlooked in the analysis of the studies summarized above. Carlson 
and Wang (2007) has an extensive design, but the composite scores of IC and ER measures 
were clouding the specific relationships that may clarify our understanding of the 
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mechanisms within CR and ER.  The controversial findings regarding the relationship 
between CR and ER might be underlined by the separation within IC. Since Blankson et al. 
(2013) only used Conflict tasks to represent CR and failed to show any relationship between 
CR and ER whereas Jahromi and Stifter (2008) reported a relationship between behavioural 
measures and ER.  Thus, CR and ER will be stripped into particular assessments in Study 2 to 
attempt to explain the mechanisms within SR.  I will test the dichotomy of positive and 
negative emotionality later (see Chapter 4). The reason behind singling out ER (negative) in 
Study 2 was to avoid the effects of fatigue or boredom. Orta et al. (2013) reported that 
Turkish children’s ER (negative) performance was related to CR and stated that such a result 
was compatible with the evidence from Western studies. In this section, I have tried to 
illustrate that studies that report the relationship of CR and ER, or lack of it, do so not 
independently of how these constructs are assessed. The evidence from Turkish children is 
limited because ER has been assessed through parental reports only. Moreover, there is no 
study that has compared the performance of Turkish children with their Western counterparts 
in CR, ER and SU measures.      
STUDY 2 
In Figure 3.1, the constructs that Study 2 deals with are illustrated. As justified above, 
the suppression of negative emotionality is explored via the Disappointment Paradigm (DG) 
of Saarni (1984).  Rather than relying on a composite CR measure, both Conflict and Delay 
measures are used in this study. As an understudied culture, the performance of Turkish 
children in both IC measures, ER (negative), and SU were compared to British children. In 
Study 1, younger Turkish children outperformed 4-year-olds in the Delay task. Thus, Study 2 
employed two Delay tasks that covered both ‘choice’ and ‘waiting’.  In line with the ‘hot’ 
neural pathway assumption of Zelazo and Carlson (2012), Delay performance is expected to 
predict performance in ER (negative) and this expected link is presented with a dotted line in 
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Figure 3.1.  Furthermore, the predictive relationship between Conflict and SU is expected to 
be replicated. Despite the methodological limitation of Orta et al.’s evidence on Turkish 
children, they reported that performance in both ER and CR was similar to that of Western 
children. Therefore, no cultural differences are expected on any of the constructs. The 
research questions can be summed up as follows;  (1) for both 3- and 4-year-old children; 
Conflict inhibition is significantly related to social understanding in both English-speaking 
and Turkish-speaking groups when controlling for verbal and non-verbal ability; (2) for both 
3- and 4- year-old children, the Delay dimension of self-regulation is significantly related to 
emotional-regulation in both English-speaking and Turkish-speaking groups when controlling 
for verbal and non-verbal ability. 
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Table 3   










Inhibitory Control IC  
       Conflict   Day/ Night Task 
Giraffe/ Mouse Game 
        Delay   Snack Delay  
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Emotional -Regulation ER Disappointing Gift (Negative 
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Social Understanding (False 
Belief) 
SU Unexpected Transfer False 
Belief  
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Thirty-nine Turkish (24 male) and 45 British preschool (21 male) children 
participated in the study. The Turkish children’s ages ranged from 2 to 5 (M = 51.51 months, 
SD= 8.59, range: 37-66 months). They were recruited from a nursery school in Bursa that 
serves mostly middle and upper-middle class families. By randomly selecting children from 
their classrooms, one 2-year-old and eight 5 years-olds were recruited and their data included 
in the sample. The British children’s ages ranged from 3 to 4 (M = 45.18 months, SD= 4.15, 
range: 36-56 months). They were recruited from four nurseries in Lancaster that serve a range 
of working and middle class families. Parental consent was obtained before each child was 
tested. Children were also asked for their consent/ willingness to start or continue before 
every task. Four further children were removed from the analysis due to: failing to complete 
the experiment (2) and technical problems due to the video recording (2). 
Procedure 
 Each child was tested individually in a quiet room that was provided by the preschool 
centre. The list of all measures is presented in Figure 3.2.  Testing was conducted in two 
sessions to avoid any drop outs due to fatigue or boredom. The tasks were presented in a 
fixed order following a logic defined as follows. The tasks that were simpler to administer 
such as Day/Night, DCCS, 8-Box, False belief tasks were presented in the first session. The 
second sessions started with Verbal ability and non-verbal cognitive skills tasks. The Delay 
and ER tasks were given in the second session. In the second session, the Delay and ER tasks 
were recorded by a camera. The second session tasks were presented last as they were less 
tiring, shorter and ended with a reward.   
 




The Day- Night Test, as administered in Study 2, was identical to Study 1. The Giraffe 
and Mouse task was a modified form of a well-known nursery game in Turkey. This game 
resembles the procedure used by Kochanska, Murray and Coy (1997) attempting to measure 
the preschool children’s control of their gross-motor abilities and inhibition of a dominant 
response. Children were invited to play a game and asked to get up from their chair. Then 
they were asked about the size of a giraffe and a mouse. All of the children from Both 
Turkish and British samples were correct identifying the relative sizes of these animals.   The 
experimenter then gave the following instruction to the children; “When I call you ‘mouse’, I 
want you to stand up from your chair and try to look as tall/big as you can.  When I call you 
‘giraffe’, I want you to squat down and look as short/small as you can” (the experimenter 
demonstrates both actions). There were 24 trials with equal numbers of each instruction, 
presented in a pseudorandom order. Children were scored with one point for each correct 
performance and their accumulated scores out of 24 trials were analysed.                                
Delay Measures 
The Snack Delay task was a situational assessment for the behavioural control of 
gratification (adapted from Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vendergeest, 1996; 
McCabe & Brooks-Gunn, 2007). Children were first told that they will be eating 5 small 
sweets in a very funny and playful way while a camera is recording them. The verbal consent 
of the child before this task was obtained due to the task’s nature (to prevent them eating 
something that they do not want to).  Only children who were willing to eat sweets and 
comfortable to be recorded were tested and none of them refused to participate. Children 
were given a piece of A4 paper as their service mat or plate for this game. The following 
instruction was given, ‘Now, you’ll get five Smarties (Bonibons is the name of the Turkish 
brand) from me. I will give them one by one to you. I’ll put each one of the Smarties at the 
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centre of your service mat. But there is a funny rule here, you cannot touch or pick up and eat 
the sweets until I give you the signal to eat.  Do you want to know what the signal is? [The 
experimenter claps her hands for once] I’ll clap my hands when the waiting time is over. 
After you hear my clap, you can go for your sweet and eat it. When you finish eating let me 
know, so you can have the next round. Remember you have to wait until I clap my hands to 
give you your signal to take the Smarties. Do you want to start now?’(instruction was adapted 
from McCabe, Rebello-Britto, Hernandez, & Brooks-Gunn, 2004). The experiment started 
with a ‘practice’ trial that only lasts for 5 seconds of delay. After that, four test trials were 
conducted. In these, the delay period lasted for 10, 20, 30 and 60 seconds.  The delay periods 
in trials were counterbalanced through Latin square.  At the half way point of each trial, the 
experimenter faked a signal almost completing a clapping gesture thus breaking the delay 
period into two. The responses of children in those waiting periods were scored using the 
codes designed by McCabe and Brooks-Gunn (2007).  Performance was scaled from 0 to 10 
according to the responses of the child such as; eating the candy, touching the candy, moving 
their hand or body towards the candy at the first half of the delay or the second half of the 
delay (for the full list of scoring, please see Appendix 3.1).  In addition to the delay scores, 
the coping strategy of the children while waiting was analysed in terms of 13 different types 
of distraction (touches Smartie, plays with his or her clothing, locks arms or hugs 
himself/herself, puts hands in pocket, hides his/ her arms behind, rocks him/herself, talks to 
the self, imitates clapping, looks away/up/behind, asks irrelevant questions or tries for a small 
chat with the experimenter, touches the table, fixates gaze on the treat, giggles and sits 
perfectly still). The number of distractions that children engaged in was recorded (for the full 
list of distraction behaviours, please see Appendix 3.2). 




The Disappointing Gift was used to assess the regulation of negative emotionality. It 
was adapted from Saarni’s (1984) disappointment paradigm where the child was expected to 
hide his or her actual feelings on receiving a present he or she did not pick as a favourite 
reward. In comparison to the original paradigm of Saarni, in which the children were 
presented with a set of toys and asked to rank them  and received the least favourite one in 
the end; a very obvious ‘bad’ present (e.g. a piece of carton or a tissue) was presented to 
reduce the testing time.  
The child was shown a toy and a tissue and then asked which one would be nice to 
play with and which one would be a nice gift to give someone. After the children pointed to 
their choice (all chose the toy), they were invited to play another game (Giraffe and Mouse 
task) with the experimenter. They were told that they will receive a surprise gift after the 
game. After completing the game, the children were told that their ‘amazing gift’ was coming 
along. They then were given the tissue to create the situational disappointment. The responses 
to the disappointing gift were recorded with a video camera for 30 seconds. Children were 
expected to hide their true feelings about receiving a ‘bad’ gift. After this period, the 
experimenter, looking at her papers, said that there had been a mistake with the gifts, and 
gave the toy to the child. The facial expressions of the children were classified according to 
Saarni’s scale (1984) and children’s negative verbal comments were added to the 
classification (Cole, 1986).  There were 7 positive, 10 negative, 13 neutral (or ‘transitional’ as 
mentioned in Saarni’s paradigm) facial expressions to categorize the children’s reaction to the 
disappointing situation.  For the emotional reactions in each category, please see Appendix 
3.3. The response in each category was scored as 1 and categorical scores were generated.  
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Social Understanding (False Belief) Measures 
In the Unexpected Content Task, children were presented with a ‘Smarties’ tube, 
which contained a pencil instead of chocolates. The researcher showed the Smarties tube to 
participants and asked them the reality control question: ‘what is in the tube?’ The researcher 
then opened the lid and pulled out a pencil. The participant was then asked two test questions, 
which were recorded on the data sheet. One question referred to the false belief of a third 
party: “If (friend’s name) came over here now and I showed him the box, what he would say 
was inside before I take the top off?” the second question referred to the respondent’s 
previous false belief: “What did you first think was inside the box?’’ The order of the 
questions was counter balanced via Latin Square. 
In the Unexpected Transfer Task, the researcher used two puppets to present a 
scenario (named Bunny and Cow). Each puppet owned a differently shaped container as a toy 
box. The researcher enacted a short scenario for the children using the boxes and dolls. 
Bunny (one of the puppets) was seen to place a ball in her container, and then she ‘goes out’ 
to play. Cow (the second puppet) moves the ball from Bunny’s container to its own container 
(e.g. a box or a purse) while Bunny is away. The participants were then asked a test question: 
‘Where will Bunny look for the ball?’ and two control questions: a memory question ‘Where 
did Bunny put its ball in the beginning?’ and a reality control question ‘Where is the ball 
really? The scoring of each of these false belief tasks was identical with Study1.  
Additional Executive Function Measures  
The Dimensional Change Card- Sort task was administered in the same way as in 
Study1. The 8 Boxes Task was used to measure children’s ability of working memory and 
administered in the same way in Study1.    
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Language Measures  
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III-R) (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) in Turkey 
has been used to measure children’s verbal skills. This test was used with Turkish children 
because the standardization of the test had been done in Turkey. 100 sets of 4 pictures were 
presented to children. They were asked to point to the picture that corresponds to a word as in 
e.g., “Show me the ‘cat’.” Three pre-test trials were employed to ensure that the child 
understood what is expected of him or her.  The list of words was uttered by the experimenter 
and the child’s correct pairing of the word and picture was recorded. The experimenter 
stopped following a child’s 9 continuous errors. The number of correct items that a child 
identified comprised the child’s overall raw score.  
For the British children, British Picture Vocabulary Scale was used. In this version of 
the one-word comprehension task, there were 12 words in a set.  The one appropriate to 
child’s age would be selected to begin the test. The experimenter continued to verbalize the 
words in the sets in the same manner as in PPVT-III, but she stopped when a child erred more 
than 8 times in one set.  The number of words that a child was been asked to define would be 
subtracted by the errors they made to produce an overall raw score. Children’s raw scores in 
these tasks were used in the analysis.  
Non-verbal Cognitive Ability Measure 
The Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (sets A, AB, B) was used (Raven, Court, 
& Raven, 1983). Three sets of 12 pictures were presented to the children. Every set has the 
same principle behind it: a picture with a missing part and 6 different pattern choices to 
complete the picture (or #matrix’).  




With regard to the research questions mentioned earlier, two associations, one 
between conflict and social understanding, another between delay and emotional-regulation, 
are proposed (see Introduction to the study).  Each task measures a particular skill in relation 
to self-regulation. Moreover, each is scored in its own way. For example, the performance in 
Day/Night task is represented by the total of ‘correct’ responses across the 16 trials. On the 
other hand, performance on emotional-regulation is based on the number of negative, positive 
and neutral reactions. Thus, I will briefly report how each measure was scored and prepared 
for the analyses.  
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Study 2 also included three 
additional goals. First, it explored developmental change in all aspects of self-regulation, 
because of the well-known age differences on IC. Secondly, the previous studies have 
produced contradictory findings on gender differences, particularly in delay performance. 
Returning to the key question of this research, whether there is a relation between Delay and 
ER, the effect of gender was examined in relation to both constructs. Thirdly, nationality was 
explored since Turkey is an understudied culture, and the recent findings regarding Turkish 
children’s ER have been limited to parental reports (Orta et al., 2013). The exploration of 
each measure is guided by those demographics mentioned above. The correlational 
relationships between IC, ER and SU are presented next. The predictive analysis of Delay, 
Conflict, ER (negative) and SU are presented last.   
Comparisons by Age, Gender, and Nationality 
Each task employed in the study is presented by Age and Nationality groups in Table 
3.1. It shows the ranges, means and the standard deviations (SD) for each measure Age and 
Nationality group.  To examine the possible effects of Age, Nationality, and Gender; 2 X 2 X 
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2 factorial analyses of variance were conducted. The evaluation of the descriptive and 
variance analyses is reported below.   
  
Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for all variables by Age and Nationality 
Measures Min Max Overall  3-year-olds 4-year-olds 
   Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD 
Day/Night 
Task 
0 16 11.91 6.1 Turkish 12.28  3.4 13.68 2.4 
      British 9.57 4.9 12.93 3.3 
Giraffe/ Mouse 2 25 19.51  6.0 Turkish 18.78 7.1 21.80  6.3 
      British 17.96 5.9 19.26 3.3 
Snack Delay  9 40 34.51 6.2 Turkish 36.35 4.1 34 4.9 
      British 34.64 6.4 33.50 8.7 
Sticker Choice 0 1 .61 .48 Turkish .71 .46 .60 .50 
     British .53 .48 .68 .47 
Disappointing 
Gift  
-7 3 -2.21 2.24 Turkish -2.00 2.0 -1.60 1.9 
     British -2.42 2.4 -3.00 2.3 
False Belief 
Score 
0 3 1.89  1.09 Turkish 1.43  1.2  2.40  .42 




  Chapter 3-Study 2   
85 
 
Conflict Measures  
 
The Day/Night Task. The Scoring was identical with the procedure reported in the 
Study 1. The Day/Night task performance was normally distributed. As Table 3.1 displays, 
the mean performance of Turkish 3-year-olds was closer to both Turkish and British 4-year-
olds than their British peers. The number of trials where children managed to suppress the 
prepotent response and follow the rule of the game is the measure of success.  A difference 
between age groups is expected in this task given the previous literature, but the slightly 
unusual performance of Turkish 3-year-olds may undermine the significance of this age 
difference.  In Table 3.2, univariate analysis of variance with Day/Night by Age, Gender, and 
Nationality (a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial design) is displayed.  As the analysis shows, age is the only 
significant effect on Day/Night performance. This finding is very consistent with the previous 
studies (see Diamond et al., 2002). The Day/Night task is a very widely used and commonly 
points to the mental transition between the ages of 3 to 4. The findings were consistent with 
the literature.  
Table 3.2  
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Day/Night Task by Age, Gender and Nationality 
Variables Sum of Squares df F  p2 p 
Age 93.67 1 6.53 .08 .01 
Gender .47 1 .03 .00 .86 
Nationality 46.81 1 3.26 .04 .08 
Age * Nationality 19.19 1 1.33 .02 .25 
Age * Gender 6.54 1 .45 .01 .50 
Nationality * Gender .21 1 .01 .00 .90 
Age * Nationality * 
Gender 
21.04 1 1.46 .02 .23 
      
Note: R Squared = .21 (Adjusted R Squared = .14) 
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The Giraffe/Mouse Task. In 25 trials, children were asked to do the reverse of what 
the cue suggests. . This task is very similar to Day/Night in principal but instead of verbal 
responses, children were supposed to use their bodies. As Table 3.1 shows, 4 year-olds of 
both nationality groups had higher mean scores than younger children. Turkish children’s 
mean scores were slightly higher than British children’s. As the inhibitory demands of the 
task were similar to Day/Night; age could have had an effect on performance. Analysis of 
variance by Age, Gender, and Nationality was conducted for the Giraffe/ Mouse task. As 
presented in Table 3.3, the variance analysis showed that none of the demographic variables 
had an effect on children’s performance of controlling their motor responses in this inhibition 
task.    
Table 3.3 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Giraffe/Mouse by Age, Gender, Nationality 
Variables Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 75.45 1 2.10 .03 .15 
Gender 2.97 1 .08 .00 .77 
Nationality 30.40 1 .85 .01 .36 
Age * Nationality 11.96 1 .33 .00 .57 
Age* Gender 13.23 1 .37 .00 .54 
Nationality * Gender 28.37 1 .79 .01 .38 
Age * Nationality * 
Gender 
51.16 1 1.43 .02 .24 
       
Note: R Squared = .10 (Adjusted R Squared = .02) 
 
Delay Measures  
The Snack Delay Task.  Its score was the accumulation of the responses over 4 trials. 
Each trial was rated on a 10-point scale. Scoring was based on whether the child waited 
quietly for E’s signal before having the treat or gives in to temptation and eats the treat before 
the signal. The highest score is 10, and the lowest is 0 in each trial. 36.1% of children 
received 10 points for all trials. This version of the Snack Delay was used for the first time 
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among the studies in this thesis. Interrater agreement was assessed on 33.7 % of the cross-
cultural sample (28 children) which was randomly selected. Since the performance was 
transformed into a continuous score, intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) was used a 
measure of reliability (Bartko, 1966). Two-way mixed ICC with 2 raters across 28 subjects in 
the Snack Delay task revealed that 83 % of the variance in the mean of these raters is real, 
ICC (2, 1) =.83. Children who were at ceiling were the ones who managed to wait without 
touching or eating the treat and did not prompt E to give the signal. They also did not move 
their hand or body towards the treat. In Table 3.1, the means of total scores are shown.  Both 
Turkish and British 3-year-olds had slightly higher mean scores than their 4-year-olds peers. 
Analysis of variance was conducted to test these apparent trends in mean scores. As Table 3.4 
displays, Age, Gender and Nationality variance analysis did not have any significant main 
effector interaction. Children’s ability to resist temptation was not influenced by their age, 
gender or nationality.  
 
Table 3.4 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Snack Delay Task by Age, Gender, Nationality 
Variables Sum of Squares df F p2             p 
Age 23.81 1 .65 .01 .43 
Gender 74.38 1 2.01 .03 .16 
Nationality 32.14 1 .87 .01 .35 
Age * Nationality .32 1 .01 .00 .93 
Age * Gender 107.76 1 2.92 .04 .09 
Nationality * 
Gender 
88.14 1 2.39 .03 .13 
Age * Nationality 
* Gender 
34.53 1 .94 .01 .34 
      
Note: R Squared = .12 (Adjusted R Squared = .04) 
 
The Sticker Choice Delay Task. It was a simplified choice task for children. They 
were asked to choose between ‘one sticker now’ and ‘two stickers later.’ If they chose the 
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immediate reward, they received 0 as a score and if they chose the delayed reward they 
received 1 as a score. The performance in this measure demonstrated a normal distribution. 
Table 3.1 presents mean scores for each age and nationality groups. Mean performance of 
younger Turkish children was higher than their British peers and both nationalities’ older 
children. Table 3.5 shows whether children’s choice of immediate or delayed rewards were 
dependent on age and nationality by testing against chance using the binomial test.  
Performance was at chance for both age and nationality groups. 
  
 
Emotional Aspect of Self-regulation Measure 
The Disappointing Gift Task. As described above, the situation was created where 
the child was expecting a nice/ surprise present but received something irrelevant. This task 
was adapted from Saarni’s (1984) original paradigm of expressive emotions. The paradigm 
has three categories of expressions classified as: ‘positive, negative or transitional.’ In these 
categories, there were 7 positive, 10 negative, and 13 transitional/ neutral emotional 
expressions. Although Table 3.1 only displays the number of negative responses of children 
in this unpleasant situation, here I will go into details of why negative reactions were chosen 
Table 3.5 
Number of children who chose Now vs. Later in Sticker Choice Task 
Nationality Age    Obs N    Obs Prop (%)  P 
Turkish    3 Now 4 29 0.18 
 Later 10 71 
   4 Now 10 40 0.42 
Later 15 60 
British    3 
  
Now 13 46 0.85 
Later 15 54 
   4 Now 5 31  0.21 
Later 11 69 
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over positive or neutral ones. The original paradigm was used to test children who were 6-to 
11- years old. Saarni (1984) administered this task in two sessions. In the first session 
children received the disappointing present, then in session 2, a pleasant gift was given to 
elicit positive reactions. Performance was analysed based on comparisons of the number of 
negative reactions in Session 1 and the positive reactions in Session 2. As these young 
children were not flexible enough to switch emotions immediately, only the disappointing 
session was recorded and coded in this study. In regard to the children’s display of additional 
emotional expressions during the testing sessions, a few additions to the original categories 
were made. Children’s positive verbalization was added to the positive category. Nine 
participants in this study showed this particular response. Children’s demonstration of 
‘bulging eyes as in a negative surprise’ was also added to the negative expression category. 
Twelve children displayed this behaviour. The application of this task with preschool 
children was drawn from Cole (1986) and Carlson and Wang (2007). They found and 
reported that younger children tend to display very few positive reactions. The number of 
negative reactions children showed was higher than other categories in those studies. 
Therefore, the score in a negative category was used. Each expression was scored as 1 point 
to produce a ‘category score’. The Disappointing Gift task was used for the first time.  
Interrater agreement was assessed on 33.7 % of the cross-cultural sample (28 children) which 
was randomly selected. Since both Snack delay and Disappointing Gift performances were 
transformed into continuous scores, intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used a 
measure of reliability (Bartko, 1966). Two-way mixed ICC with 2 raters across 28 subjects in 
Disappointing Gift task revealed that 81.4% of the variance in the mean of these raters is real. 
In addition to Table 3.1, Table 3.6 here presents means and standard deviations of 
children’s reactions in each category. As it shows, for both age and nationality categories, the 
mean of ‘transitional’ responses was higher than both negative and positive reactions.  
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Previous studies did not employ this category in the analysis, since the transitional reactions 
did not show how much the child was affected or how much she or he managed to control the 
discontent of the situation. The transitional (or neutral) responses identified, in part, 
children’s engagement in the task. Considering positive reactions as the end product of well-
developed emotional-regulation, 53% of the children did not show any positive response. The 
maximum number of positive reactions ever shown was 4, and only three children showed 
this high performance. Only 31% of children managed to not to produce any negative 
reactions that might be considered as regulate emotionality. A young child who failed to 
adjust social norms and did not consider the stranger’s feelings who gave him or her 
nonsense gift was classified as producing negative reactions.  68.7% of the children showed 
at least one and up to five negative reactions.  Table 3.6 displays the mean scores in each 
category where Turkish children of both age groups showed more negative responses than 
British children. Moreover, British children showed more positive responses compared to 
their Turkish peers. British children also showed more transitional responses. Table 3.1 
presents this Disappointing Gift score. The minimum score is -7 and maximum is 3. It is 
important to remind ourselves here that, since positive and transitional was subtracted from 
negative category, a higher score means more negative and fewer positive/transitional 
responses. Thus, here, -7 is a ‘better’ (i.e. more mature) performance whereas 3 suggests poor 
ER. To calculate this score, the assumption was made that the children produce a range of 
emotions. So their responses in each category needed to be regarded as meaningful.  
Children’s positive and transitional responses represented their ability to control their 
disappointment and engage with their surroundings. Thus, positive and transitional responses 
were summed and then subtracted from the negative responses. All the children’s efforts in 
each category would count in this way. According to mean scores in Table 3.1, British 
children from both age groups performed better than Turkish children. In the British group, 
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older children’s performance was better than that of younger children. On the contrary, an 
age difference seems apparent in Turkish children. Younger Turkish children seemed to 
demonstrate better emotional-regulation than the older children in the same culture. 
Table 3.6 
Responses in Disappointing Gift Task (Means and Standard deviations) 
Age/Nationality 
Positive Negative Transitional 
Mean     SD Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
3-year-olds 
           Turkish 1.07 1.07 1.64 .93 2.57 1.09 
           British .46 1.04 1.21 1.31 3.17 1.49 
4-year-olds 
          Turkish .96 1.06 1.52 1.08 2.16 .80 
          British 1.19 1.33 .94 1.06 2.75 1.53 
 
To see if any of the above relations were statistically significant, univariate analysis of 
variance was conducted with Age, Gender, and Nationality as factors. Age had no effect on 
children’s ability to mask their disappointment as demonstrated in Table 3.7. Gender had no 
effect on emotional-regulation, either. The age groups only consisted of 3- and 4 year olds; 
such young ages may not show any meaningful differences in emotional-regulation 
development.  The gender difference that Saarni (1984) suggested was apparent around age 
11 and girls showed more positive reactions. Young children, for example, 3-and 4-year-olds 
may not, therefore, differ by gender. On the threshold, nationality showed a near significant 
effect on emotional-regulation [F (1, 83) = 3.86, p = .053, partial η2 = .05]. Despite the lack 
of age effect on emotional-regulation, an odd discrepancy suggested that younger Turkish 
children demonstrated more mature reactions than the 4-year-olds. Due to the rarity of this 
observation (of three year olds out performing four year olds), perhaps we can ignore this 
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borderline nationality effect? To sum up, the variance analysis suggests that 3-and-4-year-
olds constitute an unstable age group from which to make inferences.   
Table 3.7 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Disappointing Gift Task by Age, Gender, Nationality 
Variables Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age .01 1 .00 .00 .97 
Gender .01 1 .00 .00 .97 
Nationality 18.98 1 3.86 .05 .05 
Age * Gender 18.01 1 3.66 .05 .06 
Age * Nationality 6.58 1 1.34 .02 .25 
Gender * Nationality .77 1 .16 .00 .69 
Age * Gender * 
Nationality 
.65 1 .13 .00 .71 
Note: R Squared = .11 (Adjusted R Squared = .03) 
 
False Belief (Social Understanding) Measures 
The Unexpected Content Task. There were self and other false belief questions in 
this task. A correct answer was scored as 1 point. If a child answered both of the questions 
correctly by saying ‘Smarties’ (as what she or he thought, and her/his friend would think was 
the content of the box), she or he received the maximum score of 2. If s/he answered both of 
the questions incorrectly by saying ‘a pencil or paper clips,’ she or he would receive the 
minimum score of 0. Firstly, and performance against chance in the other protagonist’s false 
belief was tested in each age and nationality group. Table 3.8 presents children’s answers to 
others’ false belief questions. Children from both age nationality groups performed at chance. 
Table 3.9 shows the ‘self-false belief’ responses. Only the 4-year-old Turkish pre-schoolers’ 
were significantly above chance on this measure: P <.001. 
 
 







Number of children who responded to Self FB in Unexpected Content 
Nationality       Age    Obs N    Obs Prop (%)   P 
Turkish 3 Right 8 57 0.79 
Wrong 6 43 
4 Right 22 88 <0.01 
Wrong 3 12 
British 3 
  
Right 14 50 1.00 
Wrong 14 50 
4 Right 12 75 0.07 
Wrong 4 25 
 
The Unexpected Transfer Task.  There was one question of another’s false belief in 
this task. Two additional control questions were not included in the analysis. The test 
question was scored as 1 if the child pointed to the correct box. The correct box was the one 
in which the first puppet initially hid his ball. The child received zero as a score if she or he 
pointed to the incorrect box that the ball was hidden in by the second puppet. From both 
Table 3.8 
Number of children who responded to Others’ FB in Unexpected Content 
Nationality Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)  P 
Turkish    3 Right  6 43 0.79 
 Wrong 8 57 
   4 Right 15 60 0.42 
Wrong 10 40 
British    3 
  
Right 14 50 1.00 
Wrong 14 50 
   4 Right 10 63  0.45 
Wrong 6 38 
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nationality groups, the performance of 3-year-olds was at the chance level, since half of the 
British and 57% of their Turkish children gave the incorrect answer. Four-year-olds from 
both cultures answered the question correctly above chance of significance level: Turkish; P 
<.001, British; P<.02.  
 
 
Total False Belief Score. To increase the variation in the data, children’s 
performance in each of these three questions is summed, and a total false-belief performance 
score is produced. The mean scores are displayed in Table 3.1, had a maximum score of 3 
and minimum of 0.   The performance in SU appeared to be normally distributed.   As the 
descriptive statistics displays in Table 3.1; mean scores of FB was higher for both nationality 
groups’ 4-year-olds than the 3-year-olds. A univariate analysis of variance was conducted 
with Age, Gender, and Nationality effects. Table 3.11 displays that only Age had a significant 
effect on total false belief performance [F (1, 81) = 14.25, p < 0.01].  Gender had no effect on 
false belief performance. Nationality also did not show any significant effect on children’s 




Number of children who responded to Others’ FB in Unexpected Transfer 
Nationality       Age    Obs N    Obs Prop(%)   P 
Turkish 3 Right 6 43 0.79 
Wrong 8 57 
4 Right 23 92 0.00 
Wrong 2 08 
British 3 
  
Right 14 50 1.00 
Wrong 14 50 
4 Right 13 81 0.02 
Wrong 3 19 




Univariate Analysis of Variance of Total FB Score by Age, Gender, Nationality 
Variables Sum of Squares df F       p2 p 
Age 13.21 1 12.47 .14 .00 
Gender .00 1 .00 .00 .95 
Nationality .03 1 .03 .00 .86 
Age * Gender .59 1 .56 .01 .46 
Age * Nationality .58 1 .55 .01 .46 
Gender * Nationality 2.63 1 2.48 .03 .12 
Age * Gender * 
Nationality 
.55 1 .52 .01 .48 
      
Note: R Squared = .19 (Adjusted R Squared = .11) 
 
Additional Measures 
Verbal Ability Measures. Two different language tests were used for two cultures. 
The Turkish Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test was administered to measure one-word 
comprehension because it was standardized in Turkey. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
was administered to British children. The correct pairing of a picture and a word was scored 
with 1 point.  Their overall correct answers accumulated a total raw score for each scale. The 
raw scores from both tests were standardized (z-scores) to match one another. As the analysis 
of variance with Age, Gender, and Nationality suggests, there was a significant effect of Age 
on verbal ability: [F (1, 82) = 10.29, p = .002, partial η2 = .121]. There was no effect of 
Gender or Nationality and no significant interactions.  
Non-Verbal Cognitive Ability Measure 
Raven’s Matrices Test was administered to measure the non-verbal cognitive 
abilities. Children’s correct pairing of a missing piece from a bigger illustration was scored as 
1 point. 3 scales (A, B, AB) were administered and each scale had 12 items. An overall score 
accumulated from the correct answers in all three scales. The maximum score was 36. The 
analysis of variance with Age X Gender X Nationality revealed that Age [F (1, 83) = 
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5.36, p = .023, partial η2 = .07] and Nationality [F (1, 83) = 8.95, p = .004, partial η2 = .11] 
were significant factors on this non-verbal cognitive ability task.  
Correlation Analysis 
The correlations between CR, ER and SU are reported at the task level in Table 3.12. 
The correlations revealed the interrelations among the measure of the same construct and 
how different constructs related to each other. First, Conflict measures, both the Day/Night 
and Giraffe/ Mouse tasks strongly correlated with one another (r (82) = .40, p < .01). As 
compatible with the hypothesis suggests that Conflict performance would be correlated with 
SU (False Belief performance), both conflict tasks were correlated with the FB performance 
(Day/Night: r (82) = .40, p < .01; Giraffe/Mouse: r (82) = .29, p < .01). As Table 3.12 
displays, despite being considered as a subtype of inhibitory control, the Delay and Conflict 
tasks failed to demonstrate any significant correlations with each other. The conflict tasks did 
not relate to emotional-regulation performance. Based on the correlations, the two Conflict 
tasks were collapsed together to produce a composite score.  Additionally, both Conflict tasks 
correlate with verbal ability performance. The Day/Night task alone was also correlated with 
Raven’s matrices task.  
In contrast to the inter-correlations among Conflict tasks, the Delay tasks were not 
related to each other. In the hypothesis, emotional-regulation was expected to relate to Delay 
performance. Only one Delay task - Snack Delay- fulfilled this expectation: (r (82) = -
.23, p < .05).  Children’s reactions in the Disappointing Gift task negatively correlated with 
Snack Delay performance. Although the correlation is low, this relationship supports the 
dissociation hypothesis.   
The correlations were an informative step prior to a more predictive analysis. This 
study aimed to observe the possibility of divorcing two principal components of inhibitory 
control. The ability to regulate the self is a puzzle in terms of how it is constructed by 
  Chapter 3-Study 2   
97 
 
inhibitory control, emotionality, and social understanding. To address each of these 
constructs, the discrepancies and relationships between them must be presented in a causal 
manner. At this juncture, the dissociation between Conflict and Delay was examined, based 
on the separate associations of each with social understanding and emotional-regulation 
respectively. Next, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis is conducted to add direction 










































































Day/Night    -       
Giraffe/Mouse  .40** -      
Snack Delay  -.11 -.01 -     
Sticker Choice  .01 -.03 .17 -    
Disappointing Gift   -.03 -.03 -.23* -.01 -   
False Belief   .37** .26* -.04 -.17 .13 -  
Verbal Ability   .34** .36** -.17 -.07 -.03 .20 - 
Raven’s Matrices  .28* .21 -.00 -.04 .04 .12 .28** 
Note: * p < .05; ** p <.01. 
  Chapter 3-Study 2   
98 
 
Regression Analysis  
To turn the associations between Conflict and social understanding, and Delay with 
emotional-regulation were explored using multiple regression.  First, the strategy of 
simultaneously entering all variables was considered to control for the effect of all predictors 
on each other. However, given the sample size, using the number of variables as predictors 
was thought to be inefficient for such a model fitting. Instead of aggregating all variables into 
the model, a different approach was followed based on the previous studies conducted 
multiple regression analysis with  similar measures (Scullin & Bonner, 2006; Carlson, Moses, 
& Claxton, 2004). Simply, the loading of predictors into the models was done in three steps. 
In the first step, the psychological construct that was suggested in the hypothesis was loaded. 
In the second step, the demographic variables such as age (based on the variance analysis) 
and verbal ability (based on the correlations) were added to the model. In the third step, the 
model was completed with the ‘disassociated’ constructs to make sure that the variables in 
the first step contributed unique variance to the Model.  This approach is explained 
thoroughly for the specific prediction criteria below. Before I continue with the regression 
analyses data reduction should be mentioned, since some of the measures are not included 
into the equations.  
Data Reduction. As mentioned with reference to the correlations; the Conflict 
measures were collapsed to produce a Composite Conflict measure. The Composite Conflict 
measure was correlated with social understanding (r (82) = .37, p < .01); verbal ability (r (82) 
= .42, p < .01); and Raven’s matrices (r (82) = .30, p < .01).  However, the same did not 
apply to Delay measures because as mentioned above, the Sticker Choice task was not 
correlated with Snack Delay. Therefore, no composite score was created for the Delay 
dimension; the performance of Snack Delay is used in the regression analysis. Sticker 
  Chapter 3-Study 2   
99 
 
Choice, a dichotomous variable which did not relate to any measure, was dropped from the 
regression analyses.  
Based on the analysis of variance, gender had no effect on any of the measures in this 
study. Thus, gender is dropped from the regression analysis. A similar conclusion was made 
concerning Nationality l. Apart from emotional-regulation performance, analysis of variance 
showed no difference between the two nationality groups. Age was included into regression 
analysis because it was significantly related to the Conflict and verbal ability. As the aim was 
to follow the practice of other studies and to conduct a developmental exploration, Age and 
Verbal ability were used as demographic variables.    
The first multiple regression was conducted to predict the Conflict dimension. The 
second one was conducted to predict the Delay dimension and the third to predict Emotional-
Regulation. 
Predicting the Conflict Dimension. A hierarchical multiple regression was run to 
determine if the addition of demographic variables, followed by the variables assessing ‘hot’ 
aspects of control, improved the prediction of the Conflict performance over and above False 
Belief alone. Table 3.13 presents the full details of each regression model.  In Model 1, false 
belief alone significantly predicted how children were able to suppress a prepotent response 
in rule based conflict tasks. Model 1 was statistically significant, R2 = .14, F (1, 81) = 
12.84, p < .005; adjusted R2 =.13.   
The addition of Age and Verbal ability to predict Conflict performance (Model 2) led 
to statistically significant increase in R2  of .31, F (2,78)=11.91, p<.001; adjusted R2 =.29. 
Both demographic variables were significant predictors of Conflict performance along with 
false belief performance. In Step 3, the Snack Delay and emotional-regulation measures were 
added to the model. Although Model 3 was a significant model, (R2=.33, F (2, 76) = 
7.34, p <.001; adjusted R2 =.28), the subsequently added variables did not add unique 
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variance to the prediction of Conflict performance. False belief and the demographic 
variables remained as significant predictors in Model 3, but the new measures did not lead to 
a statistically significant change from Model 2 to 3.  The fittest model of all three was, 
therefore, Model 2. Children’s ability to solve conflict in a stoop-like task was predicted by 
their understanding of others’ mind states, verbal abilities, and their age. This analysis 
provided a replication of the previous findings that provide evidence that the conflict 
dimension of inhibition control shares variance with false belief understanding (Carlson, 
Moses, & Breton, 2002).  Although Carlson and colleagues (2002) suggested that false 
belief/social understanding have a shared developmental pathway with the Conflict aspect of 
inhibitory control, the potential ties with the Delay aspect had been slightly overlooked. 
Inhibitory control was found to be strongly correlated with emotional-regulation in 4-year-
olds (but not 5-year-olds) and quite strongly in girls (compared to boys) by Carlson and 
Wang (2007). However, their IC construct, as mentioned earlier, was a combination of Delay 
and Conflict measures.  The results of this study showed that Conflict performance was not 
related to ER. To succeed in tasks with high demand of Conflict resolution, the ability to 
delay or the ability to successfully hide emotions was not necessary. For better ER 
performance and for the ability to resist and wait, a different underlying mechanism was in 
place.





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Conflict Composite 
Conflict Composite Score  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
False Belief  .57 .16 .37** .32 .16 .21* .34 .16 .22* 
Age (months)    .06 .03 .27*    .07 .03 .29* 
Verbal Ability    .43 .17 .26* .40 .17   .24* 
Snack Delay        -.00 .03    -.01 
Disappointing 
Gift 








∆ R2              .14             .18                 .01 
∆F            12.84**           9.99**                 .64 
Note: *p < .05. ; **p < .01. 
Predicting the Delay Dimension. A multiple hierarchical linear regression to predict 
Delay performance was conducted following similar three steps in the previous analyses. See 
Table 3.14 for full details of each regression model. For Model 1, emotional-regulation 
performance was added as the only predictor of Delay performance. Although the R2 value of 
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.055 was mediocre, Model 1 was a significant model, F (1, 80) = 4.65, p < .05, adjusted R2 = 
.04. In Step 2, Age and Verbal ability aggregated to the equation (Model 2), but this model 
was not significant F (3, 81) = 2.43, p = .072.  In Step 3, Composite Conflict and False Belief 
were added to the equation and this model also failed to reach significance F (5, 81) = 
1.44, p = .22.  
Children’s ability to wait for a desired snack was predicted by their way of coping 
with disappointment. This finding fits the model that suggests that affective processes are 
intertwined with the ‘hot aspect’ of executive control abilities (Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, 
& Van Bavel, 2007). Coping with delay is neither rule-based, nor structured. Nevertheless, 
waiting derives from social norms and requires conformity to these. In that sense, masking 
real emotions to spare someone else’s feeling and delaying a desired reward share an 
understanding of those social norms. In the version of Snack Delay that was used in this 
study, children were presented with a delay period that was under the control of the 
experimenter. The way in which a child copes with the uncertainty was linked to their 
performance. Even prompting the experimenter to give them permission to eat Smarties 
caused the child’s delay score to be marked down. Thus, a child who gets easily excited about 
the reward in front of him/her may engage in actions such as ‘moving hands or body’; 
‘prompting the experimenter’; ‘touching the reward.’ All these actions cause a lower score. 
The tendency of the same child to respond towards an undesirable present would be in the 
same direction. She or he may easily get agitated and find it difficult to resource positive 
expressions.





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Delay  
                Delay Score  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Disappointing Gift  -.65 .30 -.23* -.65 .31 -.24* -.67 .16 -.24* 
Age (months)    .01 .10 -.01    -.02 .12 -.02 
Verbal Ability    -1.06 .75 -.17 -1.06 .79   -.17 
Conflict Composite       -.03 .50    -.01 






1.441 F  
∆ R2              .055             .030                 .001 
∆F            4.653*           1.291                 .056 
Note  *p < .05. **p < .01. 
Predicting Emotional-Regulation. Delay performance was exclusively predicted by 
emotional-regulation performance in disappointing situations. Although correlation analysis 
points to singular relationships between Delay and emotional-regulation, hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict children’s performance in the 
Disappointing Gift task. It requires coping with negative feelings. However frustrated the 
child may be feeling about the situation, she or he is expected to reveal few, if any, negative 
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responses. Table 3.15 displays three regression models in detail. Model 1 included only 
Delay performance as a predictor and was significant, F (1, 80) = 4.65, p < .05, adjusted R2 = 
.04. In Step 2, the demographic variables were added, and Model 2 remained statistically 
significant, F (2, 78) = 2.82, p <.05 adjusted R2 = .06. However, subsequently adding False 
Belief and the Composite Conflict performance (Model 3) did not add significant variance, F 
(2, 76) = 2.05, p = .08. Model 2 was not statically different from Model 1, so the leanest 
model was taken to be the fittest one.  We can conclude here that children’s coping with 
negative emotionality in a socially demanding situation was predicted by their delay 
performance and vice versa. The models suggesting a causal relationship between emotional-
regulation and the ability to delay were not exceptionally strong. Therefore, a replication of 
the same trend between delay and emotionality ought to be addressed with a larger sample.





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting the Emotional-Regulation  
         Emotional-Regulation   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Snack Delay  -.09 .04 -.23* -.09 .04 -.23* -.08 .04 -.23* 
Age (months)    .07 .04 .22    .07 .04 .22 
Verbal Ability    -.35 .27 -.16 -.27 .28   -.12 
Conflict 
Dimension  
      -.20 .18    -.15 






2.05 F  
∆ R2              .04                 .021 
∆F            1.86                 .91 
Note: *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. 
 




Study 2 focused on the situational assessment of children’s regulation of negative 
emotionality in relation to the diverse demands of tests under the banner of IC. The 
regression analysis revealed that Delay performance (in Snack Delay task only) was predicted 
by ER (negative) performance and vice versa. Contrary to previous studies, the assessment of 
responses to the Disappointing Gift paradigm was not based only on positive or negative 
reactions. Instead, children’s reactions in all three categories (i.e. positive, negative, and 
transitional) as defined by Saarni, were incorporated into overall performance. In line with 
previous findings, Conflict performance was predicted by SU (e.g. Carlson et al., 2002).  
Having discussed the CR construct in Chapter 2, and the ER construct in this chapter, 
the results reported in this study have their own drawbacks. As mentioned earlier, studies that 
report a relationship between IC and ER rely on an extensive analysis of emotionality and 
composite IC measures. Nevertheless, Study 2 revealed that performance in the Conflict tasks 
did not relate to ER (negative) as Blankson et al. (2013) suggested. However, Blankson et al. 
overlooked the potential of how Delay inhibition might be supporting IC separately. This 
might also indicate that findings from studies such as Carlson and Wang (2007) or Orta et al. 
(2013) (which assume a relationship between IC and ER) might in fact be highlighting a link 
with responses to Delay tasks, rather than Conflict.  When age and verbal ability were 
controlled, the regressions of Study 2 demonstrated that ER (negative) still significantly 
predicted Delay, as well as SU predicting Conflict. The Conflict that was predicted by SU 
was still significant when age and verbal ability were controlled in the model.    
In terms of the relationship between ER and SU, in line with previous findings (e.g. 
Liebermann et al., 2007), Study 2 also showed no association between these two constructs.  
However, before jumping to conclusions, we should note that ER was only assessed in this 
study in relation to the control of negative emotions. Others who have found a relationship 
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between SU and measures of emotional- understanding, such as Blankson et al. (2013), 
suggest that we should cast the net further. This will be done centrally in Studies 4 and 5 (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). However, the next study (and chapter) will start this process, examining 
the child’s emotionality  in terms of a construct involving a broad analysis of the construct 
‘Emotional Understanding’ and the regulation of positive emotionality as conducted by 
Carlson and Wang (2007).  
Regarding performance in each of the Delay and Conflict tasks, a composite score 
from the Conflict tasks was created based on their inter-correlation. However, the Delay tasks 
were not correlated with each other. Snack Delay was the only measure that was correlated 
significantly with ER performance. Similar to Study 1, younger Turkish children’s 
performance in Choice/Delay (Sticker Choice) was better than in their older counterparts. As 
this finding could not be explained, Sticker Choice was dropped from further analysis. This 
odd result was also observed in the Disappointing Gift task. The positive reactions to an 
unwanted gift were higher in the younger group of Turkish children compared to the older 
Turkish and same age British children. However, nationality was the only significant effect in 
ER paradigm. Considering the marginal significance in age and nationality interaction, the 
difference in Turkish and British children’s performance in the ER paradigm is hard to 
explain. The performance of the older British children was compatible with the expectations 
of this task, showing more positive and fewer negative reactions towards an unwanted 
present. On the other hand, four-year-old Turkish children performed worse than those who 
were younger than them in both cultures, as well as British peers who were the same age. 
Although, the effect of culture appears to relate to performance, an additional regression 
analysis (not reported above) showed no significant predictions. Thus, nationality was 
dropped from the analyses reported in the results section.  Additionally, due to lack of 
associations, Choice/Delay tasks were not included in the future designs.  
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In comparison to Study1, the relationship between Conflict and SU was more robust 
in Study 2 when the sample size was increased, and both Conflict tasks were associated with 
SU. There was significant relationship between Delay and ER. However, ER was limited to 
the observation of suppression of negative emotionality only, so the lack of relationship 
between SU and ER might be due to this limitation. An ER battery that combines the 
regulation of positive emotionality and emotion-comprehension might carry the ER -IC 
relationship a step further in Study 3. The Delay tasks are altered in the next study but the 
justification for the change will be discussed further in Chapter 7.   




Chapter 4 - How Does the Regulation of Positive Emotionality and Emotion-
Understanding Contribute to Self-Regulation? 
In the previous chapter, Study 2 supported an association between Delay inhibition 
and the emotion- regulation (ER). However, ER was defined through the number of 
children’s negative expressions during a disappointing event, and the construct was thus 
labelled as ER (negative). Although ER (negative) predicted waiting performance, the 
strength of this relationship was limited to the regulation of negative emotionality. As 
mentioned in previous chapters (1 and 3) the definition of ER remains unclear based on the 
multiple demands inherent in this construct – from highly positive to intensely negative. In 
addition to managing one’s feelings and overcoming emotional challenges, understanding 
emotions has also been claimed to be a vital tool (e.g. Kopp, 1989). In addition to emotion-
understanding, the suppression of positive emotionality has also been overlooked by most 
authors.  
In this chapter, Study 3 examines whether the regulation of positive emotionality 
shares a similar relationship with Delay as does ER (negative). The investigation stretches 
our grasp of the underlying construct to examine the relationship between ER (positive), ER 
(negative) and a measure of emotion-understanding (EU). The aim is to conduct an extensive 
exploration of ER. By stretching the scope of ER, whether examining EU revealed any 
specific associations between the ‘understanding’ of both cognition and emotion; and the 
relationship of EU and SU can be investigated.  Since there was no robust effect of culture, 
Study 3 was conducted with only Turkish children to provide an insight into this understudied 
culture. 117 children from three age groups (3-, 4-, and 5-year olds) were tested for their 
performance in IC, SU, ER (negative), ER (positive) and EU tasks. I will first describe the 
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studies that have introduced the constructs of ER (positive) and EU, and explored their 
relation to other aspects of self-regulation.  Study 3 aims to clarify whether the control of 
both positive and negative emotionality plays a role in terms of the association of cognitive 
and emotional aspects of self-regulation. Additionally, it explores the role of children’s 
growing ability to label emotions in terms of both CR and SU.   
4.1 Regulation of Positive Emotionality  
The research has not shown a consensus on how to define emotion or how to 
distinguish it from emotion-regulation (Gross, 1998), let alone differentiating out the 
regulation of different emotions (i.e. positive or negative). A recent study by Kim and 
Hamann (2007) addressed the issue of ER in terms of the regulation of positive and negative 
emotions. The authors have shown that brain activation was different for ER (negative) and 
ER (positive). In line with the notion that emotional stimuli are critical for the activity in the 
amygdala (Ochsner et al., 2004), Kim and Hamann (2007) reported that decreasing negative 
emotionality was different from decreasing positive emotionality. Compared to the studies of 
the former, the control of positive emotionality is not very common in the developmental 
psychology literature.  
There are popular tasks to measure the regulation of negative emotionality, such as 
Saarni’s Disappointment Paradigm (1984) and the Frustration Paradigm (Calkins, 1997). 
However, there are not many tasks to measure the regulation of positive emotionality. The 
Disappointment paradigm is often alternated with a desirable gift to reveal children’s positive 
emotionality (e.g. Liebermann et al., 2007). However, such an alternation is not a meaningful 
measure of ‘regulation’. Children demonstrate clear emotions towards a pleasing event. The 
demand in that task does not require a child to control his or her positive or negative 
emotionality.  
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As mentioned earlier, academic success requires young children to regulate their 
positive emotionality in certain circumstances, particularly in class. For example, getting too 
excited with the task in hand or not being able to hold back when knowing the answer to a 
teacher’s question may interfere with the child’s social engagement as much as an inability to 
hide negative emotions. As the neuropsychological findings indicate a difference between 
positive and negative emotionality, young children’s coping with positive emotions deserves 
experimental attention.  
Most of the interest in the separation of positive and negative emotionality has been 
during infancy in which children’s high negative emotionality towards a novel object has 
been shown to predict better IC at 14 months and even at the age of 3, whereas babies who 
showed high positive emotionality towards a novel object were the ones who lacked IC at 14 
months (Kagan & Snidman, 1991; Park, Belsky, Putnam, & Crnic, 1997). This evidence from 
infant studies points to temperamental explanations of a child’s reactions toward novelty, yet 
the paradigm they use simply shows whether such novelty is interpreted positively or 
negatively. Despite the finding that young children’s negative reactivity to novelty is often 
related to their better inhibition in toddlerhood (Spinrad, Eisenberg, & Gaertner, 2007), 
Bridgett et al. (2013) reported that, for young adults, IC was inversely related to their 
tendency to display negative emotionality, as reported in a questionnaire.  
Bearing in mind that the methodologies for studying infants and adults may be very 
different, negative emotionality may involve different links to the regulation of actions and 
feelings. For example, adults’ appraisals of an unpleasant memory that elicits negative 
emotions can be used (Levine, 1996). In the assessment of young children’s ER capability, 
situational analyses of negative emotions may well be necessary.  
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In Study 2 (Chapter 3), children’s coping with an event that elicited a negative 
emotion predicted how they cope with a delay. This raises the question of whether 
suppressing positive emotionality shares a similar pattern as ER (negative).  Alternatively the 
demands of ER (positive) could be different to those of ER (negative).  The novelty and 
attractiveness of a toy or a game can be used to simulate positive emotionality such as 
excitement or surprise. During ER (negative), children are expected to reverse their negative 
emotional expressions to positive ones, whereas in ER (positive) process a child is expected 
to neutralize the desire to display true feelings. Now, I will address two tasks that have been 
used as ER (positive) tasks.     
One of the early procedures is the Forbidden Toy task which has been mentioned but 
not discussed in the previous chapter. Although this method has been mostly used for its 
demand on the ability to delay, it was created as a task that intertwines both with emotional 
and cognitive requirements by Lewis, Stanger, and Sullivan (1989). This task was used by 
Carlson and Wang (2007) to assess children’s coping with a delay and whether they told E 
about their misdemeanour.  They found that children’s ability to withhold from touching a 
toy, as instructed, was correlated with their performance in another delay task. Moreover, 
whether this happened while the experimenter was absent from the room was inversely 
related to the number of negative expressions children shown in the Disappointment 
Paradigm. I considered this link as support for the relationship of Delay and ER (negative) 
and Study 2 demonstrated similar evidence. However, the deception part of the task was 
overlooked. When Lewis et al. (1989) developed this task; they reported that just over half of 
the children in their sample, whose ages ranged from 3 to 5-years, touched the toy that was 
forbidden. The majority of the children also lied about this misdemeanour. Performance in 
false belief tasks was related to whether children denied about their misdemeanour while the 
experimenter was not in the room. Similarly, ER (negative) performance was also correlated 
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with children’s denial of touching the toy in Carlson and Wang’s (2007) sample. Aside from 
its delay demand, the Forbidden Toy task does not exactly elicit positive emotionality but 
does encourage children to touch the toy and therefore inform the experimenter about what 
they did.  
A very good example of a task that elicits positive emotionality and also shares the 
Forbidden Toy’s demand of deception was also created by Carlson and Wang (2007). These 
authors created a very exciting procedure in which a goldfish started to communicate with 
children and asked them to keep the fact that he can speak as a secret. The Secret Keeping 
Task excited children with the novelty/impossibility of a talking fish and demanded of them 
not to share the news with the experimenter. Their responses were correlated with EU 
performance and the feigned answers stating whether they liked their undesirable gift or not 
in the Disappointment Paradigm. Thus, ER (Positive) performance in the Secret Keeping 
Task was not related to children’s ability to hide their emotional expressions in ER 
(Negative) but their deceptive answers were. Carlson and Wang (2007) aggregated all 
emotionality measures into a scale of combined ER performance and found that it was related 
to an IC score which contained both Conflict and Delay.  
As Study 2 showed in the previous chapter, it was not Conflict but the Delay demands 
of IC that was predicted by ER (negative). In Study 3, first the relationship between ER 
(negative) and ER (positive) will be investigated. Carlson and Wang (2007) reported that it 
was not emotional displays in the Disappointment Paradigm but children’s answers regarding 
whether they liked the gift or not that related to IC. Since this finding depended on an 
aggregated ER score, while task level in ER (positive) was not correlated to IC measures, ER 
(positive) is not expected to relate any Conflict or Delay measures in Study 3. However, the 
performance in ER (positive) is expected to relate to other aspects of emotionality.   
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4.2 Emotion-Understanding (EU) 
Emotion-understanding (EU) embodies three components; [1] to identify emotional 
expressions, [2] to foresee others’ emotional reactions, [3] to understand the difference 
between visible and private emotional experiences (Denham, 1986; Pons, Harris, & de 
Rosnay, 2004). Children show competence in understanding certain emotions based on their 
simplicity and complexity at certain ages (Harris, 1989). Many studies have focused on the 
age that the child acquires the ability to comprehend different components of the construct 
such as simple (e.g. happy, sad) or moral (e.g. guilt, shame) emotions (Harris, 1989; Saarni, 
Mumme & Campos, 1998).  
According to Denham (1986), children as young as three can identify basic emotions, 
and demonstrate an understanding of particular situations that cause particular feelings (e.g. 
receiving a present makes people happy). Ten month-old children can comprehend their 
mothers’ emotional expression and adjust their actions accordingly (Campos & Stenberg, 
1981). If their mother is frowning, children become less likely to approach an interesting toy. 
This example illustrates the connection between comprehending an emotion and the ability to 
regulate one’s own behaviour. Since the child’s behaviour was affected by the mother’s 
emotional expression, the assumption is that the child has started to comprehend another’s 
emotional expressions.  
Here, I intend to report the findings from the assessment of EU through a task that 
requires children to label the emotions via verbal or pictorial cues. Although EU has been 
claimed to be part of a broader construct ‘ER’, not many studies have compared the 
regulatory and understanding demands of emotions in early childhood. Garner and Power 
(1996) linked emotion-understanding with performance in the Disappointment Paradigm. 
They reported that the positive emotional expressions of children to a disappointing gift were 
positively associated with the EU performance. However, children’s negative expressions did 
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not share a similar pattern. Garner and Power used an EU scale with 10 items that were audio 
vignettes. Children listened to and chose an emotional expression for the character that was 
described in the story.  The range of emotions was ‘happy, sad, angry, afraid, and, surprise’. 
Using a very similar scale to Gardner and Power to assess EU, including natural observations 
of children’s emotional expressivity among peers, and assessing the ER through both parental 
reports and natural observations, Denham et al. (2003) generated a model in which EU 
directly predicted children’s social competence at the age 3-and 4-year-old. The ER 
performance of 3-and 4-year-olds, on the other hand, predicted their social competence in the 
kindergarten years.  
Blankson et al. (2013) reported that in their longitudinal sample, when tested at the 
ages of both 3-and 4-year-olds, children’s EU performance was strongly related to ER 
(negative). Moreover, ER (negative) performance at the age of 3 was correlated with the EU 
performance at the age of 4.  Blankson et al. (2013) also demonstrated that children’s ER was 
predicted by EU at the age of 4-years. More importantly, their finding also sheds light on the 
relationship between CR and EU that has been much less studied that the association of CR 
and SU. They reported that EU performance at the age of 3 predicted Conflict and SU 
performance at the age of 4.  In Carlson and Wang’s (2007) study, EU performance was 
related to both Conflict and Delay performance and was stronger between Conflict and EU.  
As mentioned earlier, the growing ability to understand more complex emotions may 
go hand in hand with SU. The development of EU and SU was tied to the emergence of other 
social-emotional abilities such as prosocial behaviours and moral decision making (Eggum, 
Eisenberg, Kao, Spinrad, Bolnick, Hofer, Kupfer, & Fabricius, 2011; Lane, Wellman, Olson, 
LaBounty, & Kerr, 2010). Eggum et al. (2011) assessed EU and SU to investigate their 
relation to prosocial orientation by testing children first at 3.5-years, and then at 4.5 and 6. A 
prosocial orientation includes behaviours that intend to help others, such as putting someone 
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else’s well-being or benefit before yours. Regulating one’s own desire or expectations is 
necessary for such altruistic behaviour to occur. Eggum et al. (2011) reported that EU 
performance of 3.5 year-olds was related to the ability to share another’s emotional states 
(sympathy) at the age of 6. Early EU and SU performance were related to the later abilities of 
sharing and being compassionate about others’ feelings. Similar to prosocial development, 
children’s reasoning, based on an appreciation trusted adults’ knowledge and desire to adapt 
to social expectation at the age of 5.5, was predicted jointly by EU and SU performance 
(Lane et al., 2010). Children’s understanding of hidden emotions was highlighted by Harris, 
Donnelly, Guz, and Pitt-Watson (1986), and was thought to be based on maturing social 
cognition, particularly the mutual development of SU and EU.  
Despite the mutual effect of EU and SU on later development reported in the above 
studies, Cutting and Dunn (1999) suggested that SU and EU are not joint processes.  They 
found a lack of correlation between false belief and emotion-comprehension. However, 
Harris et al. (1986)’s claim of understanding hidden emotions raises the issue of whether 
children’s ability to hide their own emotions is influenced by such understanding. The level 
of the association between SU and EU is investigated in Study 3.  This might help to explain 
the variance between EU and ER. The assessment of EU has mostly been done through 
children’s labelling of emotions in stories. Those EU tasks were limited to the child’s 
recognition of another’s emotions.  
The child’s grasp of how more than one emotion can be felt, how an emotion lingers 
to be remembered later, and how moral reasons may interfere with emotionality were not part 
of most traditional EU tasks. Pons, Harris and de Rosnay (2004) created the Test of Emotion 
Comprehension (TEC) involving nine components as a more comprehensive scale of 
understanding of emotions. In these, children were expected to show competence in: 
recognizing emotions, causality of emotions, desire and belief reasoning behind emotions, 
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remembering emotion, and the possibility of holding more than one emotion simultaneously. 
In addition, there were also items to assess children’s understanding of how an emotion can 
be regulated and hiding one’s feelings for moral reasons.  Their scale has been used widely in 
research and the performance in TEC has been found to be strongly related to false belief 
performance in the preschool years (see Weimer, Sallquist, & Bolnick, 2012). Pons, et al. 
(2004) reported that with age performance increases on each component and moves from 
recognizing simpler emotions to appreciating mixed states, where for example feelings may 
be mixed. Weimer et al. (2012) explored whether each component might differ in their 
relation to SU. They reported that more complex components, particularly understanding 
causality, desire and belief reasoning behind emotionality and remembering a previous 
emotional state, were relating better to SU rather than simpler components such as 
recognizing emotions.   
TEC has never been used with a Turkish sample before, let alone in relation to 
explore the role of EU in the development of regulatory skills. The developmental pattern 
that occurs from age 4 to 11 that the components of this scale draw upon was validated with 
an Italian sample (Albanese, Grazzani, Molina, Antoniotti, Arati, Farina, & Pons, 2006). The 
TEC assesses a wide range of emotion-comprehension skills that children develop till the age 
of 11 but from the age of 4 the performance across all components improves (Pons et al., 
2003; 2004). Thus EU performance in Study 3 will be assessed via using the TEC.  
According to the previous studies, there is an association between EU and SU, so 
Study 3 aims to replicate this finding within a sample of Turkish 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. 
Moreover, in Study 2, only ER (negative) was examined to represent children’s emotion-
regulation. A lack of association between ER and SU was observed in Study 2. Adding 
another component of ER will expand the investigation. In Study 3, ER (positive) is 
examined. The process of controlling or hiding positive emotions resembles one of the 
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explanations for the child’s failure to pass a false belief task which is the child’s over 
eagerness to give a correct answer (Zelazo, Frye & Rapus, 1996). Although, this eagerness is 
mostly mentioned under the lack of inhibition in terms of executive functions, anyone who 
spends a few minutes to play with children would guess how emotionally charged they are 
when expected to give an answer.  Children’s performance in an ER task that assesses the 
ability to suppress the excitement of new information is expected to relate to their SU 
performance. In case SU remains disassociated with ER (negative) but forms an association 
with ER (positive), the nature of the relationship between ER (positive) and ER (negative) 
would be explored at a further level. This might indicate that the understanding of others’ 
mental states helps to suppress positive emotions but SU does not interfere with the 
regulation of negative emotions. The second half this assumption was supported in Study 2 
but Study 3 also seeks evidence to be able to support that finding.  Both of the types of 
negative or positive emotion-regulation is an adaptation to the social expectations, so instead 
of SU, either ER mechanism would be explained through the understanding of emotional 
processes.  
STUDY 3 
First this study stretched the sphere of emotion-regulation by including tasks of 
emotion-understanding and suppression of positive emotionality. Hence, the relationship 
between CR and ER could be explained through separate mechanisms that may play a role in 
the development of self-regulation. Secondly, an understanding of another’s mind (SU) and 
emotions (EU) might influence the regulation of both aspects of self-regulation. Based on the 
previous studies that were reported in this thesis, Study 3 aims to replicate the disassociation 
of IC in regard to the relationship that the Conflict shares with SU; and the Delay shares with 
ER (negative). Thus, ER (positive) in Study 3 is also expected to be related to the child’s 
reaction to a Delay. EU, on the other hand, is expected to be related to children’s SU 
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performance, consistent with the literature suggesting such a connection. Since EU is 
associated to SU, Conflict is also expected to be related to EU as well. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
the constructs in question in Study 3. As shown with a double arrow, the association of 
Conflict and SU is expected to be replicated here similar to previous studies reported here in 
this thesis. Since the effect of EU is in question here, the potential links that are expected to 
be observed are illustrated in dotted lines.   
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One hundred and seventeen (63 female) Turkish children participated in this study. 
Their ages ranged from 3 to 5 (M=52.51 months, SD=9.21 range: 35-70 months.) They were 
recruited from three nurseries in Bursa (Marmara region) in Turkey. Those nurseries serve 
mostly middle to upper-middle class families. Parental consent was obtained through the 
school administrations, following ethical clearance from the Departmental and University 
Research Ethics Committees. The consent and the willingness of the child to participate were 
treated seriously before and during the testing. Three further children were tested but 
removed from the analysis due to: failing to complete all tasks (2) and technical problems 
(the speaker battery died in the middle of the session) (1).  
Procedure 
Each child was tested individually in a separate room which was provided by the 
nursery (unoccupied administration office or, an activity room).  Due to the availability of the 
separate testing facilities in the nurseries, 29.1 % of the children were tested in two separate 
sessions, 70.9 % of them completed the study in one session. There was no difference 
between the performance of children who completed the tests in a single or two sessions. The 
tasks were presented in a fixed order in two parts. The first part comprised of the following: 
three False Belief tasks, Day / Night Task, Hand Game, Whisper Game, Less is More, and the 
Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC). Behaviour was not recorded by a camera but coded 
simultaneously. The second part comprised the following: Snack Delay, Secret Keeping, Gift 
Delay, Disappointing Gift, and the performances were recorded by a camera and analysed 
later. Table 4 illustrates the list of tasks that were used in Study 3 and the abbreviations in 
use.  




The Day/ Night Task was administered in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.  
  The Hand Game was adapted from Hughes et al. (1998) (based on Luria et al., 1964) 
to assess children’s motion control, in the face of a conflicting rule. The experimenter 
instructed the child to make the same hand motion with her; a fist or a pointed index finger. 
After the child managed 6 consecutive correct imitations of the experimenter’s hand motions, 
the instruction was changed to ‘anti-imitation’.  The child was asked to do the opposite 
motion to the one the experimenter makes (e.g., children should point a finger when he makes 
a fist). Sixteen of these anti-imitation test trials were conducted. Each correct anti-imitation 
response was scored as 1, and the total score was the number of correct trials out of 16. 
  The Whisper Game was adapted from Kochanska et al. (1996) and contained 14 cards 
depicting; 10 familiar and 4 unfamiliar cartoon characters. Children were told that they will 
name cartoon characters in a whisper. Since some children may not have known the meaning 
of the term ‘whispering’ [a few 3- year-olds struggled], they were first trained in what the 
skill involves, by being asked to say their own and the E’s name in a loud and soft tone. Then 
they were asked to say the names of the cartoon characters in a low tone. Children were 
instructed about the game as follows: “Now, you will be looking at some cartoon characters. 
You will tell me their names in a whisper….  (E whispers) ‘a very low tone’. (In normal 
intonation): If you do not know their name, that’s fine.  There might be some of them that you 
do not recognize. Please don’t worry, not many children of your age know all their names. 
Just say ‘I don’t know this one’. But remember, if you do know their name, you need to 
whisper the names to me.” E presented the cards in a pseudo-random order. When the 
children said the name of the cartoon character in a whisper or lower voice, their response 
was scored with 1 point; if they called the name in a loud or normal tone, their response was 
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scored with a 0. Responses of ‘I do not know’ were not counted in the analysis. The 
maximum score in the game was 10, and the minimum score was 0. Scores including ‘don’t 
know’ were prorated to 10 – indeed most children identified most characters. 
The Less is More Task was adapted from Carlson, Davis, and Leach (2005). First, the 
children were introduced to a soft toy called ‘Naughty Cow’ who is a character that wants to 
win all the treats in this game. Both the child and the puppet were given their ‘collecting 
cups’ to put their gains from this game. Then E placed two small boxes on the desk placing 
the treats inside, by introducing them to the child saying “One of these boxes will have a 
small treat in it like 1 candy (or 1 goldfish cracker), and the other one will have more treats 
in it like 3 candies (or 3 goldfish crackers).” Then the child was told that, in this game to win 
the bigger price, she or he has pick and point the box with a smaller amount of treat with the 
following instruction: “You will pick one of them first for Naughty Cow, and then the content 
of the box you did not pick will be yours. Remember, the box you pick first will go into 
Naughty Cow’s cup, the one you did not point/ pick will go into your cup. Be careful, you do 
not want the Naughty Cow to win all the treats, do you? ” When the child picks the cup with 
1 treat in it, her/his performance was scored as 1 point. When the child picks the cup with 3 
treats in it, her/his performance was scored as 0 in that trial. This task continued for 16 trials 
and the amount of treats in each cup (the one on the right/left) were presented in a pseudo-
random order. The maximum score was 16 and the minimum score was 0 in this task.  
Delay Measures   
The Snack Delay Task was conducted based on Wiebe et al.’s (2011) adaptation from 
(Kochanska et al., 1996; Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998) for measuring children’s ability to 
wait in the face of an exciting treat. Children were first told that they would be having some 
small treats in a very funny and playful way while a camera was recording them. The verbal 
consent of the child was obtained before the task (to prevent them from eating something that 
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they do not want to). In this task, a handful of Smarties (candies) or goldfish crackers (salty 
snacks) were placed in a transparent, plastic cup directly in front of the child. Children who 
were willing to eat treats and were comfortable being recorded on camera were tested. 
Children were given two pieces of A3 paper as a hand resting placemat for this game. The 
following instruction had been given, “This cup of treats is yours but in this game, you have 
to wait for them quietly. This is the trick of this game. You will place your hands on the 
circles drawn on the placemat and you will not move your hands out of these circles. So, 
there is a funny rule here, you can’t move your hands, touch or eat the treats and you should 
not talk either until I give you the signal to pick up your treats. Do you want to know what the 
signal is? [The experimenter claps her hands once] I’ll clap my hands when the waiting time 
is over. After you hear my clap, you can pick up your sweet and eat it. Remember you have to 
wait until I clap my hands to give you your signal to take your treats. Do you want to start 
now?” E helps the child to put her/his hands on the placemats and makes sure that she or he 
sits comfortably on the chair. Then E places the cup and starts the time for the waiting period 
which lasts for 240 seconds. In the first 120 seconds, the experimenter stays in the room with 
the child and applies two distractors (e.g. dropping her pen and coughing). In the next 90 
second period, E tells the child that she needs to leave the room for a quick break, but she 
will be back very soon. The child was asked to wait in exactly the same way as E had 
instructed her or him before. E returned to the room again for the last 30 second period.  
Children’s performance was scaled based on their reaction toward the stimuli during each 
waiting period [experimenter present in the room (120 sec), experimenter absent (90sec), 
experimenter present second time (30sec)] such as; eating the candy, touching the candy, 
moving their hand or body towards the candy. The child's latency to move their hands from 
the placemats, duration of the time that the child’s hands were not on the placemat and the 
return of the moving hands from the placemat were also recorded for the each waiting period. 
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The selected dependent measure was the latency to move hands to the mat for first time in 
each waiting period.  Children’s specific behaviours were coded similar to the coding scheme 
used in Study 2. The coding system asked [1] did the child move hands from the placemat?; 
[2] did the child eat the treat during the waiting period?; The experimenter recorded [3] when 
was the first time that the child moved his or her hands?; [4] how long were the child’s hands 
not on the placemat ? [5] how many times has this behaviour occurred (moving hands, and 
keeping them away from they were supposed to be); [6] did the child move body its towards 
the treats?  Additionally, when the child first moved her hands from the placemat (the latency 
to break the rule of the game), and the duration of their distraction from the rule were also 
coded. There were three stages of the task. In two of them the experimenter was present in 
the room and in one of them she was absent. Whether the children’s performance might be 
different in these situations was of interest, particularly the difference between the 
performance while E was present or absent in each age group. 
The Gift Delay Task was adapted from Kochanska et al. (2000). Children were 
expected to wait for 60-seconds without looking in the direction of the experimenter who was 
intriguingly wrapping a present for the child. In case of peeking, children received a score of 
0 point (fully turned around and looked), or a score of 1 point (look over the shoulder) for 
their performance. Children who did not peak received 2 points. Latency to the first pick and 
the total number of peeks were used with the performance score to create a standardized 
composite score for the task. 
Emotion-Regulation Measures 
The Disappointing Gift Task was administered in the same way as in Study 2.  There 
was only one small change in this study. Children were not presented with the toy and ‘the 
bad present’ option prior to conducting the disappointment task. Carlson and Wang (2007) 
administered the Gift Delay task prior to this task. Their lead was followed in this study.  
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The children were presented with the wrapped ‘gift’ from the previous task and were told that 
“This is your surprise present! I hope you like it. Thank you for playing with me today.”  
After this, E did not start any conversation with the child, unless the participant promptly 
asked any questions. Neutral answers were given to those questions, mainly by repeating 
questions or yes/no answers (e.g. Q: Is that what you are giving to me? A: Yes; or Q: What 
am I going to do with this? A: So, you want to know what you are going to do with this). 
The Secret Keeping Task was developed by Carlson and Wang (2007) to assess the 
ability to suppress positive emotionality in the face of an exciting event. Participants were 
made to believe that there is a talking goldfish in the room.  The experimenter presented a 
goldfish in a bowl placed in a square blue box with a hidden speaker inside the top. On each 
side of the box, there were two identical blue containers for fish food. One container had a 
picture of pizza, and the other had a picture of spinach on it. E introduced the goldfish as 
‘Ziya’ to the child and told her or him that this goldfish belongs to the experimenter’s brother 
and she needs to take care of him for the day (that was a cover-up for bringing a goldfish to 
the nursery- since more than a few children questioned the purpose of carrying the goldfish 
around). E had familiarized the child with her own name and also stressed here the goldfish’s 
name. When it was clear that the child was comfortable E said that she needed to leave the 
room briefly to ask a question of the child’s teacher and that she would be back very soon. 
Then she asked, in her absence, would the child mind looking after Ziya (All children were 
quite excited about being alone with Ziya. Some even engaged in interaction [like calling its 
name] before it started talking). When the child was alone in the room, E switched the 
bluetooth speaker on, and played the following recording for Ziya’s first speech.  
“Ziya eh?! She gave me this silly name, Ziya meh! Hi kid! What’s your name? 
[Silence for the child to answer, most of them said their name in this break] Your 
name is nice. Do you like my name, Ziya? [Another silence] Hmmm! Alright then. 
Oh, by the way, I can talk, yes. Please, do not tell this to [Cansu]! She would go and 
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tell everyone about it, and then I would have to talk to too many people. This would 
tire me. Ooph!   Let’s keep this as a secret between us, alright?  [Short silent break], 
Wait, I think she is coming.”  
After the first speech was completed, E returned to the room briefly saying that she 
forgot her pen and paper, and she is there to collect them. Then she asked the child ‘Was 
everything alright when I was gone?’. After this question, if the child shared Ziya’s secret, 
and said something about the goldfish talking, the game ended. E said that it was a joke 
intended to surprise the child and showed the speaker behind the box containing the fishbowl. 
Together they played the recording of the ‘fish-talk’ once more. She also asked the child 
whether she or he enjoyed her joke, or not.  The child who did not tell the secret in the first 
phase received 1 point for passing the first prompt. If the child did not say anything about 
Ziya’s secret, E left the room again and the second part of Ziya’s speech started.   
“Phew! That was close. Thank you for not telling my secret to E. Oh!, all this 
craziness made me hungry. I wish I had a slice of pizza. Pof! I wish somebody fed me 
some pizza.   Oh, I’m starving! E always gives me spinach, yuk! I hate spinach. Oh, 
she is coming again. Please, do keep my secret, do not tell anyone.” 
After the completion of Ziya’s speech, E returned to the room and asked the child the 
same question:  ‘Was everything alright when I was gone?’. If the child did not tell Ziya’s 
secret, she continued with the following questions as prompts for the child to spill the beans.  
Those prompts were as follows “Do you think the fish likes its name? Do you think the fish is 
hungry? What should we feed Ziya with? Which one does Ziya like the most do you think - 
spinach or pizza? / How do you know that Ziya likes pizza? / Did Ziya talk to you (as a final 
question)?”.  If the child did not say anything about the fish’s secret all through these 5 
prompts, then the child received the maximum score of 6. At any point, if the child told the 
secret, then the game was over and the child was debriefed. The minimum score in this task 
was 0, when the child told the secret, at the first time E returned the room. The children’s 
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performance was scored ranging from 0 (told the secret immediately) to 6 (not revealed the 
secret).  
Emotion-Understanding (EU) Measure   
EU was tested with the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC), which was adapted from 
Pons et al. (2003). Their assessment was based on 9 components of emotion-understanding. 
The first component was ‘recognition’ of the following emotions: ‘sad’’, ‘‘happy’’, ‘‘angry’’, 
‘‘just alright,’’ and ‘‘scared’’ in 5 pictures. These consisted of 4 faces depicting 4 of those 
emotions and children were asked to point to the emotion that the experimenter uttered. If the 
child succeeded in recognizing four items out of five, she or he received 1 point as a score for 
this component. The second component was ‘external cause’ and it also included 5 items. 
Children were told a simple story in which, for example, the protagonist’s pet turtle died and 
they were asked about how she or he felt.  This would lead to a certain emotion such as 
‘sadness’. After the story was told with the help of small drawings, children were asked ‘how 
would [name of the protagonist] feel?’, and the outcome emotions ‘‘sad’’ (the protagonist’s 
turtle just died), ‘‘happy’’ (the protagonist is getting a birthday present), ‘‘angry’’ (the 
protagonist is being annoyed by his little brother), ‘‘just alright’’ (the protagonist is standing 
at the bus stop), and ‘‘scared’’ (the protagonist is chased by a monster). In this component, 
similar to the first one, children were given 1 point when they answered at least 4 items out of 
5 correctly. The third component was ‘desire’, in which two characters (Tom and Jack) were 
in conflict over their desire for a food item in a closed box. Then the content of the box was 
revealed. Children were asked ‘how does the character (e.g., Tom) who hates this food feel?’ 
(sad) and ‘how does the other character (Jack) who loves this food feel?’ (happy). Children 
received 1 point when they answered both of the questions correctly. The fourth component 
was ‘belief’ where a story about a pet bunny of the protagonist was presented. The bunny was 
enjoying some carrots without knowing the fox, who wants to eat the bunny, was peeking 
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through the bushes. The child pulled open the bushes to allow the participant to see the fox 
for him herself/herself. After the story, the child was asked the two following questions. The 
first one was whether the bunny knows that the fox was behind the bushes and the second one 
concerned how the bunny feels. If the child picked the correct outcome “happy”, since the 
bunny was oblivious of the fox and enjoying the carrots, she or he received the score of 1 
point for this component. The fifth component was ‘reminder’ where the story of the 
protagonist’s (Tom’s) pet bunny’s tragic end at the hands of the fox has been told and then 
the follow up stories looking at photograph albums have  been told as well. Children were 
asked about Tom’s feeling towards his pet’s demise. The correct answer was “sad” and was 
scored with 1 point. The sixth component was for ‘regulation’ in which children were asked 
about the best solution for the protagonist to stop feeling upset after his pet’s demise. The 
options for the protagonist were to ‘close his eyes’, ‘go out and do something else’, ‘think 
about something else’, or that ‘there is nothing Tom can do’. Children were expected to pick 
the choice of ‘‘Tom can think about something else to stop himself being sad’’ to regulate 
their emotions. The seventh component was ‘hiding’ the emotions. Children were introduced 
to another character who was a friend (Daniel) of the protagonist (Tom) but who also teases 
Tom for having more marbles than him. Tom smiles back at Daniel. It was asked, ‘What 
would Tom be feeling after Daniel teased him although he is smiling? A correct response 
from the child was “angry”. The eighth component was for ‘mixed’ emotions in which the 
protagonist was in a situation where he has received a bicycle as a birthday present but was 
also concerned about falling off since he did not know how to ride a bike. Children were 
asked what would be the protagonist's feelings in a situation like that, and the expected 
outcome was ‘‘happy and scared’’ [Tom has just received his first bicycle (happy but fears 
that he might hurt himself (afraid)]. The final component was ‘morality’ where the 
protagonist took a cookie without asking in somebody else’s house and he did not confess to 
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his mother. When the child was asked:  "how does Tom feel about not confessing to his 
mother about the cookie that he took without any permission in somebody else’s house?" The 
expected outcome as an answer was ‘‘sad’’ (Tom is upset at not having confessed to his 
mother). A total score was calculated through accumulation of each component. Each 
component was scored 1 point for correct answers or was scored 0 points in case of failing to 
recognize the emotion correctly. The maximum score was 9 points, and the minimum score 
was 0.  
Social Understanding (False Belief) Measures 
The Unexpected Content and The Unexpected Transfer Tasks were administered in 
the same way as in Studies 1 and 2. 
The Appearance-Reality Task was presented as a money-box that looks like a small 
birthday cake. The child was shown the plastic cake and asked “What do you think this is?” 
Then the child was invited to touch the cake and look closely to see the money hole and 
shake it to hear the sound of the pennies in it. When the child realized that this object 
(looking like a cake) is actually a money-box, the experimenter asked false belief questions 
as follows: “What did you think this object was when you first looked at it?’’; “What is this 
object really?”.  
Results 
Study 2 demonstrated the discrepancy between two dimensions of inhibitory control. 
Children’s ability to cope with rule-based conflicts was strongly predicted by their ability to 
understand another’s beliefs. Children’s ability to cope with delay in the face of temptation 
was related to how they masked their real emotions in a negative situation. The strength of 
the relationship between the Delay and ER was insufficient due to the limitations of 
measures. Thus, Study 3 aimed to replicate the findings of the previous study by employing 
different and complementary tasks. For example, Snack Delay task was too structured and 
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short in the previous study. A prolonged waiting game was administered with an additional 
absent condition where E left the child alone in the room for 90 seconds. ER was observed 
through negative emotion suppression in the previous study; the Secret Keeping task was 
used here to add performance in terms of positive emotion suppression. Most importantly, 
despite the strong relationship of social understanding with Conflict performance; children’s 
understanding of others’ minds brought out the question of children’s understanding of 
others’ emotions. Although the previous study did not find any relationship between false 
belief and ER (negative) performance, enhanced emotionality measures in this study 
attempted to seek a link between SU and ER. Mainly, EU was added to build a bridge 
between social understanding and the situational control of emotions.  
The findings presented below explain whether each construct was related to children’s 
age. Gender was not examined since Study 3 failed to show any gender differences on any of 
the constructs.  Developmental change on conflict, delay, emotion-regulation, and social and 
emotion-understanding were examined through the analysis of variance with one-way 
ANOVA. Following the descriptions of the measures, to show how each task relates to the 
construct, the correlations among them are reported. Data reduction to create composite 
scores is described in detail.  Lastly, the hierarchical multiple regression analyses concluded 
the predictions.  
Children’s mean performances and standard deviations in each task of Study 3 are 
presented by Age group in Table 4.1. Below, the preparation of each measure for the further 
analysis has been explained.
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Comparisons by Age 
Conflict Measures  
The Day/Night Task.  The scoring was identical with the procedure reported in the 
Studies 1, and 2. As Table 4.1 illustrates, the mean performance of 3-year olds was lower 
than the 4-year-olds.  The highest mean score belongs to the group of 5-year-olds. The 
analysis of variance showed a significant effect of Age on children’s performance in this task, 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics for all variables by Age 
Measures Min Max     Overall  
 
Mean     SD 
3-year-olds 
 
Mean    SD 
 4-year-olds 
 
Mean      SD 
5-year-olds 
 
Mean   SD  
 
Day/Night Task  0 16 13.08    2.7 11.71 2.8  12.97      2.7 14.96     1.0  
  
Hand Game 2 16 13.38  2.6 11.44    3.2  14.25      1.7 14.66     1.4  
      
Whisper Game 0 10 5.57 2.8 3.75   2.6  6.34    2.9  6.81    1.9  
  
Less is More  0 16 12.45  3.7 10.65     4.4 13.13   3.1 13.78     2.7  
  
Snack Delay 0 12 10.06  2.0 9.30  2.1 10.04   2.1 10.93     1.4  
                
      Latency(sec) 21 240 175.72   63.2 158.12 66.7 164.27    66.5 212.51 34.48  
        
Gift Delay 0 2 1.60  0.6 1.44  0.7 1.58    0.5 1.84     0.4 
 
 
    Latency(sec) 0 60 51.1 14.9   48.9   15.8 50.4  15.4   54.8   12.7 
 
 
Disappointing Gift -9 3 -2.00  2.40  -1.92     2.5 -1.86  2.3 -2.27      2.5  
        
Secret Keeping 0 6 2.24  2.6 2.46 2.5 1.51  2.3 2.93    2.8  
        




0 9   3.96  1.8    2.95   1.5     3.76    1.6   5.48    1.6   
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F (2,117) =16.53, p<.001, p2= .23 (see Table 4.2). A Tukey test (with the Tukey-Kramer 
correction here and below) revealed that the performance of 4-year-olds was significantly 
different to that of the 3- year-olds (p=.05, 1.25, 95% CI [.00, 2.52]) and 5-years-olds 
(p<.001, -1.99, 95% CI [-3.33, -.66]). The performance of 5 year-olds was also significantly 
different from the 3-year-olds (p<.001, 3.25, 95% CI [.00, 2.52]).  This finding indicates a 
performance difference from age 3 to 4.  
Table 4.2 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Day/Night by Age 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df     F p2 p 
Age 194.29 2 16.53 .23 <.001 
Note: R Squared = .23 (Adjusted R Squared = .21) 
 
The Hand Game.  Children were required to do the opposite gesture to E’s cue 
gesture (an index finger versus a fist). In each of the 16 trials, children’s correct responses 
were scores as 1, and incorrect responses were scored as 0. A sum of the correct responses 
was claimed as a total score in this task. The maximum score was 16, and minimum score 
was 2. Three-year-olds’ mean score was below the overall mean performance and lower than 
both of the older age groups. Four- and 5-year-old children’s performance was not different 
from each other.  As Table 4.3 shows in the analysis of variance, Age has a significant effect 
on children’s performance in Hand Game, F (2,117) =23.19, p<.001, p2= .29. Tukey tests 
revealed that the performance of 3-year-olds was significantly different to that of both 4-and 
5- year olds (p<.001, 2.81, 95% CI [1.63, 3.99]); p<.001, 3.22, 95% CI [1.96, 4.49]). The 
performance of 4-and 5- year olds was not statistically different from one another (p=.71, 
.413, 95% CI [-.84, -1.67]).  




Univariate Analysis of Variance of Hand Game by Age 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df    F p2  p 
Age 241.12 2 23.19 .29      <.001 
Note: R Squared = .29 (Adjusted R Squared = .28) 
 
The Whisper Game. Children were shown 14 cards. Two of them were unfamiliar 
cartoon characters, 2 of them were difficult to identify cartoon characters and the rest were 
easily recognizable by the children. Children were asked to say the names of the characters in 
a very low-volume voice (whisper).  The correct response of whispering the names of the 
cartoon characters in each trial was scored as 1. When children recognized the character and 
called its name in a high volume or the normal voice, their response was scored as 0. The 
maximum score was 10, and minimum score was 0. Table 3.1 illustrates mean scores, in the 
Whisper game. The mean performance of 3-year-olds was very much below that of their 
elder peers. The performance of 4-and 5 year-olds was not much different from each other.  
The analysis of variance in full detail presented in Table 4.4 shows that Age has a significant 
effect on Whisper Game performance, F (2,117) =16.16, p<.001, p2= .22. The performance 
difference between age groups was revealed by Tukey tests as 3-year-olds performed 
significantly different to both 4-and 5-year olds (p<.001, -2.59, 95% CI [-3.92, -1.27]; 
p<.001, -3.05, 95% CI [-4.48, -1.63]). Similar to mean scores point, the performance of 4-








Univariate Analysis of Variance of Whisper Game by Age 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df         F p2 p 
Age 211.90 2 16.16 .22 <.001 
Note:  R Squared = .22 (Adjusted R Squared = .21) 
The Less is More Task. In this task, children’s choice of the smaller reward to gain a 
bigger one was scored as 1 and, their choice of a bigger reward in the first place was scored 
as 0. In 16 trials, children accumulated a maximum score of 16, or a minimum score of 0. 
Again, based on children’s mean scores in Table 4.1, 3-year-old children performed poorly 
compared to 4-and 5-year olds whose performance was not much different from each other. 
The analysis of variance in full detail presented in Table 4.5 showed that Age has a 
significant effect on children’s performance in the Less is More task, F (2,117) =8.59, 
p<.001, p2= .13. Similar to what the mean scores show, Tukey tests showed that 3-year-olds 
performed significantly less well than the 4-and 5-year-olds, (p<.005, -2.48, 95% CI [-4.30,-
.67]; p<.001, -3.12, 95% CI [-5.07, -1.18]. However, the performance was not statistically 
different between 4-and 5-year olds, p=.71, -.64, 95% CI [-2.57, -1.28].  
Relations among Conflict Measures 
Table 4.5 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Less is More by Age 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df           F p2 p 
Age 211.28 2 8.60 .13 <.001 
Note: R Squared = .13 (Adjusted R Squared = .12) 
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 In regard to the variance analysis reported above, performance in all four of the 
Conflict measures was improved as children reach the age of 5-year-olds.  In further analysis, 
to examine the conflict measures as a whole, data reduction was attempted. Table 4.6 
illustrates all the positive inter-correlations among four of the Conflict tasks. The strongest 
correlation existed between Day/Night and Hand Game tasks. The rest of the correlations had 
medium strength. Based on the inter-correlations, the Conflict tasks were aggregated into a 
Conflict Composite score by using standardized (z-scores) scores. Each task was strongly 
correlated with the Composite score. The Conflict measures were correlated with false belief 
performance at the task level. The analysis of variance of Conflict Composite Score by Age 
reported that a significant effect on this composite score as well, F (2,117) =38.50, p<.001, 
p2= .40. The relation between the Conflict Composite score to other measures will be 
presented after reporting other measures by comparison to age.





The Snack Delay Task. For the 240 seconds of the waiting period, children waited in 
two conditions: an adult present in the room and absent. In the first 120 seconds E was 
present in the room. Next for 90 seconds E was absent; in the last 30 seconds E returned to 
the room. Children’s latency to move their hands for the first time was recorded, along with 
the following behaviours. ‘Move Hands’, ‘Move Body’, ‘Eat treats’, ‘Touch treats’.  If a 
child did not engage in any of the 4 responses, she or he received 1 point for each of them.  
Apart from ‘Move Hands’, the other outcomes were not too common in many children. Out 
of 117 children, only 6 of them ate the treats before the cue was given.  Two (one 3-year-old; 
one 4-year-old) who ate the treats before the time were in the first ‘E is present’ stage, 2 (one 
3-year-old; one 5-year-old) of them were in ‘E is absent’ stage, and 2 (both 4-year-olds) of 
them were in the second ‘E is present’ stage.  When a child moves its hands, the rule of the 
game was broken but the child was still required to wait before eating the treats. Since not 
many of the children ate the treats, as a threshold for their patience, whether they moved their 
hands or not, touched the treats, moved their body towards the treat or ate any of the treats 
Table 4.6 

































Day/Night     -    
Hand Game  .61**  -   
Whisper G.  .25** .26**  -  
Less is More  .29** .26** .35** - 
Note: ** p< .01. 
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were all considered. For each time interval period (present-absent-present conditions), 
children received scores out of 4. The maximum score was 4; a minimum score was 0 for 
each interval. Then the scores in each interval were added up to a total Snack Delay score in 
which the maximum score was 12, and the minimum score was 0. The latency to move hand 
for the first time was recorded. For total latency, the seconds for a child to move his or her 
hand was aggregated. Minimum latency for a child to move hands was 21, and the maximum 
latency was 240 which meant that the child never moved hands during the task. Two-way 
mixed, intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) was used a measure of reliability with 2 raters 
across 23 subjects (20% of the sample) in the Snack Delay Latency revealed that 87.2% of  





Univariate Analysis of Variance of Snack Delay (Total Score) by Age and Gender 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df        F p2 p 
Age 46.79 2 6.23 .10 .00 
Gender 6.49 1 1.73 .02 .19 
Age * Gender 2.92 2 .39 .01 .68 
Note: R Squared = .12 (Adjusted R Squared = .08) 
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In Table 4.1, the means of the total score and total latency are displayed.  The mean 
performance of 3-year-olds was slightly lower than the older children of both other age 
groups. The mean performance of both 4-and 5-year olds was very close to each other.  In the 
total latency, 3-and 4-year olds were below the overall mean. The mean of total latency was 
around 212.51 seconds for 5-year-olds. It was quite high considering the length of the task 
was 240 seconds. The analysis of variance was conducted with both Score and Latency by 
Age and Gender. The child’s gender was added to the variance analysis in order not to 
overlook the gender effect on delay performance as suggested in the work of McCabe and 
Brooks-Gunn (2007). See Tables 4.7 and 4.8 for details of the variance analysis. Age had a 
significant effect on Score in Snack Delay. Tukey tests showed that the performance of 5-
year-olds was significantly different to that of 3-year-olds but not 4-year olds (p<.005, 1.54, 
95% CI [.47, 2.63]; p=.12, .89, 95% CI [-.17, 1.96]). The performance of 4 year-olds was not 
significantly different from the 3-year-olds, p=.27, -.66, 95% CI [-.35, 1.66].  
As displayed in Table 4.8, Age is a significant effect also in the Latency in Snack 
Delay task. The performance of 5-year-olds was significantly different from both 3-and 4-
year-olds (p<.001, 54.39, 95% CI [21.74, 87.05]; p<.005, 48.23, 95% CI [15.92, 80.55]). The 
difference between performances was not statistically significant for 3-and 4-year old 
children. Gender or any interaction did not significantly affect the children’s scores or the 
latency to move their hands. 
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The ‘move hands’ occurred more often than the other types of response. The number 
of children who ‘moved hands’ is displayed in Table 4.9 by age group and in present-absent 
conditions. It shows, in all age groups, that more children tend to move their hands in the 
absent condition compared to when E was present. In the 3-year-old group, 78% of the 
children moved their hands in the absent condition. Similarly for 4-year-olds, children who 
moved their hands (65.1 %) outnumber the ones who did not.  For the 5-year-olds, only 
36.4% of the children moved their hands in the absent condition. In the youngest group, it 
was quite clear that children tend to be tempted away from waiting when the adult left the 
room. The way 4-year-olds behave while the absent conditions was similar to younger 
children. However, the 5-year-olds did not seem to be much affected by E’s departure. The 
analysis of variance on children’s latency to move their hands in the absent condition showed 
that Age significantly influenced the latency to move, F (2, 117) =6.29, p<.05, p2= .102. 
Tukey tests revealed that 5-year olds’ performance was significantly different than 3-and 4- 
year-olds (p<.05, 26.66, 95% CI [7.95, 45.38]; p<.05, 20.94, 95% CI [2.42, 39.46]).  On the 
other hand, 4-year-olds did not perform differently from their younger peers.
Table 4.8 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Snack Delay (Total Latency) by Age and Gender 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df            F p2     p 
Age 64089.99 2 9.27 .14   .00 
Gender 12190.53 1 3.53 .03   .06 
Age * Gender 4078.23 2 .59 .01   .56 
Note: R Squared = .18 (Adjusted R Squared = .14) 
 




The Gift Delay Task. This task took place prior to the Disappointing Gift. Children 
were told that they were going to receive a surprise present from E, but whilst she wrapped 
their present, they were asked to turn their back and wait for 60 seconds without turning 
around or peeking. Children who did not peek for the whole waiting period received the 
maximum score of 2. Children who peeked at any time in the waiting period received the 
score of 1. Children who fully turned around and looked at the experimenter at any time of 
waiting period received the minimum score of 0. The latency of the child’s first peek and the 
repetition of the peeking were recorded. For the Gift Delay Score, the interrater reliability for 
two raters with 20 % of the sample (23 children) was found to be Kappa =.50 (p <.05), 95% 
CI (.007, .010) which indicated a moderate agreement.  
Table 4.9  
Number of children who moved hands from the placemat in each delay period 
Age      T1(Present)     T2  (Absent)      T3  (Present)  
3  
moved        18 (43.9%) 32 (78%) 15 (36.6%)  
did not move        23 (56.1%) 9 (22%) 26 (63.4%)  
     
4  
moved  17 (39.5%) 28 (65.1%) 7 (16.3%)  
did not move  26 (60.5%) 15 (34.9%) 36 (83.7%)  
     
5  
moved  
    5(15.2%) 
12 (36.4 %) 2 (6.1%)  
did not move          28(84.8%) 21 (63.6%) 31(93.9%) 
 
 
moved  40     72            25  
Total  did not move  77 45             93  
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Table 4.10 below displays number of children who responded according to the scoring 
mentioned above. It shows that in all age groups, children tended to be more patient and did 
not look at E wrapping the present5. For children who peeked during the delay period, the 
repetition of peeking decreased as the child got older. Table 4.1 above shows the children’s 
mean score and the mean latency to peek for the first time. As shown, children’s mean score 
increases as age increases. The latency to first peek (in seconds) was gradually higher for 
older children compared to the younger ones. Then three-year-old group had the shortest 
latency. The analysis of variance was conducted to Score, Latency and Repetition by Age and 
Gender. For both Latency and Repetition, neither Age nor Gender has an effect on the 
performance. Table 4.11 shows the analysis of variance which reports the significant impact 
of Age on children’s Gift Delay (Score) performance. Gender or any interaction does not 
have any significant effect on the performance. Tukey tests showed that the performance of 
5-year-olds was significantly different to that of the 3-year-olds, p<.01, .41, 95% CI [1.0, 
.73], while the difference was not statistically significant from 4-year-olds, p=.11, .27, 95% 
CI [-.043. .58]. The performance was not significantly different between 3-and 4-year-olds, 
p=.48, 3.14, 95% CI [-.15, .44]
                                                          
5 In Table 4.10, it is shown that the children scored highly in Gift Delay tasks which indicates a negatively 
skewed distribution. Thus, the scores were square rooted. The analysis variance was conducted with this new 
Square Rooted Gift Delay Score by Age and Gender.   









Children’s responses and the descriptive statistics of repetition in the Gift Delay Task by Age 
                             Gift Delay 





look over the 
shoulder (1) 
did not peek 
(2) Mean SD 
3-year-olds 5 13 23 1.00 1.67 
4-year-olds 1 16 26 .72 1.16 
5-year-olds 0 5 28 .51 1.62 
Total 6 34 77 .76 1.48 
Table 4.11 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Gift Delay (Square Root Score) by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p2 p 
Age 1.23 2 5.71 .09 .00 
Gender .12 1 1.08 .01 .30 
Age * Gender .31 2 1.46 .03 .24 
Note:  R Squared = .11 (Adjusted R Squared = .07) 
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Relations among Delay measures 
Each Delay task involved Score, Latency and Repetition measures. Table 4.13 
displays the correlations among each of these measures. The score children received in Snack 
Delay was strongly correlated with the latency to move hands in the first place in this task. 
The same pattern existed for Gift Delay task. The children’s score based on whether they 
peeked or not was strongly correlated with the latency to peek. The repetition measure in 
each task was negatively correlated with Score and Latency. Children who tended to have 
lower scores and shorter latency to move their hands or peek at the present wrapping were 
also more likely to repeat this distractive behaviour.  The score and the latency in both Delay 
tasks were correlated among themselves. The correlations for Score and Latency were 
stronger compared to Repetition. Thus, the composites from each task for Score and Latency 
were created.  
When the analysis of variance was repeated for the composites, the Delay Composite 
Score was not predicted by age or gender. However, Delay Composite Latency was 
significantly predicted by both Age and Gender but the interaction of these two was not 
significant. Table 4.14 below displays the further details of this analysis. Tukey tests revealed 
that the performance of 5 year-olds was significantly different to that of the 3- and 4-year-
olds (p<.001, .62, 95% CI [.25, .99]; p<.01, .47, 95% CI [.11, .84]). However, the 
performance of 4 year-olds was not statistically different from the 3-year-old group, p=.60, 
.14, 95% CI [-.20, .49].










Univariate Analysis of Variance of  Delay Latency Composite by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p2 p 
Age 7.97 2 8.99 .14 .00 
Gender 2.68 1 6.05 .05 .02 
Age * Gender 1.08 2 1.22 .02 .30 
      




























































Snack Delay Score    -     
Snack Delay Latency   .80**     -    
Snack Delay Rep  -.65** -.71**     -   
Gift Delay Score   .50**  .45** -.43**     -  
Gift Delay Latency   .42**  .41** -.44**   .78**     - 
Gift Delay Rep  -.37** -.34**  .38**  -.70** -.84** 
Note: ** p< .01  





The Disappointing Gift Task. The procedure and the scoring were the same as in 
Study 2. In this study, 60.7% of the children did not show any positive reaction to the 
disappointing gift. Only 39.3% of them showed at least 1 or more (up to 5) positive reactions. 
The percentage of children who did not show any negative reactions was 10.3%, but 89.7% 
of them showed at least 1 or more (up to 5) negative reactions. The percentage of the children 
who did not show any transitional reaction was very low (1.7%). When children were asked 
if they liked the present or not; 15.4% of them said that they did not like it. 26.5 % answered 
the question positively (like it) but only showed a bodily gesture (closing eyes as in a ‘yes’ or 
shaking their heads). 58.1 % verbally answered the question saying that they liked the mock 
present. Children’s verbal answers were given a score of 2; gesture answers were given the 
score of 1, and children’s negative answers were given the score of 0.  When children were 
given their actual present, after the task was over, they were asked which present they would 
prefer; almost all of them picked the second present –a real toy. Only 2 children said they did 
not mind. Children’s responses to the question: ‘Did you like your present?’ were similar in 
all age groups, clustering on ‘yes’. The analysis of variance did not show any age effect on 
children’s answers. The same variance analysis was also conducted with the children's 
reactions in each category. Mean scores for positive, negative, and transitional response 
categories is displayed in Table 4.14. The mean responses in Positive and Transitional 
categories were similar to each other for all age groups. The analysis of variance showed that 
Age does not have a significant effect on each emotional category.











Instead of using negative reactions only in the further analysis, a score was created 
using the same strategy in Study 2. The total positive and transitional reactions were 
subtracted from the total negative reactions. Table 4.15 displays the mean scores for this new 
measure. Children’s scores ranged from -9 to 3. Similar to Study 2, positive scores meant 
lower performance indicating a higher number of negative reactions and a lower number of 
positive and/or transitional reactions. The analysis of variance by Age and Gender on the 
Table 4.14 
Responses in Disappointing Gift Task (Mean and Standard deviations) 
Age 
Positive Negative Transitional 
Mean     SD Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
 
3-year-olds .78 1.33 2.00 1.22 3.14 1.35 
 
4-year-olds .74 1.02 2.25 1.19 3.37 1.23 
       
5-year-olds .81 1.26 1.96 1.33 3.42 1.29 
Table 4.15 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Disappointing Gift (Score) by Age and Gender 
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df          F p2 p 
Age 2.78 2 .24 .00 .79 
Gender 8.56 1 1.46 .01 .23 
Age * Gender 5.10 2 .43 .01 .65 
      
Note: R Squared = .03 (Adjusted R Squared = -.02) 
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Disappointing Gift performance, neither age nor gender had any impact on children’s 
emotion-regulation performance. The full details of the variance analysis are reported in 
Table 4.15.  Although, Saarni (1984) reported that older children tend to show more positive 
reactions, whereas younger children express more negative reactions, in this sample, the 
preschool children were not as young as the children in this study.  
The Secret Keeping Task.  The task was administered in the nurseries, instead of 
under laboratory conditions as in Carlson and Wang’s (2007) version. Each prompt to make 
the child tell the ‘talking fish’s secret’ received 1 point. A child, who did not reveal the secret 
all through 6 prompts, received the maximum score of 6. The child received the minimum 
score of 0 when she or he revealed the secret in the middle of the task (at the 1st prompt). This 
task was used for the first time in this study, so interrater reliability with 20 % of the sample 
(23 children) showed a high agreement between two raters as the Kappa = .80 (p <.001), 95% 
CI (0.86, 0.97) (Landis &Koch, 1977). 
4-year-olds’ tendency (60.5%) to reveal the secret in the first prompt was higher than 
the older and younger children.  Only 39% of the 3-year-olds and 39.4% of the 5-year-olds 
revealed the secret in the first prompt. A similarity between 3-and 5-year olds raised a curious 
point. Most of the 4-year-olds told the secret at the first prompt. This may implicate that they 
were very eager to share new information with E or they did not believe that the fish was 
talking. If 4-year olds are unable to keep a secret, the 3-year-olds should be more likely to 
inhibit their eagerness to tell the secret, however only 39% were in this position. The same 
percentage of children in the 5-year-old group also managed to keep the secret. In Table 4.1 
above, children’s mean score out of 6 was shown for each age group. The mean score of 4-
year olds was lower than that of both younger and older children. On the 6-point scale, 
children’s responses were mostly clustered on ‘told the secret’ and ‘did not tell the secret’. 
The scoring varied depending on which prompt the children told the secret. Thus, the scores 
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were reduced to a 3-points scale. Table 4.16 below, displays the number of children 
according to a 3-point scale. In this way, children who told the secret throughout the prompts 
were clustered together. The analysis of variance showed that children’s ability to keep a 
secret was affected by Age significantly and Table 4.17 displays the full details of this 
analysis. However, Tukey tests revealed that the performance of 5-year-olds was significantly 
different from the 4-year olds (p<.05, .47, 95% CI [.04, .91]), but no such difference was 
found with the 3-year-olds (p=.50, .62, 95% CI [-.23, .64]). The performance also was not 
statistically different between 3- and 4-year-olds (p=.27, .27, 95% CI [-.14, .67]). This 
indicates that 4-year-olds were more likely to give the secret away compared to 5-year-olds.  
Table 4.16 
Number of children who kept the secret or not in the Secret Keeping by Age 
 Age 







Did not tell 
Secret (2) 
3-year-olds 18 16 7 
4-year-olds 28 10 5 
5-year-olds 15 5 13 
Total 61 31 25 
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Emotion-Understanding (EU) Measure 
Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC). There were nine components in the 
emotion-comprehension test. Based on the scoring of Pons et al. (2003), the correct answer to 
each component was scored as 1 point. All components were aggregated to create a total 
score. Out of nine components the maximum score was 9 and the minimum score was 0. As 
Table 4.1 displays, the mean scores for TEC for each age group, 5-year-olds have the highest 
mean score of 5.48 when compared to younger children. 4-year-olds also have a higher mean 
score than the 3-year-olds. The analysis of variance showed in Table 4.18 revealed that Age 
has a significant effect on children's understanding of emotions. Tukey tests showed that 5 
year-olds performed significantly differently to the 3-and 4-year-olds, (p<.001, 2.53, 95% CI 
[1.64. 3.43]; p<.001, .1.72, 95% CI [.84, .2.60]). However, 4 year-olds’ performance was not 
significantly different to that of the 3-year-olds (p=.06, .82, 95% CI [-.02, 1.65]).  
Table 4.17 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Secret Keeping by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df       F p2 p 
Age 4.42 2 3.49 .06 .03 
Gender .36 1 .57 .01 .45 
Age * Gender .04 2 .03 .00 .97 
Note:  R Squared = .06 (Adjusted R Squared = .02) 





Univariate Analysis of Variance of  TEC by Age and Gender    
Source Sum of 
Squares 
df F p2 p 
Age 123.65 2 23.29 .30 .00 
      













      



































Disappointing Gift       -   
    
Negative Reactions    .73**       -  
    
Secret Keeping Task   - .17 -.31**    - 
    
TEC   -.09  .04 .21* 
    
Note: **p<.01; *p<.05. 
 
Relations among Emotion -Regulation and Understanding Measures 
             Similar to the other constructs, based on the inter-correlations among emotionality 
measures, creating a composite score was attempted. Nevertheless, the Disappointing Gift 
and Secret Keeping performance failed to show any association.  Table 4.19 displays the 
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details of this correlation analysis. The negative reactions in the Disappointing Gift task 
were inversely associated with the performance in keeping a secret which indicates a better 
performance. Children who showed fewer negative reactions to a disappointing situation 
also tended to keep the fish’s secret longer.  This correlation was in line with the hypothesis 
that suggested that positive and negative emotion suppression should be interlinked. 
However, this interconnection was not apparent when the positive and transitional reactions 
were taken into consideration. Secret Keeping was correlated only with emotion 
understanding. Hence, no composite score was created from ER task and the potential of 
each task to explain other aspects of self-regulation was preserved. 
False Belief (Social Understanding) Measures   
The unexpected content and unexpected transfer tasks were identical with those in 
Study 2. The additional false belief task was Appearance-Reality.  
The Unexpected Content Task.  Children were asked only a self-false belief 
question.  A chi-square test with age groups showed that there is a statistically significant 
association between age and self-false belief performance, χ2 (2) = 9.07, p < .05,Cramer’s 
V=.28. As Table 4.20.1 illustrates, both 4- and 5-year-old preschoolers were significantly 










The Unexpected Transfer Task.  The administration and the scoring were identical 
to Study 2. A chi-square test with age groups showed that there is a statistically significant 
association between age groups and others’ false belief performance, χ2(2) = 19.02, p < .001, 
V=.40. As Table 4.21 illustrates that both  4- and 5-year-old preschoolers were significantly 












Number of children who responded to Unexpected Content  
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)   P 
Self    3 Right  24 59 0.35 
 Wrong 17 41 
   4 Right 35 81 0.00 
Wrong 8 19 
    5 
  
Right 33 1.00 0.00 
Wrong 0  




The Appearance-Reality Task. The correct answer of ‘cake’ by referring to a 
previous state of mind to the self-belief question in this was scored as 1 point. The answer of 
‘money-box’ was incorrect and scored as 0 because it was referring to the current state of 
mind about the object. A chi-square test for association was conducted between age groups 
and self-appearance-reality false belief performance. There was a statistically significant 
association between age and others’ false belief performance, χ2(2) = 25.70, p < .001, V=.47.  
Table 4.22 illustrates that both 4-and 5-year-old pre-schoolers were significantly above 







Number of children who responded to Unexpected Transfer 
 Age    Obs N    Obs Prop (%)   P 
Other    3 Right  21 51 1.00 
 Wrong 20 49 
   4 Right 32 74 0.02 
Wrong 11 26 
   5 
  
Right 27 82 0.00 
Wrong 6 18 




Number of children who responded to Appearance –Reality Task 
 Age    Obs N    Obs Prop (%)   P 
Self    3 Right  23 56 0.53 
 Wrong 18 44 
   4 Right 35 81 0.00 
Wrong 8 19 
  5 
  
Right 31 94 0.00 
Wrong 2 06 
 
Total False Belief Score. Children’s performance in each of these tasks was summed. 
A total false belief performance score was created, with a maximum score of 3 and a 
minimum of 0.  This aggregated measure is displayed in Table 4.1.  Children’s performance 
in this total score was normally disturbed. The analysis of variance on the total score showed 
that Age had a statically significant effect on the false belief performance, F (2,114) = 
16.16, p <.001, p2=.22.  Tukey tests showed that the 3-year-olds’ performance was 
significantly different from 4-and 5-year-olds, p<.001, -.84, 95% CI [-1.33, -.34], p<.001, -
1.22, 95% CI [-1.75, -.69]. The performance of 4-and-5-year-olds was not statistically 
different from each other (p=.19, -.39, 95% CI [-.91, .14]). In further analysis, the total score 
of false belief is used and labelled as SU. 
Correlation Analysis  
The inter-correlations among the measures of same construct were used for data 
reduction to create composite scores, as already reported above. Before predictive analysis, 
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the relationships among the cognitive and emotional constructs of self-regulation were 
explored. Table 4.23 presents the correlations between each self-regulation construct.  
As the hypothesis and the previous findings suggest, the Conflict Composite was 
strong positively correlated with False Belief Performance (r (116) = .61, p<.001). The next 
strong correlation for Conflict Composite was with emotion- understanding measure (TEC), 
(r (116) = .54, p<.001). TEC demonstrated an unforeseen link with Conflict which ought to 
be explained in detail.  The emotion-understanding task was included in the study to support 
the emotion-regulation tasks. Due to the emotional demands of the task, it was expected to be 
closely related to both ER tasks. Instead of being related, EU performance in TEC was 
correlated with Conflict. EU was also related with SU which indicates an underlying 
‘understanding’ skill both cognitive and emotional domains. Children’s grasp of emotions 
may be closer to how they solve conflicts and understand others’ minds than their control 
their own emotions. This was a cue to me to explore the importance of ‘understanding’ 
further.   
In comparison to Studies 1 and 2, Conflict and Delay shared a relationship in this 
study. Conflict and the Delay (Latency) were positively correlated. This relationship is not 
surprising because both of them are sourced from an IC construct. The correlation indicates 
that children who tend to cope better with conflicting demands are also more likely to wait 
longer before they become disturbed during the waiting period.   
The weak negative correlation between Conflict and the Disappointing Gift indicates 
a relationship between better coping with conflict responses and the lack of ability to hide 
true emotions about a disappointing present. Neither ER (negative) nor ER (positive) was 
expected to relate to Conflict. However, the Conflict shared a small negative correlation with 
ER (negative) in this study.  
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In contrast to the expected relationship between the Delay and ER; none of the ER 
measures were related to any of the Delay measures. The findings in task level repeated the 
results in Study 2. Snack Delay was in a weak negative correlation with Disappointing Gift 
task (Score, r (116) = -.22, p< .05; Latency, r (116) = -.18, p< .05).  The composite Delay 
measures failed to show a similar relationship with emotionality measures. However, The 
Delay (Latency) was related to EU to a moderate degree.  The Delay (Latency) was also 
related to the Conflict and SU. This was an unexpected finding based on the disassociations 
reported in Studies 1 and 2, because SU was not related to Delay performance in those 
investigations. The children’s response to Delay was expected to relate both ER measures and 
EU but not to SU. Notwithstanding the separation between Conflict and Delay in the previous 
studies, these two still share an underlying link to inhibitory control. 
 Although both the Delay Score and Latency were strongly correlated with each other, 
only Latency shared an association with the Conflict, SU and EU.  Recall that in all 
measures, the Latency is the time until the child broke the rule of waiting.  
Lastly, one of the key links was between false belief and emotion-understanding. 
Initially, both of these skills tap the ‘understanding’ of a mental construct. One is focused on 
understanding others’ state of mind or beliefs and can be summarized as social understanding 
or false belief. The second is focused on the comprehension of emotions in which children 
are required to spot the correct emotion that suits the situation for a protagonist. Matching the 
appropriate emotion to a given situation firstly requires understanding of the situation itself. 
Different situations may elicit different feelings and the child must understand the nature of 
the situation first to be able to produce any emotions. For example, a child who received a 
birthday present would feel happy. To match the emotions, children are supposed to identify 
the situation and project such feelings to the protagonist. This exerts very similar cognitive 
demand to those that SU entails. The relationship between SU and ER hinders the importance 
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of awareness and understanding regarding the other’s mental states and the environment prior 
to adjusting a reaction.  
Table 4.23 


















































     -      
Delay Score 
Composite 
  .09     -     
Delay Latency 
Composite 
  .26**  .77**    -    
Secret Keeping 
(ER+) 
  .03  .03  .12     -   
Disappointing 
Gift (ER-) 
 -.20* -.08 -.13 -.17     -  
SU    .61**  .17  .27**  .01  -.17    - 
EU   .54**  .09  .24*  .21*  -.09 .57** 
Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01. 
 
Regression Analysis 
With a hierarchical multiple regression analysis, it was expected to replicate the 
disassociation between the two dimensions of IC with a larger sample and a wider age range 
in Study 3. With regard to the correlations among the constructs that entail self-regulation, 
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the story was slightly changed here. Yet, the same strategy as in Study 2 was followed on 
conducting the following regression analyses. For predicting the constructs in focus, firstly 
the predicted variable was entered into the model. Then, the demographic variable Age was 
added. In the third step, the distant measure to the construct was predicted in the model 
The Conflict, Delay and ER measures were predicted by the same strategy. Since 
children’s understanding of emotions within SR would throw some light on the investigation 
of the association between ‘regulation’ and ‘understanding’, a hierarchical regression analysis 
was conducted with EU as well.     
Predicting Conflict. Children solve problems that have two conflicting solutions in 
this measure.  One of the solutions to the problem is an initially impulsive reaction (e.g. 
imitation in the Hand Game or pointing the desired outcome in Less is More) whereas the 
other solution is a required/task-appropriate response. Conflict ability kicks in when the child 
starts to initiate in the task-appropriate responses.  
A three step hierarchical regression analysis is displayed in full detail in Table 4.24, 
producing three models to predict Conflict. Model 1 with only False Belief (Social 
Cognition) was significant, R2 = .38, F (1, 115) = 69.40, p < .001; adjusted R2 =.37.  In this 
model, false belief was significantly predicted Conflict performance. In the next step, Age 
was added to the Model 2 and it was also significant, R2 = .57, F (1, 114) = 74.23, p < .001; 
adjusted R2 =.56.  Both False Belief and Age significantly predicted unique variance in 
Conflict performance. In Step 3, delay and emotionality measures were added to produce 
Model 3. Although Model 3 was significant, R2 = .58, F (4, 110) = 25.21, p < .001; 
adjusted R2 =.56; it was not statistically different from Model 2, given the change in R2 value 
was parsimonious.  In Model 3, previous significant predictors remained significant. As 
Model 2 is the fittest model, it showed the clear link between understanding the others’ mind 
and coping with the conflicting demands. Considering this finding is not novel since it has 
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been reported in the literature, the lack of attachment between conflict and emotionality was 
posed.




Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Conflict Composite  
                Conflict Composite Score  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SU  .40 .05 .61** .25 .05 .38** .22 .05 .33** 




      -.01 .07  -.01 
Disappointing 
Gift 
      -.03 .02   -.09 
Secret 
Keeping 
      -.06 .06   -.07 






25.21** F  
∆ R2                           .19                 .01 
∆F                       49.68**                 .87 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01. 
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Predicting Delay. Based on the ‘hot’ explanation, an association between Delay and 
ER was expected to be found in the multiple regression model. Despite the lack of correlation 
between delay and emotion-regulation or understanding measures, the same strategy in Study 
2 to produce regression models was employed in this study. The hierarchical multiple 
regressions failed to produce any significant models. When the performance in Delay in 
terms of Latency was employed in the analysis, three significant models were produced and it 
is displayed in detail in Table 4.25.  Model 1 had all three emotionality measures: positive 
and negative emotion-regulation, and emotion- understanding.  Model 1 was significant, R2 = 
.07, F (3, 113) = 2.88, p < .05; adjusted R2 =.05. Only TEC (that measures emotion-
understanding) significantly predicted children’s ability to delay in the face of a provoking 
desire. In Step 2, age was added to the equations and emotion-understanding lost its 
significance as a predictor.  Model 2 was statistically different from the first model with 
better R2 value of .13 and was a significant model, F (1, 112) = 4.12, p < .001; 
adjusted R2 =.09. Age was the only variable predicting Latency significantly.  Model 3 
included the false belief and conflict measures and was significant, R2 = .14, F (2, 110) = 
3.00, p< .001; adjusted R2 =.09.  Despite the fact that Age remained as significant predictor in 
Model 3, the model itself was not statistically different to that in Model 2.  None of the 
emotion-regulation measures demonstrated any significant effect on delay performance, thus 
not supporting the research question. Admitting the shortfall of the effect of emotion-
regulation, the ability to understand emotions succinctly predicted the Delay performance in 
the first model.





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Delay  
                            Delay Composite Latency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Secret 
Keeping 
.05 .09 .06 .06 .08 .06 .07 .08 .08 
Disappointing 
Gift 
-.03 .03 -.10 -.03 .03 -.09    -.02 .03 -.07 
EU  .08 .04 .22* .02 .04 .05 -.01 .05   -.02 
Age (months)    .02 .01 .29** -.03 .01   .27* 
Conflict 
Composite  
      -.02 .14  -.02 






3.00** F  
∆ R2                           .06                 .01 
∆F            7.35**                 .78 
Note: *p  <  .05.  **p  <  .01. 
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Predicting Emotion – Regulation. Given the lack of a correlation between the 
positive and negative emotion-regulation tasks, a composite emotion-regulation construct was 
not compiled. Instead, each task was analysed by the hierarchical multiple regression 
individually. None of the regression models generated to predict Disappointing Gift reached 
an appropriate level of significance, so they are not reported in here. 
 The regression analysis with Secret Keeping was conducted in four steps. The 
additional step was used to separate emotionality and delay measures. ER (positive) was 
predicted by ER (negative) and EU in Model 1 which was significant, R2 = .07, F (2, 114) = 
4.12, p < .05; adjusted R2 =.05.  Only EU was a significant predictor [b=.09, t(114)=2.21, 
p<.05] of whether children tell or do not keep the talking fish’s secret. In the next step, Delay 
was added to Model 2 but it was not significant. In the third step, Age was added to the 
equation but Model 3 was also not significant. Model 4 included Conflict and False belief 
performance but that was also not a significant model. Since the performance in situational 
assessment of emotionality control failed to show a link with the delay aspect of inhibitory 
control, the potential influence of EU was highlighted. Therefore, a multiple regression 
analysis was conducted with both emotional- and social understanding as predictors.  
Predicting Emotion- Understanding.  The four step hierarchical regressions are 
presented in Table 4.26 in full detail. The first step included two situational emotion-
regulation measures. Model 1 was marginally significant (p=.06) with the positive emotion-
regulation as a significant predictor.   In the second step, the Delay measure was also added 
to the model and it was a significant predictor along with Secret Keeping. Model 2 was a 
significant model within the margins, F (2, 113) = 3.83, p < .05; but had a very low R2 value 
.09 (adjusted R2 =.07). The addition of Age in Model 3 made Age the only significant 
predictor of performance in EU, R2 = .35, F (1, 112) = 15.16, p < .001; adjusted R2 =.33. The 
effect of age was not surprising since it was shown in the variance analysis as well. In step 4, 
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both conflict and false belief were added to the equation and Model 4 was the fittest model 
based on the highest R2 value of .48 (adjusted R2 =.45) and a significant model, F (2, 110) = 
16.87, p < .001. It was also significantly different to Model 3. Model 4 shows that EU was 
significantly predicted by the ability to keep a secret (ER-positive), age and the understanding 
of their own or others’ state of minds. This model suggests a cluster of relationships among, 
social- and emotion- understanding along with the control of positive emotionality.   








Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Emotion-Understanding  
 
                                                                        Emotion-Understanding   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Secret Keeping .48 .22 .21* .43 .22 .18* .34 .18 .15 .43 .17 .18* 
Disappointing Gift -.05 .07 -.06 -.03 .07 -.03    -.01 .06 -.01 .04 .06    .05 
Delay Composite 
(Latency)  
   .55 .24 .21* .09 .21     .03   -.03     .19    -.01 
Age (months)       .11 .02    .54**    .06     .02    .21** 
Conflict 
Composite  
            .28     .28    .11 
SU             .65     .16  .37** 
R2 .05 






F          16.87** 
∆ R2              .04         .26         .13 
∆F      5.37*       44.69**       13.52** 




Predicting Social-Understanding (False Belief). Since children’s social 
understanding significantly predicted Conflict and EU in separate models, a hierarchical 
multiple regressions analysis with false belief performance was conducted to explain how 
children’s understanding of their own and others’ state of mind and belief would interact with 
the other self-regulatory constructs. In three steps that are displayed in Table 4.27, three 
significant models were generated. Model 1 only had the Conflict as a predictor, R2 = .38, F 
(1, 115) = 69.40, p < .001; adjusted R2 =.37. Age was added to the equation in the second 
step. Conflict remained significant in the model. Although the model was significant, it was 
not statistically different to the previous model and the added predictor (Age) failed to reach 
significance. In the final step, delay and emotional measures were added to generate Model 3. 
It was significantly different from the previous model as ∆F value suggests. Along with the 
Conflict, EU also significantly predicted SU in the final model.





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Social Understanding  
Social Understanding  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Conflict 
Composite  
.94 .11 .61** .82 .15 .54** .62 .15 .41** 
Age (months)    .01 .01 .11    -.00 .01 -.04 
Secret 
Keeping  
      -.01 .10    -.01 
Disappointing 
Gift 
      -.03 .03   -.06 










16.77** F  
∆ R2              .007                 .095 
∆F            1.26                 4.98** 






The main purpose of Study 3 was to explore the dynamic relationship of the 
regulation of positive and negative emotionality. In expanding ER assessment, understanding 
of emotion was also included. The focus on EU and its relation to ER aimed to examine a 
parallel to the relationship between SU and Conflict. This new construct showed that 
understanding ‘emotions’ was connected to both cognitive and emotion-regulation skills in a 
way that was not expected.  Moreover, in Study 3, the tasks that were responsible for the 
measurement of some SR constructs were modified.  For example, a new set of Conflict tasks 
related to SU as coherently as in Study 2. The Delay construct was also strengthened by 
adding another measure, but increasing the number of tasks did not show support for the 
predicted ER (negative) – delay association. Indeed the association found in Study 2 
disappeared in Study 3. ER (positive) was also not related to Delay. I will start by discussing 
the deviation of findings from Study 2 focusing on why two ‘hot’ measures (i.e. Delay and 
ER) were no longer related. Then I will discuss the rising importance of EU in terms of both 
cognitive and emotional aspects of SR. There was also a commonality in both emotional and 
cognitive ‘understanding’ which requires further attention.   
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ aspects of self-
regulation was proposed by Zelazo and Muller (2002) to highlight how high-order-mental-
activities may differ in their demand. The ‘hot’ aspect was defined by its emotionally charged 
nature. Accordingly, it is necessary to exercise inhibitory control to delay gratification. The 
‘hot’ measures were studied mostly in the course of executive function tests and the 
distinction between IC to Delay (hot) and Conflict (cool) demands has been used to support 
the separation of the constructs (Brock, Rimm-Kaufman, Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009; Smith-




Donald, Raver, Hayes, & Richardson, 2007; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002). However, the 
affective feature of this ‘hot’ aspect of control remained unstudied. Studies 2 and 3 examined 
the affect-control link and ties with its functional component – Delay.  
One possible reason why there may be differences in the link between delay and 
emotion-regulation in Studies 2 and 3 lies in the methods used. Different Delay tasks were 
used in these studies. A very structured and succinct version of Kochanska’s Snack Delay 
Task was used in Study 2. The constant supervision of E may have prompted children’s better 
performance. Wiebe et al.’s (2011) longer alternative of the task was used in Study 3, 
incorporating, over 4 minutes, the ‘absent’ and ‘present’ conditions of Kochanska’s task. The 
absent condition in Wiebe’s version may have challenged the children more. The reason for 
the switch from one task to another concerns the nature of the tasks. The longest of the trials 
in Kochanska’s design was 60 seconds. It is therefore possible that a shorter period of delay 
might shift the demand from ‘coping with the temptation’ to ‘ability to abide by a rule’. It 
was my contention that such a short delay may well have turned Kochanska’s procedure into 
a rule-based Conflict task. Children are told a 2-step rule: ‘do not eat or touch the treat until 
the cue’, ‘when you hear the cue, you can eat the treat’. Similarly, the Snack Delay task in 
Study 2 might be also high on Conflict demands. Despite the expectation of an association 
between Delay and ER based on ‘hot’ neural pathway explanation and the finding from Study 
2, the alternative demands in Delay tasks raised awareness that the relationship among these 
constructs might be task-specific. Jahromi and Stifter (2008) demonstrated that the Tapping 
Task (a Conflict task with motor responses) was negatively correlated with children’s 
negative and aggressive responses in the Disappointment Paradigm. Children who were better 
at moving flexibly between two rules (about how to tap their fingers) were also less likely to 
display negative emotional expressions. Given that similar concerns about Kochanska’s task 




are hinted at in more recent work (Wiebe et al., 2011), the decision to move to a measure that 
measures delay in a more ecologically valid way seems to have been justified. 
Despite the lack of its relationship with the ER tasks, the Delay measures 
administered in Study 3 were positively correlated with each other  and were discriminated 
by age in a similar manner to previous studies (e.g. Jahromi & Stifter, 2008). In the absent 
condition of the Snack Delay task, especially, the likelihood of ending the delay period 
prematurely was significantly lower in the 5-year-old group. The better performance in the 
absent condition in this study may reflect the child’s developing internalization of the value 
of social conformity. Indeed, only Age was significant as a predictor of children’s latency in 
the Delay tasks. We return to the issue of delay tasks in Study 5, when a further measure will 
be added to explore the cognitive underpinnings of the child’s ‘hot’ EF.   
The inclusion of ER (positive) and EU was attempted to broaden the ER construct as 
it has been defined. The correlations among the three emotionality measures (ER (positive), 
ER (negative) and EU) were limited to the link between EU and ER (positive). For ER 
(negative), only children’s negative reactions in the Disappointing Gift tasks was correlated 
with Secret Keeping performance. For the Disappointing Gift task children’s reactions to 
change in each dimension (i.e., transitional behaviours) formed the central measure, and a 
distinction was made between positive and negative emotional expressions. This score was 
used in both Studies 2 and 3. Contrary to the positive link between ER (negative) and Delay 
in Study 2, a small negative correlation was observed in Study 3 between ER (negative) and 
Conflict. This association disappeared in regression analysis, as children who were better at 
hiding their true emotions in the face of a disappointment performed better in Conflict tasks. 
This finding also support the arguments that some Delay tasks might be high on Conflict 
demand (such as in Study 2).  




Why did we not observe the expected Conflict-ER relationship as in the previous 
study? In Study 2, one verbal (Day/Night) and one motor (Giraffe/Mouse) procedure were 
used to assess Conflict.  Yet, Study 3 increased the number of Conflict tasks. The Hand 
Game is a simple motor task. The Whisper Game is a task for controlling the voice. The 
Conflict tasks of Study 3 were more diverse and may have captured the children’s 
performance better. Although positive and negative ER performances were correlated with 
each other, ER (positive) did not share any association with Conflict. This result may lead to 
the conclusion that the regulation of positive and negative emotionality has involved separate 
operations. However, the relationships between the emotionality measures require closer 
inspection.  
Firstly, the link between ER (positive) and EU in this study may be consistent with 
Blankson et al.’s (2013) finding of a link between ER (negative) and EU, thus suggesting a 
general link between the regulation of  ‘emotion’ and its cognitive underpinnings. In both 
studies inhibitory control was used. However, without further experimentation (Studies 4 and 
5) this link remains speculative as they used a frustration paradigm while Study 3 used a 
disappointment task. EU, though, was positively correlated with both Delay and Conflict. 
Study 4 starts this process by attempting to understand more about the nature of EU. 
 It is important here to consider the findings of Study 3 in relation to the nature of EU 
itself. Children’s budding awareness of emotionality (as measured by EU) and social 
understanding were both related to inhibitory control. The data seem to suggest that a child’s 
early grasp of emotions links with his/her behaviour -how long she or he waits for a treat and 
performance on tasks with conflicting rules. Given the strong link between SU and EU 
reported in Study 3, we need to examine if there is an overall ‘understanding’ skill that is 
general and not specific to, emotionality or social cognition. This has been suggested in other 




studies (e.g. Blankson et al., 2013; Eggum et al., 2011; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Hughes & 
Dunn, 1998). Indeed such emotional-understanding has been found to predict children’s 
prosocial behaviours and moral reasoning (e.g. Eggum et al., 2011; Eisenberg et al., 2006). 
However, there are also conflicting findings that suggest dissociation between these two 
constructs. In a much cited paper, Dunn et al. (1991) reported no correlation, but they tested 
considerably younger children compared to studies that reported an association.  
The strong EU-SU relationship that was reported in this study contributes to a body of 
investigations that dwell on the specifics of the link. EU is sometimes measured as an index 
of affective competence (for a review see, Izard et al., 2011) but Hughes (1998) treats it as a 
test of social cognition among others (e.g. Harwood & Farrar, 2004; Dunn, 2002. What we 
need is to explore the nature of EU further. Study 4 looks closely at it and suggests that the 
Pons et al. scale assesses only a limited aspect of understanding when it comes to regulation. 
It develops a new measure to fill this gap. 
Furthermore, it was found that both EU and Conflict explained a significant amount 
of SU variance whilst EU was associated with SU as well as the ER (positive). This thesis 
aimed to reveal the nature of interaction between two lines of regulatory mechanisms for 
emotions and cognitions, and the links between them and other skills.    
It was established that neither ER (negative) nor ER (positive) was significantly 
related to any aspects of the IC. However, through the ‘understanding’ performances, there 
was a chain of interactions. Hence there is a robust influence of understanding in binding 
cognitive and emotional aspects of self-regulation. A meta-understanding of emotion-
regulation was thought to contribute to explaining the mechanism of self-regulation. Based 
on the correlations both EU and ER (negative) shared with Conflict, it was thought that the 
missing link between Conflict and ER might be the children’s understanding of emotion-




regulation process itself. The EU measure that was used in Study 3 also had a ‘regulation’ 
component for children’s understanding of ER which was thought to emerge in children’s 
emotional behaviour repertoire around the age of 7 according to Pons et al. (2004). The 
features and qualities that components possessed will be examined in detail in the next 
chapter, a new scale will also be developed to explore the middle ground between both 
understanding and regulation of cognitions and emotions.




Chapter 5 - Assessing the Understanding of Emotional-Regulation: A Scale for 
an Understanding of the Regulation of Emotions (SURE) 
Chapter 4 identified a connection among EU, SU, and Conflict Inhibition. Many 
studies have reported a close link between SU and EU (O’Brien et al., 2011; Hughes & Dunn, 
1998; Harwood & Farrar, 2006; Wellman, 1990), but a further look at the nature of this 
connection is necessary. EU can be approached as a part of social cognition, in regard to its 
hypothesised shared ‘metacognitive’ structure with SU.  The idea of ‘metacognition’ 
proposed by Flavell in the 1970s focused on key developmental changes in children’s 
cognitive abilities. How children come to understand the mind and the complexity of 
emotions has been thought to be strongly tied to the emergence of cognitive activities in 
which two contrasting perspectives can be compared and reconciled (e.g. Flavell, 1999; also 
see Pillow, 2008). Young children’s ability to understand mental activities has also been 
claimed to be limited to constructing inferences between past emotional experiences and 
present thought and feelings (Lagattuta & Wellman, 2001).  As reported in the previous 
chapter (Study 3), the performance of preschoolers in an extensive emotional-comprehension 
scale (TEC) was found to be strongly related to their performance in false belief tasks (SU). 
Moreover, both understanding of emotions and others’ mental states were closely related to 
inhibitory control.  
Despite the intensely investigated relationship between the meta-understanding of 
mind and self-control, the relationship between understanding of emotions and control of 
emotions has not been explored in depth. EU has been considered as a prerequisite for ER, or 
as a complementary part of ER performance, but the investigation of meta-understanding of 
ER is limited in three ways. First, generic emotion-comprehension is considered as an 
understanding skill that underlies ER. Second, the understanding of ER is identified mostly as 
the ability to generate coping strategies. Third, children’s understanding of ER is observed in 




retrospective situations such as emotions that are already elicited and regulated. This chapter 
will introduce and discuss these limitations as a justification for, and introduction to, a new 
scale of ER-understanding that will be devised in an attempt to overcome these limitations.    
In terms of metacognitive abilities, researchers have speculated that EU is a specific 
metacognitive skill underpinning ER and their assumption has received some support. First, 
the ability to keep the secret of a confidante in ER (positive) predicted the performance of 
extensive emotional-comprehension scale (EU) in Study 3. In unpacking such a finding, EU 
can be claimed to be a prerequisite for ER, which emerges in the child’s daily behaviour 
(Gross, 1998). In support of this prediction, results from the Turkish sample in that study 
showed that ER-EU relationship was specific to ER (positive). These studies report that ER 
measures are mostly gathered from parental reports (e.g. Blankson et al., 2013). In online 
assessments (i.e. the child being tested him- or herself), ER lacks an association with SU or 
either aspect of IC (delay and conflict inhibition). As the assessments of ER skills were 
mentioned in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses particularly on children’s 
understanding of the regulation of action.   
The suggestion that EU facilitates ER was also supported by Rieffe (2012), who 
reported that the ability to differentiate negative feelings was limited in a sample of deaf 
children, who have been shown to be slow in developing SU (Russell, Hosie, Gray, et al., 
1998; Schick B, de Villers, de Villers, & Hoffmeister, 2007; but see Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 
2002). They found that deaf children tend to exhibit less efficient ER strategies, and were less 
likely to avoid a situation that would cause negative feelings, when compared to their hearing 
peers.  
In terms of children’s understanding of ER, most studies have focused on coping 
strategies. As Davis et al. (2010) suggested metacognitive emotional-regulation strategies 
include children’s ability to alter their mental states in order to change their negative feelings. 




Besides exploring how an understanding of the ‘regulation’ of ER develops, researchers have 
closely observed children’s solutions to problems where they need to cope with changing 
emotional states.  
The Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC) used by Pons et al. (2004) covered each 
developmental threshold in the acquisition of EU including a section about the ‘regulation’ of 
emotions. Similar to the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph, the ER-understanding 
component was based on coping strategies required to cope with negative feelings that have 
been caused by a previous event. In these studies, children were given a scenario for example, 
the following: ‘a young boy’s pet rabbit is dead, and he is feeling sad about it.’ They were 
asked whether they would choose a physical or mental strategy to change this emotional 
state.  Pons et al. (2004) illustrated four strategies for the protagonist. The physical strategies 
were ‘closing eyes’ and ‘going out and doing something else’. The mental strategy was 
‘thinking about something else’. The last [neutral] strategy option was ‘there is nothing this 
boy could do’. The mental strategy was identified as the correct response in their scoring. The 
finding from Pons et al. (2004) suggested that the majority of children were able to opt for the 
mental strategy after the age of 7. Children, who were younger than 7-years, were able to 
pinpoint the external causes of the emotion, understand that two people in the same situation 
may experience different emotional states due to different desires, and grasp that the 
emotions can be recalled. However, they still tended to prefer physical strategies to cope with 
their negative feelings.  
The same component of ‘regulation’ was presented to Turkish preschoolers in Study 
3. Nearly half of the youngest group (53.7%) (3-year-olds) chose the physical strategy of 
‘closing eyes’ to stop feeling sad.  Only 7.3% of these 3-year-olds were able to choose the 
correct strategy. Among 4-year-olds, only 16.3% were able to choose a mental strategy over a 




physical one. 36.4 percent of 5-year-olds children successfully chose the mental strategy. 
This was higher than the 20 percent reported by Pons et al. (2004) for the same age group. 
Pons et al. (2004) suggested that children grasp the mentalist nature of emotions at around 
age 7, and mostly opt for physical coping strategies in the preschool years. In contrast, the 
Turkish data suggests that 5 year-olds were more likely to choose mental strategies rather 
than one of the other strategies.  
However, generating a coping strategy for negative emotionality may not be the only 
way to assess how children start to understand ER. When the locus of a meta-understanding 
of ER is coping, then children’s understanding of past emotions is assessed. Thus, a 
retrospective comprehension of emotions is observed in Pons et al.’s measure. Instead of 
expecting the child to generate a solution to the given emotional state that was caused by a 
past event, asking them to make predictions about the emotional display expected of a 
protagonist might expand our understanding of children’s EU performance. What if we were 
to ask children to make suggestions for the possible emotional display that the protagonist 
should be presenting?   
Some findings regarding children’s ability to make assumptions about future emotions 
suggests that they are able to prepare themselves for a future based on past experience. 
Atance and Meltzoff (2006) found a shift in children’s ability to anticipate future internal 
states between 3 and 4 years of age. They gave participants (3- to 5-year-olds) pretzels which 
made them thirsty, and then asked these children what they would like on their visit the 
following day: pretzels or water. The older children were able to inhibit their current desire 
for water and predicted that they would like some more pretzels, thus anticipating their future 
state. However, 3-year-olds were unable to inhibit their current desires and chose the less 
desirable alternative (i.e., water) as their next day choice of snack. Although this finding may 




be accounted for by the limited self-regulation ability of preschoolers, it also shows that older 
children were able to predict what they might desire the next day regardless of what they 
desired at the moment. In addition to physical desire and needs, Suddendorf and Busby 
(2005) showed that children were able to attribute future mental states to avoid boredom.  In 
their Two Rooms task, children in the experimental condition were told that they were going 
to have the chance to play with an empty puzzle board, whereas the control group simply 
waited in an empty room. Next, all of the children were taken to a room where they were 
instructed to pick from various toys, which they could then take back with them to the first 
room. The results showed that 4- and 5-year-old children who were instructed to play with an 
empty puzzle board were more likely to choose the puzzle pieces for that board in the new 
room than the children who had been in an empty room. The toy preferences of the 3-year-
olds were not affected by the previous condition.  In addition to the fact that preschoolers 
were able to make assumptions about their present based on their past experiences (Lagattuta, 
Wellman, & Flavell, 1997), children were also shown to be able to make predictions for the 
future based on their current conditions. Preschoolers’ ability to predict future desires 
becomes stronger as they get older (see Lagattuta, 2014).   
The ability of children to assemble past experiences flexibly in order to create novel 
scenarios has been investigated in order to explore the potential link between episodic future 
thinking and relational memory during the preschool years. Richmond and Pan (2013) found 
that children were capable of describing both past and possible future events and both 
abilities were expected to develop between 3 and 5 years of age. However, when making up 
scenarios for future events, children were less likely to generate detail than when they 
recalled a past event. In their episodic future thinking task, participants were asked to talk 
about a past event and to speculate about a likely future experience using three cue cards (i.e., 




a person, an object, and a place). The cue cards were developed by asking children and their 
parents about their experience in the past 3 months.  When the relevant cue cards were 
constructed for their life events (e.g., grandma, a hat, and the beach), children were asked to 
generate a possible future event after a random card was chosen (as a cue). The researchers 
reported that children were able to reconstruct relational knowledge in a flexible manner for 
future events. Children’s ability flexibly to assemble past and future knowledge in particular 
situations allows them to make inferences based on possible outcomes in the future, by 
drawing on their knowledge of past events.     
The research findings summarized above indicate that preschoolers have some ability 
to anticipate their own future internal states. However, as argued by Pons et al. (2004), 
children’s presumptions about their own and others’ emotional states raises a key question 
about their understanding of emotions that need to be controlled. As anticipation over one’s 
own or another’s emotional state develops, the preschoolers’ ability to be in control of their 
own emotional reactions improves. At the age of 4, children are able to anticipate future 
events and to grasp the causality between the emotions, such as another’s happiness or 
sadness, and the sources of those feelings (e.g. Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Denham, Zoller, & 
Couchod, 1994). Although children can make inferences about another’s happiness or 
sadness, and the sources of those feelings, they still struggle to distinguish how anger might 
relate to sadness until the age of 6-and 7-years (Levine, 1995). It can be inferred, then, that 
the ability to distinguish negative and positive emotions occurs earlier whereas the 
understanding of the differences between two negative emotions may still pose a challenge 
for young preschoolers.  
Thus, rather than adapting an ER-understanding task that observes children’s mental 
strategies for handling emotional states that have already been experienced (as in Pons et al., 




2003; 2004), a new approach is introduced. In their review of ER theories, Gross and Barrett 
(2011) concluded that focusing on the process of ER would help us to understand how 
emotions are generated. In terms of investigating ER, online assessments have been used in 
an attempt to elicit an emotional experience and then observe how a child behaves in that 
emotionally charged situation. The interpretation of their behaviour cannot be done 
independently of the social expectations, such as the need to be polite to stranger. Thus social 
expectations ought also to be incorporated into the emotionality for a complete assessment of 
both EU and ER.   
Capturing a child’s ER performance over time through a lens of social expectation 
was made possible through Saarni’s (1984) Disappointment Paradigm. The paradigm 
proposed in this chapter aims to develop a task that imitates the Saarni’s Disappointment 
Paradigm, but creates characters who find themselves in difficult circumstances such as 
masking sad feelings because of an unwanted present. Instead of being disappointed by a 
stranger, these characters would find themselves in need of adjusting their emotional 
expressions towards people from their social group such as friends or relatives. Since basic 
emotions are easier to provoke within online assessments like the ones used in Study 3, the 
assumption is that such a procedure elicits a single emotion for example sadness or 
happiness. However, a closer look at emotional states would probably identify more complex 
processes which hinder mental evaluation of the situation, and which therefore need to be 
controlled.  Although online- assessment of ER of both positive and negative emotions relies 
on the assumption of creating the reactive states of disappointment or excitement, they are 
also limited because individual children seem to react in different ways (or levels of 
awareness). I will return to this issue in Chapter 7.  




Hitherto, children’s understanding of the causality between emotional states and their 
external elicitors emerges in the early preschool years (Harris et al., 1989) when they come to 
understand the appraisal of feelings. In a shift to false belief understanding, within a process 
of grasping desires, then beliefs then emotions, as Wellman et al. (1995) suggest, children 
start to base their judgment by comparing two conflicting mental states. At the age of around 
4-and - 5-years, children recognize how thoughts and beliefs may influence one’s actions, but 
the understanding that thoughts and beliefs have an influence on emotions has been thought 
to develop later (Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).The items that 
have been assembled to assess emotional understanding were ranked as highly difficult in 
Wellman and Liu’s (2004) false belief scale. One of their items was ‘Belief-Emotion’ in 
which a character’s feeling was based on his or her false-belief about a snack that he or she 
likes.  The other emotionality item on Wellman and Liu’s scale is ‘Real-Apparent Emotion’ 
and it is more complex. In that item, a character is teased by his friends by a mean joke. 
Despite being teased already, the character tries to hide their emotions to avoid more 
embarrassment. The emotion that needs to be hidden (i.e. feeling sad) and the emotion that is 
used to mask (i.e. expressing happiness) the actual feeling was presented to children. Both of 
these items was derived from Harris et al.’s (1989; 1986) earlier work. According to the 
evaluations from Wellman and Liu (2004), a child’s comprehension of a hidden emotion 
emerges later in development, similar to the hidden and moral emotional items in Pons et 
al.’s (2004) scale.  The item distinguishing real from apparent emotion was based on the 
child’s need to suppress negative feelings but  the motivation for hiding true feelings is to 
avoid the public embarrassment which is the source of the feeling as well. The regulation of 
emotion is needed to eliminate the persistence and development of the negative feelings. 
However, it is suggested here that the regulation of both negative and positive emotions is 




also necessary to keep a social relationship intact, protecting the feelings of others by hiding 
one’s own emotions.  
 I aimed, in a new measure, to create an emotion-eliciting setting equivalent to an 
online ER task, by suggesting that a condition can be created in order to elicit a 
disappointment, even if the source of the feeling may not fulfil the previous (true) desire, or if 
recent events have changed the situation to lead the current emotional state. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 7, it is predicted that this ability slightly contrasts with the expected shift 
at the age of 6 made by Wellman and Liu (2004).  I based my analysis on the idea that the 
structure of this task is equivalent in complexity to false belief and conflict inhibition, which 
both require the resolution of two contrasting positions.  I would like to demonstrate my logic 
with the help of an example.     
Billy loves funfairs. His grandparents promised to take him to the funfair. On the way, 
his grandmother noticed the beautiful woods nearby. She asked Billy to go for a walk 
in the woods instead of going to the funfair.  
What is straightforward about the story above is that Billy is a boy who has been 
disappointed by his grandmother. The nature of their social exchange is complicated and may 
require Billy to act differently: they were going out to spend time together at the funfair. This 
new suggestion for a last minute change of plans from his grandmother, to go to the 
woodland instead, is most likely to alter Billy’s emotional state (it is hard to imagine a 
preschooler who would rather walk in the woods than experience a funfair). His internal state 
is expected to change from ‘happy/ excited’ (because he was going to do something he 
wanted), to ‘sad/disappointed/angry’ (because he was not going get what he wanted).  As 
mentioned above, the evidence suggests that preschool children may not grasp the nuance 
between two negative feelings but they can understand the causal relationship between the 




feeling and the emotional display. If ‘How is Billy feeling?’ was asked, this question would 
be very straightforward even for 4-year-olds, as observed earlier in the external causes 
component of TEC (Pons et al., 2004). Moreover, around the age of 4 to 6 years, children 
start to grasp the fact that it is possible for a person to express an emotion [outwardly] but 
feel another emotion [internally] (e.g. Harris, Donnelly, Guz, & Pitt-Watson, 1986). So, we 
would expect them to understand that Billy is feeling upset internally. To tap the relationship 
between the child’s inner feelings and his commitment to pleasing his grandmother, we could 
ask ‘How would Billy express his feelings to his Grandmother?’ For a developmental 
researcher who presents a young child with a broken toy and expects them to show a 
minimum number of negative emotional expressions to a stranger as a measure of ER ability, 
I would also expect the response that Billy would be nice to his grandmother.  
The options for emotional display need to be simple in order to summarize the boy’s 
reaction as being ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. However, this raises a source problem. Why was 
Billy feeling a certain way? To answer this, children need to be reminded of the origins of the 
emotion. While remembering or thinking about the emotion underlying the cause of the 
recent event is within preschoolers’ range of capabilities, simultaneously holding conflicting 
states of feeling and inhibiting the expression of this feeling may be still difficult for young 
children. 
In Figure 5.1, four pictures are presented to depict Billy’s true desire (what he is 
thinking about) and the emotional display that he makes to his grandmother. Both the top two 
pictures depict Billy smiling when reacting to his grandmother’s idea, but in one he is keen to 
go to the wood while in the other he hankers after the funfair. This latter display, in Picture 1, 
indicates his ability to hide his true feelings. In Picture 2, Billy thinks about the walk in the 
woods, which indicates that he might have changed his mind and therefore is smiling to his 




grandmother about their joint new venture. It is predicted that only older children would be 
able to acknowledge the possibility of being able to conceal a true emotion whilst holding 
onto their true desire. It is also possible that as a demonstration of ER, another strategy would 
be to adjust the mental state in order to change the emotional state (as depicted in Picture 2). 
Pictures 3 and 4 can be defined in two ways: as the display of true emotions or a failure to 
regulate emotions. Here, though, the changed events are a true cause of the negative 
emotionality. Billy is looking upset and thinking about the woods which were the reason he 
could not reach his true desire in Picture 4. This combination is a match between the true 
emotion and its cause. The literature would suggest that at around 3 and 4- years of age, 
preschoolers can make this deduction. However, they will be expected to avoid their initial 
deduction regarding Billy’s feelings and make a prediction about how he should display his 
emotions.     
Figure 5.1.:  Emotional Display Choices for Story 1 
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STUDY 4  
Stitching up: A Scale of Understanding the Regulation of Emotions (SURE) 
In the introduction, the objectives for a scale to cover the middle ground between EU 
and SU have been explained.  Eight more vignettes were created that were similar to Billy’s 
story above. In all of those vignettes, the emotional outcome options were created in the same 
way. To explore whether it is possible to construct a coherent scale of EU relating to 
controlling one’s displays of emotion and to be able to use this scale later in comparison to 
Conflict, SU, and EU (in Study 5, next chapter), the main aim of this chapter is to test the 
reliability of this new scale. The scoring scheme is based on two dynamics. Positive displays 
are regarded as showing understanding towards the necessity of ER (and execution of it), so 
scored higher than the two negative emotional reactions. The ability to conceal one’s true 
thoughts (thinking about the funfair in this case) was also considered as a more mature form 
of thinking. Based on the previous findings on children’s EU as speculated above, I expect to 
see older age group to tend to show a better understanding of ER and choose positive 
emotional displays.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-two Turkish (32 male) preschool children participated in this study. The age 
range was from 3 to 5 (M = 54.22 months, SD= 11.10, range: 35-75 months). Children were 
recruited from a nursery school in Bursa that serves mostly middle-class families. The 
consent of the parents and the child’s willingness to participate in testing were obtained, 
following permission from the Departmental Ethics Committee.   
 




Procedure and Materials 
Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their nursery. Each story was 
presented in a picture book. E told the stories with the help of pictures and pointed to the 
relevant picture while telling the story in detail. Continuing the example provided above, the 
instructions for that story were as follows: “Let’s look at these pictures together. I am going 
to tell you a story about this boy/girl [points to the first picture]. This boy’s name is Billy. He 
loves funfairs very much. His grandparents promised to take him to the funfair this weekend. 
Here, his grandparents came to pick him up [points to the second picture]. On their way to 
the funfair, they pass by this nice woodland [points to the third picture]. His grandmother 
says, ‘what a beautiful wood, why don’t we go for a walk in the wood instead of going to the 
funfair? We’ll go to the funfair another time.’” E stopped the story there and turned to the 
next page. There were four pictures that each depicts an emotional display for the protagonist 
on the next page.   
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, those emotional expressions were 
represented in the positive-negative dichotomy. The emotional displays were backed up with 
thoughts that Billy might be having at that moment. The mental representations were 
presented in a thought balloon next to Billy’s head. In those thought balloons, the 
protagonist’s true desire or the recent change of events were depicted and the child was 
instructed that this was the case (see below). Thus, there were two pictures that showed 
Billy’s smiling and two pictures frowning. In one of the positive display versions, Billy was 
thinking about the funfair that represents his true desire. The recent change of events was 
depicted as Billy was thinking about the walk in the woods. Both true desire and the recent 
events were also combined in the negative emotional expressions (please see Figure 5.1 for 
the examples of each of these emotional outcome options). Then E asked the child to point 




which outcome would be appropriate for the character in the story; “Now, how should Billy 
react to his grandma?” 6She continued with describing each picture. “Should he smile to his 
grandmother but still think about the funfair? [points Picture 1 in Figure 5.1]; Should he 
smile to his grandmother and be thinking about the walk in the woods? [points Picture 2]; 
Should he frown at his grandmother and be thinking about the funfair? [points Picture 3]; 
Should he frown at his grandmother and be thinking about the walk in the woods? [points 
Picture 4].”   
After the child had pointed to the picture to reveal his/her choice, two follow-up 
questions were asked. Each answer was recorded for possible qualitative analysis later, 
particularly in terms of the justifications for the choice of emotional display. Those questions 
were dependent on whether the child chose a positive or negative emotionality display, “[1] 
Why did you think [E points] this child would be smiling/ frowning?; [2] How would you act 
if you were this child?” Here Story 1 was used as an example to describe how items were 
presented to children. The illustrations and vignettes of the rest of the stories of SURE are 
presented in Appendix 5.1. 
Scoring. The rationale for generating each emotional display combination and why 
they were scored accordingly was mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. Here, I will 
only summarize how each item of the scale was scored. The protagonist of the story faces a 
socially demanding situation where his or her desire is not met for the greater good of others. 
Thus, the protagonist is expected to adjust the display of his or her emotions. Only a 
dichotomy between a positive and negative display of emotions was presented. The 
                                                          
6
  This question asked in Turkish was, “Sence [e.g. Billy- character’s name] babaannesine nasil davran-mali?” 
[Do you think –Billy-to grandmother-how- react-should]. So, the exact translation of the question from Turkish 
would be ‘how should [character’s name] react [to X person], do you think?’. Using ‘do you think’ or ‘in your 
opinion’ as a conditional clause is necessary at the beginning of the sentence because it continues with should. 
The translation that fits the meaning better in English was provided in the example, even though the literal one 
is more complex.
 




protagonist was depicted as smiling or frowning. The thoughts to accompany emotional 
displays were also dichotomous. They varied from the true desire of the protagonist to the 
recent change of the events. The match of the thought of the recent change of events – as the 
source of disappointment- and the negative emotional display was scored as 1 point [i.e. see 
Picture 4 above]. The match of the true desire that was not fulfilled and the negative 
emotional display was scored as 2 points [i.e. see Picture 3]. The match of the thought of the 
recent change of events and the positive emotional display was scored as 3 points [i.e. see 
Picture 2]. The match of the true desire and the positive emotional display was scored as 4 
points [i.e. see Picture 1].    
Results 
There are two very straightforward segments of the analysis in Study 4. The reliability 
of the scale was in the first main question. Secondly, the nature of the scoring of each item 
was examined in terms of the possible differences between age groups. The assumption was 
that the older (i.e. 5 year old) children would tend to have a grip of social necessity of putting 
on a positive emotional display, whereas the choices of younger children would be expected 
to be at chance or would show more expressions of ‘negative’ emotions due to the true 
feelings caused by the situation. Thus, attributing a positive display in spite of holding a 
conflicting desire (or feeling) is difficult but it would indicate a child’s ability to understand 
hiding emotion and replacing them with a socially appropriate (i.e. positive) emotion display.     
Reliability Analysis 
Cronbach’s alpha value calculated for 9-item version of SURE was 0.792. Excluding 
Story 6 from the scale led to an increase in alpha value to .81. In the next step, exclusion of 
Story 4 was also suggesting an increase of alpha value. Thus, two items (Story 4 and Story 6) 
were dropped from the scale. The 7-item version of SURE had Cronbach’s alpha value of .83 




which indicates a uniform scale with large inter-correlations among items. Since the 
reliability analysis showed that Stories 4 and 6 provided a less robust fit into the scale, they 
are dropped from the further analysis7. 
Age Comparisons 
For each story, the number of children’s choices is presented in a table. The effects of 
age group and gender on each story was examined by a series (2 X 2) ANOVAs.  
Story 1. Billy is the protagonist of the story who desired (was promised in the first 
place) to go to a funfair but he was taken for a walk in the woods instead by his grandmother. 
The number of participants who chose each emotional display is illustrated in Table 5.1. 
Children from all age groups tended to attribute a positive emotional display for Billy rather 
than a negative one. The univariate analysis of variance showed that neither age nor gender 
groups had a significant effect on children’s choices in Story 1: age, F (2, 62) =.36, p=.70, 
p2= .01; gender, F (1, 62) =.96, p=.33, p2= .02. The interaction of these variables was also 
insignificant; F (2, 62) =1.81, p=.17, p2= .06. 
                                                          
7 The analysis with Stories 4 and 6 showed no significant main effects of age, gender or their interaction.  






Numbers of Children based on Their Choice of Emotional Display in Story 1 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-year-olds 0 8 8 3 
4-year-olds 3 3 8 7 
5-year-olds 2 4 9 7 
 
Ten children from the whole sample did not state any explanation for their choice. 8 
of the children who chose the positive display of emotions made an explanation regarding the 
grandma’s feelings. A boy (5-year and 4 months-old) picked the highest scored outcome 
(positive display and true desire) as his choice and this is his explanation for his choice: ‘he 
should not go to funfair and not upset his grandma (ID: 12)”.  A girl (5-years 9 months- old) 
also chose the same outcome and gave the following explanation: “he should know that he 
could go to the funfair later, and not to upset his grandma now (ID: 20)”. On the other hand, 
a younger girl (3 year and 2 months old) who chose a negative display and the recent event 
explained her choice as ‘he didn’t go the funfair but my mum would take me to the park in 
any minute now (ID:43)”.  
Story 2. Jasmine is the protagonist of this story who finds out that her beloved pet 
turtle died in the morning of a close friend’s birthday party. The true feeling towards the 
tragic event of losing a pet is ‘upset’ or ‘sad’. However, she would have been expected to 




display positive emotional cues to conform to the behaviour expected at a party while she 
may still think about her pet turtle. As Table 5.2 shows, most of the 3-year-olds tended to 
choose the negative emotional display for Jasmine. Four-and 5-year-olds, on the other hand, 
tend to choose positive emotional displays more than the negative ones. As the univariate 
analyses of variance (please see Table 5.2.1) shows, age significantly affected the emotional 
display choices in Story 2, but gender and the interaction were not significant. Tukey tests 
(with the Tukey-Kramer adjustment) revealed that the 3-year-olds’ choice in this story was 
statistically different from the older children. Such a difference was not apparent between the 
4-and 5-year-olds’ choices.   
Table 5.2 
Numbers of Children based on their Choice of Emotional Display in Story 2 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-year-olds 8 5 4 2 
4-year-olds 3 3 8 7 
5-year-olds 1 7 8 6 
 
When children’s explanations were solicited, a girl (5 year and 8 months old) who 
chose a positive emotional display gave the following explanation: “she would not miss out a 
friend’s birthday. I would have been thinking about my turtle, but I would still go to my 
friend’s party (ID: 27)”. Another boy (4 year and 1 month old) chose a negative display (with 




the recent event) and justified  his choice by describing the characters’ situation: “she is upset 
that her turtle is dead and she is at a party (ID: 5)”.  
 
Story 3. Eileen is the protagonist of the story who wants to go ice-skating with her 
parents. Her parents say that they will go to her brother’s football match before ice-skating. 
However, her brother gets slightly injured and is very tired after the match. Thus, her parents 
decide to go back home instead of ice-skating. Clearly, Eileen would be upset and/or 
disappointed due to her unfulfilled desire but she would also be expected to feel 
compassionate towards her brother’s condition. Table 5.3 presents the raw number of 
children according to their choices. Eighteen children chose positive emotional display and a 
true desire out of the whole sample. Seven of them justified their choice by giving 
explanations like “could go ice skating later”, “brother is hurt, better go back home”. Fifteen 
children picked the negative emotional display and recent event mostly explaining their 




Univariate Analysis of Variance of Story 2 by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 10.83 2 5.74 .17 .01 
Gender .32 1 .34 .01 .56 
Age * Gender 5.18 2 2.75 .09 .07 
Note:  R Squared = .23 (Adjusted R Squared = .16) 





Number of Children based on their choice of emotional display in Story 3 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-year-olds 9 4 5 1 
4-year-olds 4 5 6 6 
5-year-olds 2 1 8 11 
 
Three-year-olds mostly picked a negative emotional display. The choice of the 4-and-
5-year-olds was inclined towards positive emotionality displays. The univariate analysis of 
variance backed up that finding and demonstrated that both age and gender has a significant 
effect on children’s choices in Story 3 as displayed in Table 5.3.1. Tukey tests revealed that 
the choices of 3-year-olds was different from the 4-year-olds (p<.05, -.77, 95% CI [-1.53, -
.01] and 5-year-olds (p<.001, -1.38, 95% CI [-2.13, -.62]. The age difference was not 
apparent between 4- and 5-year-olds (p=.13, -.61, 95% CI [-.13, -1.34].  
Table 5.3.1 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Story 3 by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 18.90 2 9.42 .25 <.001 
Gender 4.51 1 4.50 .07 .04 
Age * Gender .25 2 .13 .00 .88 
Note: R Squared = .30 (Adjusted R Squared = .24) 





Story5. Mabel is the protagonist of this story who buys flowers for her mum’s 
birthday with her sister. While their tired mum is resting, she is supposed to wait until her 
sister finishes her homework before they present the flowers. Mabel would cope with this 
obligatory delay request from her sister with a positive or negative display of emotions, and 
by delaying the gift presentation, or not.  In Table 5.4, the raw number of children’s choices 
is illustrated again. In all age groups, children tended to pick the recent change of events (e.g. 
Mabel thinking about her sister doing homework as opposed to the two girls presenting the 
flowers together) with either positive or negative emotional displays. The analysis of variance 
presented in Table 5.4.1 though showed a marginal effect of age group on children’s choices 
in Story 5. Tukey tests also showed that there was no difference between the performances of 
3-, 4- and 5- year-olds.  
Table 5.4 
Number of Children based on their Choice of Emotional Display in Story 5 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-year-olds 9 3 4 3 
4-year-olds 3 4 7 7 









Univariate Analysis of Variance of Story 5 by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 7.31 2 3.10 .10 .05 
Gender 1.60 1 1.36 .02 .25 
Age * Gender .21 2 .09 .00 .91 
Note: R Squared = .12 (Adjusted R Squared = .04) 
Story 7. Denise, the protagonist in Story 7, was told by her mother to postpone her 
play date that she was very much looking forward to because she was feeling poorly. In this 
story, the illness of the main character was the reason behind the delay of this pleasurable 
activity but she was prevented from doing this by her mother to spare her friend from 
catching her cold. Again, how she handles the situation could go either way. She might focus 
on not being able to get what she want (e.g. playing her friend) and display negative emotions 
or see the possibility of having what she wants later and display positive emotions.  
The univariate analysis of variance showed a significant effect of age on children 
choices as an outcome for the protagonist (see Table 5.5.1). Tukey tests suggest that the 3-
year-olds’ responses were statically different from the 4- (p<.001, -1.17, 95% CI [-1.93, -.42] 
and 5-year-olds (p<.001, -1.45, 95% CI [-2.20, -.70]. However, there was no such difference 









Numbers of Children based on their Choice of Emotional Display in Story 7 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-year-olds 11 4 3 1 
4-year-olds 2 6 6 7 
5-year-olds 2 4 5 11 
 
Table 5.5.1 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Story 7 by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 23.86 2 12.12 .30 .00 
Gender 2.02 1 2.05 .04 .16 
Age * Gender 2.01 2 1.02 .04 .37 
Note: R Squared = .34 (Adjusted R Squared = .28) 
Story 8. Bob is the protagonist of this story who faces social pressure when sharing 
his favourite toy with a new friend in his nursery.  His friends know he likes to play with that 
special toy, but the new boy in the nursery wants to play with it too. Bob may display 
negative emotion if he does not want to share his toy with a new friend. His smiling response 
would be his acceptance of sharing, irrespective of whether he was thinking about playing 
with the toy alone or with the new friend. Most of the children acknowledged that Bob should 
be sharing his toy with his friend in their answers to follow-up questions. Although his true 
desire is identified as playing alone, based on the protagonist’s habits, the recent turn of 




events required imagining playing together. Playing together with a friend seemed more 
appealing to 30 children, so their explanations were: “he should be happy to share his car 
with a friend”, “not sharing his car with a friend would be rude”, and “playing together is 
fun”.  Thirty-two children, who chose a positive emotional display, also used the prosocial 
words such as the underlined ones: ‘sharing (is important/ nice)’, ‘playing together nicely’.  
Regardless of their emotional display choices, 21 children chose the version where the 
protagonist thinks about playing alone and not liking the idea of sharing his toy with a friend. 
Only 5 of those children chose a positive emotional display imagining playing alone. The rest 
chose the negative emotional display for the protagonist. When asked what they would do if a 
new kid in their class asks them to play together with their favourite toy; 34 children said that 
they would share and be happy about it.  Nine children did not give any relevant explanation 
for their choices, and all of them chose a negative display of emotion for the protagonist.  As 
Table 5.6 presents, younger children tended to go for a negative display for the story 
character. The univariate analysis of variance was demonstrated in detail in Table 5.6.1. It 
revealed that age was a significant predictor in Story 8. Tukey tests showed that the responses 
of 3-year-olds were statistically different from the 4- (p<.05, -.85, 95% CI [-1.64, -.07] and 5-
year-olds (p<.001, -1.36, 95% CI [-2.13, -.57]. However, there was no difference between the 










Numbers of Children based on their Choice of Emotional Display in Story 8 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3-year-olds 7 7 3 2 
4-year-olds 1 6 6 8 




Univariate Analysis of Variance of Story 8 by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 19.23 2 9.04 .24 .00 
Gender .47 1 .44 .01 .51 
Age * Gender 1.96 2 .92 .03 .40 
Note: R Squared = .27 (Adjusted R Squared = .20) 
Story 9. John is the protagonist of this story in a dilemma based on being kind and 
polite to his sister for the hard work that she put into making cookies for him and revealing 
his true feelings about their unappetizing nature. As a reflection of his politeness, he could 
smile and display positive emotionality. Displaying negative emotions would be considered 
as showing his true feelings toward the cookies but that would upset his sister.  Such actions 
would take place when imagining either how bad the cookies were or how much effort his 




sister put into making them. A positive display of emotions would conform to the norms of 
being kind to someone who has attempted to be kind themselves. In Table 5.7 the raw 
numbers of emotional display choices are shown. Three-year-olds tended to choose a 
negative display when they were disappointed with the outcome whereas older children 
appreciated the need to smile regardless of how bad the cookies were. In their explanations, 
older children pointed out how John’s sister got tired after baking the cookies for him, so he 
should be smiling at her no matter what the cookies taste like. Younger children, on the other 
hand, stated that John would be frowning because he is not going to like the tasteless cookies. 
The univariate analysis of variance that was displayed in Table 5.7.1 showed that age 
significantly influenced children’s choices in Story 9. Tukey tests showed that the 3-year-old-
group responded significantly differently from the 4- (p<.05, -.87, 95% CI [-1.73, -.02] and 5-
year-olds (p<.001, -1.19, 95% CI [-2.13, -.45]. Again, there was no difference between the 
older children (p=.44, -.42, 95% CI [-1.24, .40].  
Table 5.7 
Numbers of Children based on their Choice of Emotional Display in Story 8 by Age  










 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
3 11 3 2 3 
4 3 6 6 6 
5 2 6 1 13 
 
 





Univariate Analysis of Variance of Story 9 by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 17.67 2 7.06 .20 .00 
Gender 1.35 1 1.08 .02 .30 
Age * Gender 1.85 2 .74 .03 .48 
Note: R Squared = .23 (Adjusted R Squared = .16) 
Total SURE Score. Seven-items from the scales evaluated above were aggregated to 
create an overall score for this scale. The overall mean was 18.71 (SD =5.50, ranging from 
minimum 8 to maximum 28). The mean score increased by each age group (3-year-olds: 
M=14.26, SD=; 4-year-olds: M=19.81; SD=4.73; 5-year-olds: M=21.50; SD=4.73). When the 
univariate analysis of variance was employed to this new total score of SURE; Age had a 
significant effect on overall performance, and the detail of the analysis is in Table 5.8. 
Gender, on the other hand, did not significantly affect performance on the SURE. The 
interaction between two variables was also non-significant. Tukey tests showed that the 
performance of 3- year-olds was significantly different from both 4- and 5- year-olds. There 
was no difference between the performances of 4-and 5-year-olds. 
Table 5.8 
The analysis of variance on 7-item Scale (SURE) with Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F  p2 p 
Age 578.15 2 14.34 .34 .00 
Gender 65.88 1 3.27 .06 .08 
Age * Gender 71.12 2 1.76 .06 .18 
Note:  R Squared = .39 (Adjusted R Squared = .33) 
 





The objective of this chapter was to develop a scale that taps a specific skill of 
understanding emotion-regulation. Since Study 3 revealed that Conflict Inhibition and ER 
(positive) were explained mostly by SU and EU performance, the Scale of an Understanding 
of Regulation of Emotions (SURE) was developed. 
 As summarized in the introduction of this chapter, previous studies approached EU as 
the reflection of understanding of ER. Even those studies that investigated the notion of 
understanding of emotional-regulation process approached emotions post-hoc and explored 
the coping strategies with these past feelings. In SURE, children were presented with a story 
in which a character faces a need to suppress true feeling and display socially appropriate 
emotion. By creating items with such contrasts, a child’s anticipation for an emotional 
outcome that will be produced has been taken into account.  
Nine-items were generated in the first place. As this pilot study suggested in the 
reliability analysis, two items were dropped from the scale so that the measure of internal 
consistency was strong.  In most items (excluding Story 1), children’s age was a significant 
factor in their choice of emotional display for the story characters. Hence, through a 
reliability analysis it was ensured that the items in the scale were in harmony.  
In addition to the reliability analysis, children’s choices of each story protagonist’s 
actions and thoughts were also informative. Choosing the positive emotional display was 
suggested as a reflection of ER, young children’s tendency to select positive emotions 
without considering the moral implications was suggested in a previous study by Nunner-
Winkler and Sodian (1988). In spite of involving a moral transgression such as lying or 
stealing, as long as the protagonist gets what he or she wants, 4-and 5-year-olds claimed that 
the protagonist would be happy. Denham et al. (2014) recently suggested that when asked to 




make a judgement regarding an emotion younger children tend to go for positive emotions 
while older children were able to adjust their answers according to the context. Our findings 
here show that young children are able to attribute negative feelings to someone displaying 
positive emotion. According to their findings, younger children would have chosen a positive 
emotional display more often.  However, the explanatory age analysis showed that.3-year-
olds in this study tend to choose negative emotional outcomes for the protagonists. The 
consistent significant age differences in this study strongly suggest a developmental change 
between the choices of 3-year-olds and 4- year-olds (apart from Stories 1 and 5). When the 
scores of each item were aggregated, the overall SURE score also showed the same 
significant effect of age, with a 3-4 transition.  
The performance in SURE should be compared to other SR constructs for two 
reasons.  Firstly, SURE is also a comprehension task similar to SU and EU. Children’s 
understanding and awareness of a situation that elicits certain emotions such as excitement or 
disappointment may relate to their false belief performance and the understanding of 
emotions in general.  
The way children predict the desired emotional outcomes for the protagonist may 
determine ER performance. Therefore, a test of emotional-regulation would make better 
predictions for the ability to regulate both positive and negative emotionality in online 
assessments. Instead of using ER as a tool to keep the child’s own psychological state stable, 
the SURE was specifically designed to test the types of competing demands that are 
presented in ER tasks. Thus, we expect the performance in SURE as a reflector of child’s 
better grasp of control of emotionality in which the ER abilities are assessed without being 
too demanding.  




Chapter 6 - How does the “Understanding” (Emotional and Social) relate 
to other Mechanisms of Self-Regulation?  
Study 5 syntheses the constructs that have been examined in the previous studies of 
this thesis. It aims to explain the relationship between ‘regulatory’ (i.e., behavioural 
measures: CR and ER) and ‘understanding’ mechanisms (SU, EU and SURE).  Figure 6.1 
presents a schematic analysis of the relationships between these constructs in the previous 
chapters (i.e., in Studies 1, 2, and 3). The associations that were reported were not always 
consistent, as the reference to each study in Figure 6.1 suggests (the flag S2, for example, 
refers to Study 2 in each of the boxes with a lighter border). In terms of distinguishing the 
Conflict and Delay aspects of inhibitory control and their relation to emotion-regulation 
performance, Study 2 and 3 revealed a discrepancy. There seemed to be a strong relationship 
between SU and EU and each correlated with Conflict in Study 3. We need, first, to replicate 
this link with the new measure of ER-understanding in order more fully to explore the 
hypothesis that there is a crucial role of ‘understanding’ of mind and emotion in children’s 
self-regulation.  
There are two key aims of this thesis. One is to look more closely at the differences 
between conflict and delay tasks in their relations to emotionality. The other one is to clarify 
the assessment of emotionality in terms of regulatory performance.  As illustrated in Figure 
6.1, the ER measures demonstrated an inconsistent pattern regarding to their association to 
other SR constructs.  In Study 3 (Chapter 4), the scope of ER was broadened with positive 
and negative emotionality and EU. A different developmental pathway was suggested for 
negative and positive ER processes due to their lack of association. The ability to hide a 
secret for an unusual confidant was considered as the regulation of positive emotions, and it 
was only related to emotion-comprehension performance in Study 3. The regulation of 




negative emotions was assessed via creating a ‘disappointing’ situation. The child’s ability to 
control his or her emotionality was observed according to assumption that certain emotions 
(i.e. negative or positive) were always provoked in the assessment setting.  The inconsistency 
that ER (negative) and ER (positive) presented in their associations to IC measures led to the 
development, in Study 4, of a new measure of the child’s understanding of ER.  In this 
chapter, this novel task of ER will be examined thoroughly in its relation to both cognitive 
and emotional aspects of SR.  
Thus, this study adds a new dimension; the part of emotion understanding tested by 
the SURE was to assess prospective control of one’s behaviour. The SURE investigates 
children’s potential to appraise a situation where, instead of displaying true feelings, socially 
appropriate versions should be displayed. Chapter 5 identified that the SURE is a reliable 
way to measure such understanding in preschoolers. The beginning of the children’s grasp of 
the pragmatics of the regulation of both emotions and thoughts is suggested to be an 
important point to start investigating both CR (traditionally assessed in delay or conflict 
inhibition) and ER (in both its positive and negative forms).  Thus, this chapter aims to 
extend our grasp of the importance of children’s growing ‘awareness’ of regulation.  
In the previous studies, our analysis was guided by the psychological proximity 
among various measures of SR. For example, EU was considered as part of the ER measures, 
disregarding the task’s demand of ‘understanding’ which resembles the demand of SU. At the 
same time, the regression analysis tested the expected proximity between behavioural or 
cognitive measures. As stated above, these analyses revealed that the link between emotional 
aspect of SR and Delay IC appears to be inconsistent. Thus, we aim to shift our focus to 
constructs to seek greater consistency in the associations between the constructs that have 
been examined throughout. With the inclusion of EU in Study 3, our focus shifted to 




exploring the importance of meta-cognition in terms of social and emotional abilities. 
Children’s performance in Conflict IC was consistently related to SU and even EU, but the 
significance of EU’s impact on Conflict disappeared when controlled by age. I believe that 
children’s understanding of social cognition, emotion, and emotion-regulation may be the key 
underlying mechanism of SR.  
STUDY 5 
To probe the trajectory of SURE, a straightforward question was asked in the current 
study, which was whether the ability of prospective emotion attribution according to ER 
requirements related to the performance of online control of emotionality. Regarding this 
question, it should be recalled that the items of SURE imitate real-life ER processes such as 
those tested in the Disappointment Paradigm. The demand of both ER assessments (i.e. 
negative and positive) may be different from the new method developed in the previous 
study, because of the engagement of the child with the given tasks. The child’s contribution 
in SURE is easier to control by the experimenter, compared to ER tasks. By emotionality, I 
specifically refer to the child’s reactivity in a task. The level (or valence) of experiencing 
emotions may be different for each child (Russell, 2009). The child’s level of experiencing 
disappointment or excitement might be influenced by the prior events that cannot be 
controlled in a natural setting. It was felt that SURE might be a simpler way of elaborating 
children’s understanding of the control of emotions. Similar to ER tasks, Delay performance 
is also prone to be influenced by situational factors (Kidd, Palmeri, & Aslin, 2013).  The 
impact of such factors on the SURE should be considered as an equivalent to the effect of the 
behavioural measures used in previous studies.  
Although the conditions for the protagonist in SURE were set up to match on the 
social interactions they experience in ER, the constructs tapped might online ER processes 




for the reasons mentioned above. The factors that may play a role in the ability to attribute 
ER in others might stem from the recognition of others’ state of mind and/or inhibitory 
control. Thus, it is expected that SURE performance will be in a closer relationship with SU 
rather than performance-based ER measures.  Moreover, based on the strong bond between 
SU and Conflict, it is predicted that the emotional attribution of control will also predict 
children’s performance in Conflict tasks. 
If  SURE was related to SU and Conflict but not ER and Delay, some might argue that 
then the task I developed  might be lacking the emotional qualities that I aimed to assess in 
the first place. I would like to remind the reader that the studies showing any effect of ER on 
the other cognitive abilities mostly relied on parental reports that make overarching 
statements about the child’s behaviour in an emotionally challenging situation. I intend to put 
the child in a position where she or he can make predictions regarding an emotion-control in 
a familiar scenario. Hence, it is predicted that the performance in SURE would be a better 
reflector of children’s developing ER mechanisms.  






                                                          
8 The dotted lines are put to represent the potential relationships that SURE might share with other SR 
constructs. SURE may demonstrate a link with performance based ER measures and/or cognitively driven 
Conflict Inhibition and ‘Understanding’ measures.  
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One hundred and twenty (60 female) Turkish children participated in this study. Their 
age ranged from 3 to 5 (M=53.77 months, SD=9.95 range: 34- 72 months).  They were 
recruited from four nurseries in Bursa (Marmara region) in Turkey. The socio-economic 
statues of the families in those nurseries ranged from lower- middle to middle class. 
Following clearance from the Departmental and University Research Ethics Committees, 
Table 6.1 









Cognitive -Regulation CR  
       Conflict Dimension  Day & Night Task 
Hand Game 
Whisper Game 
Less is More 
        Delay Dimension  Marker Delay  
Snack Delay  
Gift Delay  
Emotional -Regulation ER Disappointing Gift  
Secret Keeping 
Social Understanding SU Unexpected Transfer False Belief  
Unexpected Content False Belief  
Appearance-Reality False Belief 
Emotion Understanding EU Test of Emotion Comprehension 
Understanding of Regulation 
of Emotion  
SURE A Scale for an Understanding of 
Regulation of Emotion 
Verbal Ability Language TEDL-III (Turkish Adaptation) 




parental consent was obtained through the school administrations. The consent and the 
willingness of the child to participate were taken very seriously before and during the testing. 
Five further children were tested but removed from the analysis due to: failing to complete all 
tasks (3), technical problems (speaker made odd noises that jeopardized the Secret Keeping 
task’s credibility) (1), and refusing to continue to the study (1).    
Procedure 
 Children were tested individually in a quiet room at their nurseries. The testing 
session lasted approximately one and a half hours to two hours depending on the child. The 
tasks were presented in a fixed order in two sittings (see Table 6.1 for the full list of tasks). 
At the end of the first sitting, E allowed the child to have a short break (5-10 min). In the first 
half of the test, False Belief tasks, Conflict tasks, SURE, the language measure, and TEC 
were administered. In the second half, Marker Delay, Secret Keeping, Toy Sort, Snack Delay, 
Gift Delay and the Disappointing Gift tasks were administered.  48 of children needed to 
finish the tasks in two sittings in addition to the usual break time, due to the interruptions 
caused by nursery’s daily activities (i.e. lunch break, nap time).    
Conflict Measures  
The same Conflict measures (Day/Night, Hand Game, Whisper Game, and Less is 
More tasks, as in Study 3) were administered in Study 5.  
Delay Measures 
The same Delay measures as Snack Delay and Gift Delay tasks in Study 3 were 
administered in Study 5. In addition to these, the Marker Delay task was added.  The Snack 
Delay task was based on the motivation of eating some treats. During testing in nurseries, 




meal times may interfere with some of the children’s motivation in this task. So, in addition 
to using an edible reward following the wait, a task with a neutral reward was added. 
The Marker Delay Task (Calkins, 1997) is adapted from the Telephone task (Vaughn, 
Kopp, & Krakow, 1984).  It assesses the ability to suppress a desire to engage in an enjoyable 
activity. It measures children’s response to delay colouring when left alone with the supplies 
to do so. Each child was presented with a box of markers/ crayons and paper.  Then the 
participant was asked if she or he would like to colour. The box of markers was opened.  
They were readily accessible and visible, and both the markers and paper were pushed toward 
the child. Then E said that she needed to leave and she will be back in the room very soon. 
The child was instructed not to colour or touch the paper, markers, or marker box until E’s 
return. The delay period was 2 minutes.  Performance was scored based on ability to follow 
instructions. Scores ranged from 1 to 6 (see Appendix 6.1 for the scoring) 
Emotionality Measures 
For emotional-regulation, the Disappointing Gift and Secret Keeping tasks used in 
Study 3 were administered in Study 5. For emotional understanding, the Test of Emotion 
Comprehension (TEC) in Study 3 was administered in Study 5 as well. For understanding of 
emotional-regulation, The Scale of Understanding of Emotional-Regulation (SURE) that was 
developed in Study 4 was administered with a 7-item-version in Study 5.  
Social Understanding (False Belief) Measures 
The same three tasks were used in Studies 1, 2, and 3, Unexpected Transfer, 
Unexpected Content, and Appearance Reality tasks were administered in Study 5.  
 





Test of Early Language Development-Third Edition: Turkish (TELD-3) was used as a 
language battery (Topbas & Guven, 2007). TELD-3 is a recently adapted Turkish assessment 
that is normed in Turkey.  The test has both Receptive and Expressive language batteries. 
Considering the length of testing procedure, the Receptive language battery (Form A) was 
used. Children given the oral instructions: “We are going to play a fun game now. I will show 
you some pictures. When I ask you to ‘show me the small one’ on the picture; you will point 
the relevant picture”. Testing started with an entry item based on the child’s age. Then a 
basal point was specified according to the child’s consecutive three correct answers. If the 
child did not succeed three items in a row, E continued with items that were prior to her/his 
entry point. The testing continued until the child made three mistakes in a row. When the 
child reached this ceiling, the raw score was calculated by adding correct items. Each was 
scored as 1 point.  
Results 
Study 5 comprised all the aspects of self-regulation that were addressed in the 
previous studies in this thesis. The purpose of the analysis here is to replicate the previous 
findings and to synthesise the components of self-regulation. In this study, verbal ability was 
also assessed, so this gives us the opportunity to control the effect of verbal ability in the 
regression analysis along with age. Then a conclusion can be made about whether verbal 
ability and age influence the relationship that the SR constructs share with each other. 
However, as mentioned in the introduction, rather than repeating the same predictions that 
were reported in the previous chapters, Conflict and SURE will be explored closely in terms 
their contribution to the aspects of SR (i.e. cognitive and emotional). 
 




Comparisons by Age and Gender 
Children’s mean performance and standard deviations in each task of Study 5 are 
presented by age group in Table 6.1. As below, the preparation of each measure for the 
further analysis has been explained. The first analyses explore whether there are (within the 
constraints of a cross-sectional design) developmental changes in the constructs under 
investigation and the particular age transitions that are evidence from 3 to 5. Gender, on the 
other hand, is only tested for delay and emotion measures because the findings regarding the 
effect of gender on those constructs remain complicated in the literature such as better 
performance of the girls in Delay tasks (e.g. Jahromi & Stifter, 2008; McCabe & Brooks-
Gunn, 2007). There is also the new measure –SURE - that is supposed to control for 
individual differences which may have any potential impact on the performance, by making 
the procedure as equivalent as possible for all children and making it third person.    
 
Table 6.2  
Descriptive Statistics for Conflict Measures by Age 
Measures Min Max     Overall  
 
Mean     SD 
3-year-olds 
 
Mean    SD 
 4-year-olds 
 
Mean      SD 
5-year-olds 
 
Mean   SD  
Day/Night Task  0 16 12.71 3.47 11.36 4.16 12.41 3.62 14.25 1.61 
 
Hand Game 0 16 11.80 4.63 7.83 5.28 12.75 3.74 14.32 1.69 
     
Whisper Game 0 1 .63 .36 .38 .40 .70 .31 .77 .26 
 
Less is More  3 16 11.93 3.43 9.53 3.92 12.66 2.70 13.30 2.50 




Conflict Measures  
The Day/Night Task.  The scoring was identical with the procedure reported in the 
Studies 1, 2, and 3. As illustrated in Table 6.2, the mean performance of the task was quite 
high. The mean scores for each age group increase with age. The 5-year-olds were almost at 
the ceiling. To avoid the effect of the negative skew, the Day/Night scores were transformed 
using the square root procedure. The analysis of variance was conducted with age on the 
transformed Day/Night scores. In Table 2, the detail of the analysis shows that Age 
significantly affected Day/Night performance, F (2,120) = 6.72, p<.01, p2= .1. Tukey tests 
revealed that the performance of 5-year-olds was significantly different to that of the 3- 
years-olds (p<.001, .49, 95% CI [.17, .82]) but was not statistically different than the 4-year-
olds (p=.06, .30, 95% CI [-.01, .61]). The performance was not statically different between 3-
and 4-year-olds (p=.31, -.20, 95% CI [-.51, .12]).  
  The Hand Game. The scoring was identical with the procedure reported in Study 3. 
As illustrated in Table 6.2, 3-year-olds had the lowest mean score that was smaller than the 
overall mean. With increasing age, the mean score for the Hand Game increased. Similar to 
the Day/Night task, 5-year-olds’ performance was almost at ceiling. The scores were square 
root transformed before the analysis of variance by age.  Age had a significant effect on Hand 
Game performance, F (2,120) = 23.34, p<.01, p2= .29. Tukey tests showed that the 
performance of 3-year-olds was statistically different from the 4-and -5-year olds, (p<.001, -
.93, 95% CI [-1.35, -.49]; (p<.001, -1.22, 95% CI [-1.66, -.78])). The performance was not 
significantly different between the 4-and-5-year-olds, (p=.22, -.29, 95% CI [-.71, .12]). 
  The Whisper Game. The administration of the task was identical the procedure 
reported in Study 3. The scoring was slightly changed in this study. Children were instructed 
to whisper when they see the cartoon characters. However, some children did not know every 




cartoon character.  Children’s performance was supposed to be based on their ability to hold 
their impulse to call the character’s name, not based on their cartoon character knowledge. 
Therefore, the following formula was used for calculating children’s performance in this task: 
Whispered Responses / (Whispered Responses+ Loud Responses)  
Table 6.2 displays children’s mean scores based on this formula. The three-year-old group 
has a lower mean score than the older children. The analysis of variance showed that the Age 
had a significant effect on the Whisper Game performance, F (2,120) = 15.53, p<.001, p2= 
.21. Tukey tests revealed that the performance of 3-year-olds was significantly different to 
that of the 4-and 5-year-olds, (p<.001, -.32, 95% CI [-.49, -.14]; (p<.001, -.40, 95% CI [-.57, 
-.22]). The performance was not statistically different between 4-and 5-year-olds, (p=.50, -
.08, 95% CI [-.25, .09]).  
Less is More Task. The administration and the scoring were the same as in Study 3. 
Table 6.2 displays the mean scores for each age group. Three-year-olds had the lowest mean 
score in this task. Five-year-olds, with a mean score of 13.30, are very close the maximum 
score of 16 which indicate a possible ceiling effect. Children’s scores were transformed by 
using the Square Root procedure. The transformed scores were used in the analysis of 
variance that showed that age significantly affects how children can inhibit their impulsive 
urge to point the box with more treats (e.g. stickers) and be able to point to the box with less 
treats to win more, F (2,120) = 17.54, p<.001, p2= .23.  Tukey tests show that the 
performance of 3-year-olds was significantly different from both 4-and 5-year olds, (p<.001, 
-.51, 95% CI [-.77, -.26]; p<.001, -.60, 95% CI [-.86, -.35]). However, the performance was 
not statically different between 4-and 5-year-olds, p=.65, -.09, 95% CI [-.34, .16]. 
 




Relations among Conflict Measures 
The analysis of variance suggested that in the Day/Night task, the performance of 3-
and 4 year olds was similar to each other in comparison to 5-year-olds who performed better 
than their younger peers. The aim of the analyses in this subsection (and subsequent ones 
with similar titles) is to examine how similar measures relate to each other and whether these 
should be combined to form a composite construct. For the other three Conflict measures, 4-
and-5 year-olds showed a similar level of performance compared to 3-year-olds’ poorer 
performance. Before creating a composite score out of the conflict measures, the inter-
correlations among them were analysed. Table 6.3 displays that the strongest correlation 
appears to be between the Day/Night task and Hand Game.  Hand Game was correlated with 
the Whisper Game and in the Less is More as well. The weakest correlation was between the 
Day/Night and the Less is More. The performance in each task was standardised (z-score) 
and those transformed scores were used to generate a Conflict Composite Score.  The 
analysis of variance conducted with this new Composite score showed that Age significantly 
predicted it, F (2,120) = 35.14, p<.001, p2= .38. The Conflict Composite Score is used in the 
further analyses.  
Table 6.3 
Pearson Correlations among Conflict Measures  
 Day/Night  Hand Game Whisper 
Day/Night Task  -   
Hand Game  .45** -  
Whisper   .30** .42** - 
Less is More  .20* .39** .38** 








Delay Measures  
One additional Delay measure was added to the design of Study 5; Marker Delay.  
Snack Delay. The administration and the scoring of the task were identical with 
Study 3. Children’s score out of 4 for each time-interval was aggregated to a total score. The 
latency to first hand movement was recorded. Table 6.4 displays children’s scores out of 12 
and clearly suggests an exceptional performance based on the mean scores.  The score of 3-
year-olds was slightly lower than older age groups whose performance was not different from 
one another. The analysis of variance by Age and Gender is presented in Table 6.5, and 
showed that the main effect of each demographic variable was not significant. However, the 
interaction between them had a significant effect on children’s scores in Snack Delay task. To 
unpack the interaction, one-way ANOVA was conducted separately for gender groups. For 
Table 6.4  
Descriptive Statistics for Delay Measures by Age  
Measures Min Max Overall 
Mean     SD 
3-year-olds 
Mean    SD 
4-year-olds 
Mean      SD 
5-year-olds 
Mean   SD 
Snack Delay 0 12 9.22 2.35 8.64 3.03 9.47 1.84 9.45 2.11 
     Latency  8 240 177.63 68.53 156.39 81.03 182.45 58.83 191.43 63.09 
Gift Delay Score  0 2 1.41 .71 1.17 .85 1.48 .63 1.55 .64 
    Latency 2 60 45.85 78.97 43.08 20.33 46.30 19.26 47.85 17.50 
Marker Delay Score 0 6 5.02 1.32 4.72 1.56 5.13 1.19 5.15 1.21 
   Latency  1 120 85.45 45.01 82.67 44.38 87.61 44.76 85.58 46.83 




girls (M= 9.43, SD=2.47), there was a statistically significant effect of Age, F (2, 57) = 4.57, 
p<.01. Tukey tests revealed that the performance of 5-year-olds was statically different than 
3-year-olds (p<.01, 2.28, 95% CI .46, 4.11]. For boys (M= 9.00 SD=2.22), age had no 
significant effect on their Delay performance, F (2, 57)= 1.01, p=.37. The increasing ability 
with age and the better performance of girls was in line with McCabe and Brooks-Gunn’s 
(2007) findings. The univariate analysis on the performance by children’s latency to move 
hand did not show any statistical effect of age, F (2,120) = 2.74, p=.07, p
2=. 05; gender, F 
(1,120) = 1.92, p=.17, p





Gift Delay. The administration and scoring of the task were same as in Study 3. In Table 6.4, the mean 
score of children in the task (ranging from 0 to 2) was presented. Although 3-year-olds had the lowest 
mean score, all three age groups were above 1. Therefore, in Table 6.6, the children’s responses in raw 
numbers were presented. It is clear that more children tend to wait without peeking whilst the E was 
wrapping their present.  Furthermore, mean latency to peek for all age groups (overall mean was 45.85) 
was also high considering the 60 second delay period. Due to the negative skew on this performance, 
Table 6.5 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Snack Delay Task Total Score  by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 17.18 2 1.65 .03 .20 
Gender 4.70 1 .90 .01 .34 
Age * Gender 42.60 2 4.10 .07 .02 
Note:  R Squared = .10 (Adjusted R Squared = .06) 




scores were transformed by Square Root procedure. As the analysis of variance with Age and Gender 
presented in Table 6.7 shows, both of them had a significant main effect on children’s performance, as 
in scores in the Gift Delay task, but their interaction did not. The main effect of Gender was unpacked 
by conducting one-way ANOVA with Age for each gender group separately. It showed that statically 
significant age effect was only observed in girls (M=1.60, SD=.64),  F(2,57)=5.53, p <.01; the same 
trend was not observed in boys (M=1.21, SD=.74), F(2,57)=.26, p =.77. The performance of 3-year-olds 
was significantly different from both 4- and 5-year-olds, (p<.05, -.25, 95% CI [-.49, -.01]; p<.05, -.28, 
95% CI [-.52, -.03]). The performance was not statistically different between 4-and 5-year olds (p=.96, -
.03, 95% CI [-.26, .20]). When the univariate analysis was conducted with children’s performance as in 
latency to first peek in the Gift Delay task (see Table 6.8), only gender had a significant effect on 
performance (for girls: M=51.88,SD=14.30, for boys: M=39.82,SD=21.14) . Neither age nor the 
interaction between age and gender statistically predicted the latency to peek during the delay period. 
Table 6.6 




fully turned/ looked 
(0) 
look over the shoulder 
(1) 
did not peek  
(2) 
3-year-olds 10 10 16 
4-year-olds 3 17 24 
5-year-olds 3 12 25 
Total 16 39 65 
 
 






Univariate Analysis of Variance of Gift Delay Task Latency by Age and Gender 
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 444.29 2 .67 .01 .52 
Gender 4407.22 1 13.26 .10 .00 
Age * Gender 101.90 2 .15 .00 .86 
Note: R Squared = .12 (Adjusted R Squared = .08) 
 
Marker Delay. This task was added to the Delay measures as the stimulus was 
neutral, based on its lack of connection to any natural need for food. Children were instructed 
to not start colouring/drawing before E was back with some ‘special crayons’, so then the 
child can start colouring.  The delay period that the E was absent was 2 minutes.  The 
performance of children during that time was scored based on how they engaged in with the 
colouring activity. The minimum score of 1 point was given if the child started to colour with 
Table 6.7 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of Gift Delay Task Scores (Transformed)  by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 1.77 2 4.471 .07 .01 
Gender 1.32 1 6.68 .06 .01 
Age * Gender .42 2 1.05 .02 .35 
Note: R Squared = .14 (Adjusted R Squared = .10) 




the makers. The maximum score of 6 was given if the child did not touch the marker or the 
paper during the delay period. The score of children was marked down based on whether they 
engaged with paper or the markers. When a child touched the paper, his or her score was 
marked down to 5 points and touching the box or the markers was scored as 4 points. The act 
of lifting the box of markers decreased the score to 3 points. The child received 2 point when 
she or he took the markers out of the box. The list of scoring also presented in Appendix 6.1. 
This task was used for the first time in this study, so inter-rater reliability with 20 % of the 
sample (24 children) was conducted. This showed a high agreement between two raters as the 
Kappa = .93 (p <.001), 95% CI (0.86, 0.97) (Landis &Koch, 1977). 
Considering that the maximum score was 6, as Table 6.4 displays children’s mean 
performance in the task, all age groups were very good at waiting during E’s absence. 3-year-
olds had the lowest mean score compared to older children but the score of 5-year-olds was 
almost at ceiling. Therefore, the scores were transformed by square root. The analysis of 
variance on the performance for Marker Delay task showed that neither the age nor the 
gender had a significant effect on Score: Age, F (2,120) = 1.55, p=.22, p
2= .03; Gender, F 
(1,120) = .44, p=.51, p
2= .00,  and Latency: Age, F (2,120) = .12, p=.89, p
2= .00; Gender,  
F (1,120) = 1.12, p=.29, p
2= .01. The interaction between Age and Gender was also not 
significant for the Score: F (2,120) = .54, p=.59, p
2= .01, or the Latency F (2,120) = .75, 
p=.48, p
2= .01.  
Relations among Delay measures 
Before exploring the relationships that the Delay measures may have with other 
variables, the inter-correlations among three tasks were presented in Table 6.9. For obvious 
reasons the score and the latency in each task had the strongest correlation with each other. 
The score of Snack Delay was positively correlated both the scores Gift and Marker Delay 




task. The score for Gift Delay was also positively correlated with the Marker Delay Score. A 
similar pattern also occurred between the latency in all three Delay tasks. Based on these 
inter-correlations, the scores and the latency in the three tasks were standardized (z-scores) 
and aggregated to generate a Composite Delay Score and a Composite Delay Latency 
performance. These two Composite Delay measures were strongly correlated to each other r 
(119) =.85, p<.01. The univariate analysis with Age and Gender on the Composite Delay 
Score showed that only children’s age significantly predicted performance F (2,120) = 3.27, 
p=.04, p2= .05. The univariate analysis with Composite Delay Latency showed no 
significant effect of age or gender on children’s performance.  
Table 6.9 






































Snack Delay  Score  -     
Snack Delay  Latency  .79** -    
Gift Delay Score  .46** .34** -   
Gift Delay Latency  .34** .34** .61** -  
Marker Delay Score  .47** .43** .25** .34** - 
Marker Delay Latency  .40** .34** .17 .22* .72** 
Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01. 




Emotional -Regulation Measures 
 
Disappointing Gift. The administration and the scoring were same as in Studies 2 
and 3. In the previous studies, the numbers of positive and transitional reactions were 
summed and then subtracted from the number of negative reactions. As displayed in Table 
6.10, children’s scores ranged from -6 to 4. A smaller score means that children had fewer 
negative and more positive/transitional reactions. For all age groups, children’s scores were 
not particularly different. For a thorough picture of children’s performance in the 
Disappointing Gift task, in Table 6.11, mean reactions in each emotional category are 
presented. For all age groups, children showed a smaller number of positive reactions. The 
mean number of the transitional reactions was marginally the highest.  The univariate 
analysis with Age and Gender on the Disappointing Gift score revealed that neither of them 
has a statistical effect on children’s performance of masking their disappointment (Age, F 
(2,120) = .44, p=.65, p
2= .01. Gender, F (1,120) = 1.97, p=.16, p
2= .02, Age X Gender, F 
(2,120) = .79, p=.46, p
2= .01).  
Table 6.10  
Descriptive Statistics for Emotion Measures by Age 
 
Measures Min Max     Overall  
Mean     SD 
3-year-olds 
Mean    SD 
 4-year-olds 
Mean      SD 
5-year-olds 
Mean   SD  
Disappointing Gift -6 4 -1.25 2.19 -1.53 2.51 -1.18 1.98 -1.08 2.13 
Secret Keeping 0 2 .60 .77 .47 .77 .50 .66 .82 .85 
EU  0 7 3.67 1.85 2.28 1.52 4.00 1.77 4.55 1.48 
SURE 8 27 18.83 5.35 16.08 5.56 18.16 5.08 22.03 3.63 





Responses in Disappointing Gift Task (Mean and Standard deviations) 
Age 
Positive Negative Transitional 
Mean     SD Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
 
3-year-olds .83 1.18 2.27 1.21 2.97 1.21 
 
4-year-olds .70 .95 2.31 .95 2.79 1.13 
       
5-year-olds .65 .98 2.55 1.11 2.98 1.22 
 
The Secret Keeping Task.  The administration and the scoring were same as in Study 
3. As Table 6.10 displays, children who did not reveal the secret following all 6 prompts, 
received the maximum score of 6. However, similar to Study 3, children’s responses 
clustered around revealing the secret in the first half of the task, or not revealing the secret at 
all. Therefore, as presented in Table 6.12, children’s performance was assessed using a 3-
point-scale. For all age groups, children mostly tended to reveal the secret on E’s first return 
to the room. Children who told the secret in the first half of the task received the score of 0. 
Only 21 children out of 120 managed to keep the fish’s secret and their performance was 
scored with 2 points. Children who revealed the secret when E prompted them with questions 
received the score of 1.There were a few in this group as the children who kept the secret. 
The performance in this task suggested a positive skew but it was within acceptable limits. 
The univariate analysis on the Secret Keeping score (see Table 6.13) showed no main effect 
of Age or Gender. However, the interaction of two had a significant effect on children’s 
performance. Table 6.12 shows the raw numbers of responses and the mean scores for each 




gender group by age. To unpack the interaction, one-way ANOVA was conducted for each 
gender group and showed that Age was statically a significant effect on girls’ performance 
(M= .72, SD=.78), F (2, 57)= 5.71, p<.01; but not for boys (M= .47 SD=.75), F (2, 57)= .18, 
p=.83. The performance of 5-year-old girls was statically different from 3-year-olds (p<.01, 
.76, 95% CI [.19, 1.33]) and 4-year-olds (p<.05, .56, 95% CI [.02, 1.09]).There was no 
statistical difference between 3-and 4-year-olds, p=.66, -.20, 95% CI [-.76, .35].   
Table 6.12 



















Female 13 3 2 .39 .70 
Male 12 2 4 .56 .86 
4-year-olds 
Female 11 9 2 .59 .67 
Male 15 5 2 .41 .67 
5-year-olds 
Female 15 7 8 1.15 .81 
Male 13 3 3 .47 .77 
Total  69 29 21   
 
Table 6.13 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of the Secret Keeping Task Score by Age and Gender 
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 2.77 2 2.50 .04 .09 
Gender 1.57 1 2.83 .02 .10 
Age * Gender 3.38 2 3.05 .05 .05 
Note: R Squared = .11 (Adjusted R Squared = .07) 
 
 




Emotional Understanding (EU) Measure   
Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC). The administration and scoring of this task 
were the same as in Study 3.   In Table 6.10, the mean scores for each age group show that 
the youngest group had the lowest mean score compared to the older children. In the analysis 
of variance presented in Table 6.14, both age and gender had a significant effect on children’s 
emotional-understanding. The interaction was not significant. Tukey tests revealed that the 
performance of 3-year-olds was significantly different than both 4-and 5 year-old children, 
(p<.001, -1.72, 95% CI [-2.56, -.88; p<.001, -2.27, 95% CI [-3.13, -1.41]). There was no 
statistical different between the performances of 4-and 5-year-olds (p=.25, -.55, 95% CI [-
1.36, .26]). The performance of the girls was better than the boys (for girls, M= 4.00, 
SD=1.79; for boys, M= 3.33 SD=1.86).  
Table 6.14 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of the TEC by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 105.54 2 21.45 .27 .00 
Gender 12.31 1 5.01 .04 .03 
Age * Gender 7.36 2 1.50 .03 .23 
Note:  R Squared = .31 (Adjusted R Squared = .28) 
 
The Scale of Understanding a Regulation of Emotions (SURE). The administration 
and the scoring of this scale were identical with the procedure reported in Study 4.  As the 
reliability analysis suggested in Study 4, the 7-item version of the scale was administered. 
The SURE was found to be highly reliable as the Cronbach’s alpha was .81. Children’s 
performance was scored based their choice of a positive or negative emotional display for the 
protagonist of the stories. Each item was scored from 1 to 4. Thus for all 7 items, the 
maximum score was 28 and the minimum score was 7. As Table 6.10 displays, the mean 




score of 5-year-olds was quite high.  The mean scores of the two younger age groups were 
less than the 5-year-olds.  The analysis of variance showed that children’s age has a 
significant effect on their overall performance in the SURE (see Table 6.15). Neither gender, 
nor the interaction was significant. A Tukey test showed that the performance of 5-year-olds 
was statistically different from both 3-and 4-year-olds (p<.001, 5.94, 95% CI [3.33, 8.55; 
p<.001, 3.87, 95% CI [1.38, 6.35]). However, the performance of 3-year-olds was not 
statistically different from the 4-year-olds, p=.14, -2.08, 95% CI [-4. 63, .48].   
 
Table 6.15 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of the SURE by Age and Gender  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 699.71 2 15.27 .21 .00 
Gender 56.50 1 2.47 .02 .12 
Age * 
Gender 
40.25 2 .88 .02 .42 
Note: R Squared = .23 (Adjusted R Squared = .20) 
 
Relations among Emotionality Measures  
To generate a composite emotional-regulation score, inter-correlations among the 
emotionality measures are presented in Table 6.16. As it displays, the positive and negative 
emotional-regulation neither relate to each other nor relate to the emotion understanding 
(TEC) and emotion-regulation understanding (SURE) scales. On the other hand, 
understanding of emotion and emotional-regulation scales were positively correlated with 
each other, r (119) =.40, p<.001.  The lack of inter-correlations among the emotionality 
measures led to the decision to examine each aspect of emotional-regulation separately in the 
further analyses.  









Secret Keeping  TEC 
Disappointing Gift   
   -   
Secret Keeping     .13 -  
TEC  -.02 .15 - 
SURE   .02 .11 .40** 
Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01 
 
False Belief (Social Understanding) Measures 
The Unexpected Content Task. The scoring was identical to Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
A chi-square test for association was conducted between age and self- and other-false belief 
performance. There was a statistically significant association between children’s age and self-
false belief performance, χ2(2) = 31.65, p < .001, Cramer’s V= .51. A chi-square test for 
association was also significant for the other’s false belief performance χ2(2) = 33.12, p < 
.001, V= .53. Table 6.17 presents children’s performance and binomial tests against chance in 
each age group. The 4-and-5-year-olds were both above chance on their performance. 






Number of children who responded to Unexpected Content Task 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)   P 
Self    3 Right  14 39 0.24 
 Wrong 22 61 
   4 Right 35 80 
0.00 
Wrong 9 20 
    5 
  
Right 38 95 
0.00 
Wrong 2 5 
Other 
3 Right 12 33 0.07 
 Wrong 24 67  
4 Right 31 70 0.01 
 Wrong 13 30  
5 Right 38 95 0.00 
 Wrong 2 5  
 
 
                 The Unexpected Transfer Task.  The scoring was identical to Studies 1, 2, and 3. 
A chi-square test for association was conducted between age group and children’s 
performance of the false belief of others. There was a statistically significant association 
between age and other’s false belief performance, χ2(2) = 18.42, p < .001,  V= .39.   
 
 





The Appearance-Reality Task. The scoring was identical to Studies 1, 2, and 3.  
A chi-square test for association was conducted between age and self- and other’s-false belief 
performance. There was a statistically significant association between children’s age and self-
false belief performance, χ2(2) = 29.18, p < .001, V= .49. A chi-square test for association 
was also significant for others’ false belief performance χ2(2) = 36.63, p < .001, V=.55. Table 










Number of children who responded to Unexpected Transfer Task 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)   P 
Other    3 Right  15 42 0.41 
 Wrong 21 58 
   4 Right 31 70 0.01 
Wrong 13 3 
   5 
  
Right 35 88 0.00 
Wrong 5 13 





Number of children who responded to Appearance –Reality Task 
 Age    Obs N    Obs  Prop (%)   P 
Self    3 Right  12 33 0.35 
 Wrong 24 67 
   4 Right 29 66 0.00 
Wrong 15 34 
    5 
  
Right 37 93 0.05 
Wrong 3 07 
Other 
3 Right 9 25 1.00 
 Wrong 27 75  
4 Right 28 64 0.00 
 Wrong 16 36  
5 Right 37 93 0.00 
 Wrong 3 07  
 
Total False Belief Score. Similar to the previous studies, children’s performance in 
each false question was aggregated to generate a Total False Belief Score. Out of 5 false 
belief questions, in this aggregated measure, children’s maximum score was 5 and the 
minimum score was 0. Three-year-olds had the lowest mean score (M=1.72, SD=.14) whilst 
the 5-year-olds were nearly at ceiling (M=4.63, SD=.87). Four year olds had mean score of 
3.50 (SD=1.41). The analysis of variance by age conducted on the total false belief score is 
presented in Table 6.20. This shows that children’s age had significant effect on the false 
belief performance. Tukey tests showed that the 3-year-olds’ performance was significantly 
different from the 4-and 5-year-olds (p<.001, -1.78, 95% CI [-2.44, -1.11]; p<.001, -2.90, 




95% CI [-3.58, -2.22]). The 4-and 5-year-olds were also statistically different form each 
other, p<.001, -1.13, 95% CI [-1.77, -.48]. 
 
Table 6.20 
Univariate Analysis of Variance of the Total False Belief  Score by Age  
Source Sum of Squares df F p2 p 
Age 161.39 2 51.99 .47 <.001 
      
Note: R Squared = .47 (Adjusted R Squared = .46) 
 
Correlation Analysis  
Prior to the predictive analysis among different aspects of self-regulation, associative 
analysis was conducted via Pearson correlations and presented in Table 6.21 below.  Conflict 
Inhibition had a small correlation with the Delay aspect of the same construct. Consistent 
with the previous findings, Conflict was strongly associated with SU, as in false belief 
performance. Conflict was also correlated with EU and the understanding of emotional-
regulation (SURE). Against the previous findings in this thesis, Conflict performance shared 
a (weak) correlation with children’s performance of regulating positive emotionality (e.g. 
excitement) in the Secret Keeping task(ER-positive) in this study. Although it was a small 
correlation, this finding provokes the concerns about a shared inhibitory demand between ER 
(positive) and SU. Delay Inhibition did not relate to the children’s performance in the 
regulation of both positive and negative emotions but it had a small correlation with EU. ER-
(negative) performance in the Disappointing Gift task did not correlate with any of the other 
measures. ER (positive) performance in the Secret Keeping task was correlated with SU and 
Conflict. Children’s understanding of emotional-regulation in SURE by attributing altered 




displays of emotions to the protagonists had no association with ER performance. Two 
understanding scales were correlated with each other as mentioned earlier.  
Table 6.21 shows that EU and SURE were highly associated with the children’s social 
understanding which may indicate an alignment of among these measures because all were 
assessing conceptual competence. The performance in Conflict tasks was also related with 
EU and SURE which may indicate that inhibitory control performance may reach to solving 
conflicting emotional representations. In following section, the regression analysis is 
conducted with each of the aspects of inhibitory control, emotionality measures and social 
understanding.






In a hierarchical regression analysis, the tasks were grouped and loaded in the analysis 
based on their cognitive or affective demand affiliations. The measures were grouped 
together in an attempt to resolve the conflicting findings between Studies 2 and 3 regarding 
Table 6.21 




































































































.65** .16 -.00 .28** .60** .46**    - 
 
Language   .36** .07 -.15 .07 .47** .16 .32**  
Months  .67** .21* .11 .19* .56** .46** .69** .07 
Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01 




the relationship between ER and IC. As mentioned in the introduction, the behavioural 
measures such as ER and Delay were unpredictable in their contribution. Study 5 aimed to 
clarify this discrepancy by generating models to explain the factors that relate to SURE as a 
new an outcome measure that embodies both affective and cognitive demands. Conflict 
performance has been suggested as a core predictor of SU and its potential relations to 
emotionality is further investigated in this section. To be able make clear conclusions, it is 
necessary to develop parsimonious models for both Conflict and SURE to identify the 
relationship between the cognitive and emotional aspects of SR. Another tweaking in the 
regression analysis was done in the order of the loading of demographic variables. As a new 
addition language was also known for its impact in the growth of SU and EU in the literature 
(e.g. Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003). 
Age and Language performance were added into regression analysis as a final step, thus the 
effect of age or verbal ability were overpowering the effect of the psychological constructs 
was controlled. 
Predicting Conflict. Table 6.22 displays all the details of the hierarchical regression 
analysis which generated three models to predict Conflict performance. As mentioned above 
(and in the introduction), the behavioural measures were loaded as Model 1. This was 
significant and ER (negative) and Delay contributed significant variance. This model had a 
very low R2 value.  In Step 2, SU and EU as understanding measures were added along with 
SURE (its demand varied between understanding and attribution of ER) and all three new 
variables were significant predictors along with ER (negative) and Delay. Model 2 was 
significant and has a statistically higher R2 value. However, there was a change of the 
significance occurred in the variance that ER (negative) contributed in Model 2. Despite its 
lack of contribution to the previous model, the contribution of ‘understanding’ measures 
related it in such a way as to produce unique shared variance with Conflict. In Step 3, age and 




language performance were added and generated also a significant model; but the significant 
predictors were different to Step 3. The contribution of age and language were significant but 
their inclusion caused the loss of significance for SU and EU in Model 3. Despite their 
correlation with Conflict, EU and SU were no longer contributing the variance. The effect of 
SURE on the other hand remained significant.  
Language might play a role in the disappearance of the effect of SU and EU because 
verbal performance is known to be closely related to both of the understanding performance. 
Thus, I attempted to separate the effect of age and language by adding them into the analysis 
in separate steps, in models excluding the influence of the behavioural measures. Table 
6.22.1 presents these models. In Step 1, SU, EU and SURE were loaded and each contributed 
unique variance to the Conflict in a model that had a fairly good R2 value. In Step 2, inclusion 
of the age generated a statically better model in which each variable was significantly 
predicting the outcome. In Step 3, language performance was added and the model was also 
significant but SU and EU were no longer contributing statistical variance. As expected, 
when verbal ability was taken into account, the standardized performance in TEDL-III 
seemed to overpower the contribution of SU and EU. In Model 2, significant contributions of 
SU, EU, SURE, and Age show that the representation of emotionality and its attribution 
purposefully plays an important role on children’s inhibitory responses in complex tasks that 
require handling two conflicting mental representations.





Table 6.22  
Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Conflict 
                Conflict Composite Score  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
ER (positive)  .18 .08 .18* .03 .06 .03 .03 .06 .03 
ER (negative) .04 .03 .12 .05 .02 .15* .05 .02 .14* 
Delay Score 
Composite 
.25 .08 .27** .14 .06 .15* .11 .06 .12* 
SU     .15 .04 .35** .07 .04 .16 
EU    .10 .03 .25** .04 .03 .09 
SURE    .03 .01 .25** .03 .01 .21** 
Month       .03 .01 .36** 






24.34** F  
∆ R2  .45 .07 
∆F  39.23** 9.93** 
Note: *p < .05;  **p  <  .01 
 




Table 6.22.1  
Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Conflict (Alternative-without behavioural 
measures) 
                Conflict Composite Score  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B        β  B SE B β 
SU  .16 .04 .37** .09 .04 .21* .07 .04 .16 
EU .11 .03 .27** .08 .03 .21** .04 .03 .10 
SURE .03 .01 .25** .03 .01 .20** .03 .01 .20** 
Month    .02 .01 .31** .03 .01 .40** 






35.57** F  
∆ R2  .05 .03 
∆F  12.92** 7.80** 
Note: *p < .05;  **p  <  .01 
Predicting SURE. SURE was developed to explore whether there is interference 
between the online assessment of emotional behaviour and the understanding of ER. This 
new scale was analysed through hierarchical regression models with a novel approach. 
Understanding measures – SU and EU were grouped together instead of loading EU together 
with ER measures in the first step as in the previous study (Chapter 3).  




In this study, behavioural and understanding measures were grouped separately. So, in 
the first step ER and Delay were loaded in the analyses because they represent the 
behavioural outcomes. Thus, EU was not loaded in this step. As Table 6.23 illustrates, Model 
1 was not significant.  I continued with loading the understanding measures in Step 2 and the 
Conflict in Step 3. Model 2 revealed that SU contributed a significant variance to model. In 
Step 3, the inclusion of Conflict created a statically better fit than Model 2.  Conflict was the 
only significant predictor of SURE in Model 3. Children’s ability to inhibit impulsive 
responses in cognitively demanding tasks appears to predict their performance of attributing 
regulated emotional displays for others in social interaction. Children’s insight into 
comprehending emotions and the requirement of emotional-regulation social situation did not 
relate their online performance of suppression of positive or negative emotionality. 
Understanding emotionality, though, was affiliated with cognitive control of conflicting 
situations and rules.  
Similar to the approach in the analysis of Conflict and based on the lack of 
significance of the model that contained the behavioural measures the variables that were 
loaded in the Step 1 were dropped in the next regression analysis. As Table 6.23.1 illustrated, 
in Step 1 SU and EU were loaded and only SU was contributing a unique variance to SURE. 
EU on the other hand did not contribute to model. One of the concerns about including EU in 
a model that predicts SURE was that both scales might be very similar in their assessment of 
emotional ability. It is considered that EU might be dropped from the analyses later. In Step 
2, with the inclusion of Conflict; SU also lost its significant contribution to model. The 
addition of Age and Language in Step 3 generated a significant model but neither of 
demographic variables contributed unique variance to SURE. Model 3 was not statically 
different than the previous model based on the ∆ R2 value. When the EU was dropped from 
the regression analysis, new model was not as strong as the prior ones but both SU and 




Conflict were contributing unique variance to SURE, R2= .31, F (2,117)= 25.87, p<.001; 
adjusted R2=.30. 
In a nutshell, children’s ability to attribute prospective emotional outcomes where the 
masking of the true feelings was necessary was strongly related to their performance in tasks 
which require them to inhibit a prepotent response in favour of the less salient one. Children’s 
emotional attribution was also related to their ability to grasp the other’s mental states. It 
appears that, at the core of a need for masking a true feeling lies in the ability to consider 
others as mental entities. The findings from the current study support this assumption despite 
the less likely relationship of ER and SU in the literature (Blankson et al., 2012, 2013; 
Liebermann et al., 2007).






Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting SURE  
                            SURE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
ER (positive) .72 .65 .10 -.17 .60 -.03 -.23 .57 -.03 
ER (negative) .01 .23 .00 .06 .21 .03 -.09 .20 -.04 
Delay Score  .40 .64 .06 -.25 .58 -.04 -.63 .56  -.09 
SU    1.11 .34 .35** -.70 .36 .17 
EU    .58 .30 .20┼ .55 .07 .09 






8.64** F  
∆ R2  .22 .08 
∆F  16.50** 12.97** 
Note: *p < .05; **p  <  .01,  ┼=.057. 
 





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting SURE (Alternative-without behavioural 
measures) 
SURE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SU 1.08 .32 .35** .55 .34 .17 .44 .38 .14 
EU .57 .29 .20┼ .22 .30 .08 .26 .33 .09 
Conflict     2.76 .80 .37** 2.60 .88   .35** 
Months       .04 .07    .08 
Language       -.02 .03  - .06 






10.62** F  
∆ R2  .07 .01 
∆F  11.99** .65 
Note: *p < .05; **p  < .01,  ┼=.056. 
 





 Study 5 explored the association of cognitive and emotional aspect of SR at a new 
level. It examined the influence of the ‘understanding’ of others’ mental representations, 
feelings, and the conditions that require regulation of emotions. The Conflict aspect of IC was 
related to SU, EU, and the meta-understanding of ER (SURE). As highlighted earlier (in 
Study 2), Conflict was found to be not associated with emotional aspect of self-regulation. 
Despite the correlation reported between Conflict and ER (negative) in Study 3; and with ER 
(positive) in Study 5, the relationship was inconclusive because the association with 
regulation performances was not supported by the regression analysis. Rather than relying on 
the behavioural measures of ER, children’s ability to attribute prospective emotions in 
conditions where the true feelings were supposed to be masked was compared to inhibitory 
control in Study 5. The Delay aspect of IC was associated with Conflict and EU but it did not 
share any relationship with the other constructs in Study 5. The different pathway of Delay 
performance in each of these studies will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7.    
One particular problem with the Delay task in this study concerned the increased 
number of tasks administered. Children might have been disappointed in the Marker Delay 
task because E said that she will turn up with new set of crayons. Although she did, children 
had already been patient and were alone in the room for 2 minutes. Later they were asked to 
wait 4 more minutes in Snack Delay and then another minute for Gift Delay. The 
performance in each delay task was associated with the others but extending the tasks may 
have eroded their performance in the consecutive tasks. For example, the number of children 
who actually ate the treat in the Snack Delay task increased in the current study. Only 6 
children ate the treat in Study 3 but their number increased 29 in the current study. So by 
increasing the number of Delay task, we may have cause a disadvantage for children.  




 There have been inconsistent findings regarding ER measures.  For example, there 
was a lack of association between ER (positive) and EU in Study 3 but ER (positive) was 
related to SU in the current study. The association with EU may indicate that regulation and 
understanding of emotions might stem from a similar core which was claimed by many 
researchers (Izard et al., 2011; Waters et al., 2010; Cole et al., 2009).  There are not many 
studies that have examined the performance –based ER and SU relationship. Liebermann et 
al. (2007) and Blankson et al. (2012; 2013) who investigated the link between SU and ER, 
reported that there was a lack of association between very common. However, this can be 
explained based on the demands of both false belief and secret keeping tasks. The ER 
(positive) task imposes a demand of deception that is very high because children are expected 
to see the talking fish as a confederate. Lewis et al (1989) claimed that false belief 
performance is closely related to children’s deception ability. The demand of manipulating 
the reality to create a misconception in another person resembles (and requires) the ability to 
represent (imagine) another’s mental representation which may entitle an alternative reality. 
Thus, both EU and SU were associated with ER performance, suggesting that ‘understanding’ 
plays a role in the domain of emotion-control abilities.  
 Moreover, despite the studies that claimed that there is a lag between 
understanding of emotions and the false belief (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Harwood & Farrar, 
2006), the current study showed a close relationship between SU and EU. In addition to their 
correlation, predictive analysis that has not been reported in this chapter (see Appendix 6.2) 
showed that the correlation between EU and SU was strong even when controlled by age but 
not by language performance. Our focus on SURE as a task that collaborate the qualities of 
SU, EU and ER (in social context) was due to its relation to the cognitive-control would be 
considered as a support for CR and ER relationship.     




  SURE was strongly associated with SU and EU. It lacked an association with the 
behavioural measures of ER. However, it was shown that SURE predicted Conflict. Although 
ER measures suggested an odd relationships with both Conflict (in Study 3) and Delay (in 
Study 2), those were not repeated to make trustworthy conclusions. SURE on the other hand 
(as a measure of children’s ability to make prospective emotional attributions for situations 
requiring ER) had a strong relationship with Conflict that persisted even when the age and 
language skills were considered. This may lead us to consider that the SURE as a task may 
resemble a false belief task. According to Wellman and Liu (2004), though, children’s ability 
to grasp the emotional meaning of mental (social) interactions would develop later in 
preschool years around age of 6.  Nonetheless, children’s performance on SURE, as a task 
exploring emotional demands within a social situation, showed that at around age of four they 
tend to understand the necessity of masking true feelings. There was clear age difference that 
3-year-old were more likely to attribute the true feeling of protagonist whereas older groups 
(4-and 5-year-olds) tend to mask the true emotions and chose emotional displays that socially 
appropriate for the protagonist.  These findings will form the core of the final section of 
Chapter 7.





Chapter 7 - General Discussion 
“The greatest weapon against stress is our ability to choose one thought over another.”       
William James [cited by Jamieson, Nock, & Mendes, (2012)]  
General Discussion: Does the ability to ‘understand’ lie at the core of Self-Regulation?  
When I was first interested with self-regulation as a doctoral research topic, I kept 
returning to the philosophical background behind self-regulation as this provides an essential 
ingredient for our understanding of this construct.  Schopenhauer raises the idea that to 
understand the ‘will’ we necessarily need to consider the intertwined nature of ‘desire’ and 
‘action’ in the production of ‘control’ and ‘understanding’ (see Appendix 1).  
I am not the first to address the link between control and understanding. In the past 
three decades, the understanding of mind (theory of mind/SU) along with its relations to the 
control of the mind (EF) has been one of the most investigated topics in developmental 
psychology. I am also not the first to mention Schopenhauer’s explanation of the 
inseparability of mind and will in terms of young children’s developing control of themselves 
and their social surroundings. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Russell’s (1996) argument on 
experience of agency was referred to in its claim that self-awareness depicts children’s 
control over their action in terms of their emerging self-awareness as beings separate from 
others.  
The investigation of self-regulation had two angles. First, the developing ability to 
control in cognitive and emotional domains and their interaction were explored.  Second, the 
‘understanding’ of these domains that are imbued with both cognitive and emotion-regulation 




was investigated.  This chapter will briefly summarize the contribution of each study and will 
focus on the collective empirical findings in an attempt to draw together a novel approach tp 
preschoolers’ the self-regulation.  
   In Study 1, the cognitive aspect of SR was linked with inhibitory control. The 
distinguishable demands within IC, Conflict, and the ability to Delay were identified based 
on their differential association with SU.  Even with a small sample, Study 1 showed that the 
relationship between control and understanding can only formed between Conflict and SU 
that was consistent with previous studies (e.g. Carlson & Moses, 2001). Study 2 introduced 
the focus on ER performance in negative emotion-inducing situations. This construct was 
only related to Delay Inhibition. Interestingly this finding was unique to that data set and was 
not observed in the later studies. The inconsistency of Delay, regarding its assessment and 
theoretical grounding, is discussed briefly in section 7.1.  
  Study 3 stretched the scope of ER by including the regulation of positive emotions 
and emotional understanding. A separate dynamic within ER was suggested in Study 3 due to 
the lack of association between positive and negative ER measures. Moreover, ER (negative) 
showed an association with Conflict, instead of Delay as reported in Study 2. Conflict 
Inhibition also had an association with EU which was noteworthy given the paucity of 
research which has been conducted to examine at the influence of CR on the growing ability 
of comprehension of emotions. The strong association between SU, EU and Conflict raised 
an issue on the role of ‘understanding’ as within social-cognition. So, Study 4 devised a scale 
–SURE - to measure children’s understanding of emotions, specifically in ER situations. The 
assessment of ER in performance–based settings, rather than parental reports, was one of the 
aims of this thesis. However, the inconsistency of the findings and difficulties of testing are 
critiqued in section 7.2.  




  Study 5 consisted of SURE along with other SR constructs that were in question in the 
previous studies. In spite of being associated with performance-based ER; understanding of 
the nature of situations that require ER in SURE was related to the ability of inhibiting 
prepotent responses (Conflict) and understanding others’ belief (SU) and emotions (EU). A 
long-discussed issue of the ‘control’ versus ‘understanding’ issue will be addressed based on 
the findings from Study 5, in section 7.3.  
7.1 What is the Role of Delay Inhibition in Self-Regulation?  
Delay Inhibition was addressed in Chapter 1 through the lens of self-control, 
following Mischel et al. (2010). I asked whether Delay can be used as a construct/measure to 
represent children’s ability to abstain from temptation and can influence the development of 
emotion- regulation. Interestingly, a relationship between Delay and ER (negative) was 
demonstrated in Study 2. This relationship suggested that a shared skill may be responsible 
for both coping with a negative display of emotions and the ability to postpone a desirable 
action. However, their link was not replicated in the following studies. One of the two issues 
should be considered here is that the assessment of Delay performance. A structured Snack 
Delay task that was developed by Kochanska et al. (2000) was used in Study 2 and I will 
reflect upon this next.  The other issue concerns the situational factors that recent studies 
suggested may influence the child’s performance.  
The methodology used for assessing Delay inhibition is rich and includes a variety of 
different tasks. However, each of these differs from the rest in terms of the demands it 
imposes upon children. For example, Mischel’s paradigm involves a higher degree of 
uncertainty as the participant does not know when the experimenter will return. Under such a 
constraint the child waits with the tempting treat in a room by himself or herself. In contrast, 
the Delay tasks that were designed by Kochanska et al. (2000), and used by many other 




researchers, contain more structure and exert different types of influence on the child’s 
performance. If we examine Snack Delay by way of example, children’s delay periods are 
shorter (longest trial is 60 sec) compared to the approximately 15 minute interval of Mischel. 
Additionally, adult supervision is constant in Kochanska’s version. Even for younger 
children, to give in to the temptation while E is sitting across the table might not be easy, and 
the much shorter time period might also help the child to resist a temptation. Thus, 
Kochanska’s version might assess cooperation with E until she presents the child with a cue 
rather than how children cope with delay. This structured version of a delay task did relate to 
children’s reactions to disappointment in Study 2, but this finding did not generalise to other 
studies.  
It is impossible to tell whether the failure to replicate the Study 2 finding shows that 
this was a statistical artefact or the product of the methods I used, I altered the Delay tasks in 
Study 3 and 5 to test whether different procedures would replicate the effect of Kochanska’s 
procedure as I discuss in the next paragraph.   
Delay tasks may contain different executive skills to different degrees, depending on 
how they are designed and presented. Garon et al. (2008) distinguished the Delay as a simple 
inhibitory reaction, due to its lower working memory demand, from more complex inhibition 
which they labelled as ‘conflict’.  Delay is described as requiring the participant to postpone a 
prepotent response whereas the conflict concerns holding a rule in mind and responding 
according that rule by managing to inhibit the dominant reaction, this was discussed in 
Chapter 4. However, all the delay tasks that are in use require the child to remember a rule 
and adjust his or her reaction accordingly. In Snack Delay, the preschooler needs to 
remember not to eat or touch the treat until E gives her permission with a symbolic gesture. 
Over the past decade delay has been theorised as being separate from Conflict due to the 




demands that is supposed to work which are deemed to be similar to the way in which 
emotionality works. Zelazo and Carlson (2012) clearly identify delay as such a ‘hot’ aspect of 
executive functions.   
Studies 3 and 5 increased the demand of the Delay tasks (by longer and unsupervised 
delay periods as in Wiebe et al.’s (2010) method).  I presume as a result the link between ER 
and Delay disappeared under these conditions, whereas associations that Delay shared with 
Conflict were reported in both studies. In contrast to Zelazo and Carlson, the vast bulk of the 
literature approaches Conflict and Delay as complementary skills of inhibitory control. 
Indeed many studies tend to use one or the other as a representative of IC. For example, 
Blankson et al. (2013) only used Day/Night –Conflict task when reporting that CR at age 3 
and found that this predicted SU, EU and ER at the age 4. ER was, however, based on 
maternal reports, not observational assessments.  
The length of the delay period may also have an effect on the data collected at around 
age 4.  Garon et al. (2011) suggested that children tend to keep preferred toys for themselves 
or for a friend rather than a less-known peer and this may become particularly salient in 
longer delay periods. Similarly, in their choices for delay or immediate rewards Kidd, 
Palmeri, and Aslin (2013) reported that children who were in reliable environments such as 
where their needs were met consistently, waited for longer periods of time during the 
traditional marshmallow task. A child’s growing representations about the world that 
surrounds him may thus alter her or his performance in tasks that requires the control of 
impulsive actions. 
7.2 The holy grail of emotion-regulation  
Throughout this thesis, the aim has been to consider whether emotion regulation in 
preschool children can be directly observed and measured sufficiently enough for the 




relationship between such a skill and a range of social-cognitive skills can be examined. The 
measurement of children’s changing ability to control emotions remains as a widely debated 
issue (e.g., Zeman, Klimes-Dougan, Cassano, & Adrian, 2007). In an attempt to explore the 
links between the cognitive and emotional aspects of self-regulation, the performance-based 
assessments of ER in conditions that induced positive and negative emotions revealed 
inconsistent results. The inconsistencies in my data, in fact, echo the mixed findings from the 
literature as a whole and the critique that many authors rely on parental report alone (see 
especially Chapters 1, 4 & 5).  Although the child’s typical responses across a range of 
situations are thought to be captured in those methods, there is an inconsistency between 
direct observations of ER and parental reports in which statistically meaningful links are 
mostly based on the parental reports (e.g. Blankson et al., 2012).  This leads me to conclude 
both that the behavioural assessment of ER is difficult and that before abandoning the quest 
for a valid study of ER we need to search for a different solution (see 7.4 below).   
The direct observation of children’s ER capabilities can be assessed through a few 
paradigms that were mentioned in chapters that used the ER constructs such as the 
Disappointment (Saarni, 1996), Frustration (Calkins, 1997), or Excitement (Carlson &Wang, 
2007) Paradigms.  These are important for observing a child’s abilities to control emotion 
when facing a stranger. Most of the other studies using these methods tested children in 
laboratory settings. So, the control of emotions was assessed with a stranger in unfamiliar 
surroundings. To avoid unfamiliar environment, children were tested in their nurseries in all 
studies of this thesis. Environmental validity may be an important for ER measure because 
children’s emotional responses towards an unfamiliar environment and/or a stranger may 
play a role prior to the tasks that set out to induce certain emotions.   
Diamond, Balvin, and Diamond (1963) stated that the people attribute their own and 
others’ behaviours as more consistent and coherent than they truly are. The control of 




emotions analyses produced similar to the findings regarding Delay (as mentioned in the 
section above) and I would contend this again suggests that measures of regulation-in-action 
cannot be considered separate from the situations in which they are tested. We may each 
assume that we are good at regulation emotions, but there would be occasions that we lack 
control over them. Thus, I feel that a conclusion from this thesis is that ER is not a behaviour 
that I can easily label as consistent, particularly for children. To cover the variety of 
emotionality in positively or negatively charged affects, children’s performance of ER 
(positive) is measured by their ability not to tell a secret that excites them; and ER (negative) 
by their ability to hide emotional displays of disappointment were used in this thesis. ER 
(positive) was moderately correlated with EU in Study 3, which suggests support for a 
domain-specific mechanism for emotionality. However, ER (positive) was associated with 
SU and Conflict in Study 5. So it can also be argued, tentatively, that the inhibitory demand 
of three constructs accounts for this relationship. When assessing ER (negative), I found that 
children were prone to show more negative reactions to a disappointing event, instead of 
hiding them and engaging in socially appropriate positive emotion reactions in all age groups. 
Despite the link between ER (negative) and Delay (which was compatible with the theory 
that offered a hot-neural pathway explanation in Study 2), there was no association between 
these two measures in the following studies. Instead a weak association with Conflict 
suggested that the links with ER measures are elusive or only of minor importance.  
Due to their volatile nature, both Delay and ER measures tend to be influenced easily 
by situational changes. In each study, inclusion of new Delay and ER measures might have 
led a carry-over effect on children’s performance from one task to another. Although such 
effects and fatigue due to the additional tasks were considered as a potential risk, using a 
fixed-order in testing was used to eliminate the differences between children in terms of the 
effect of one task over the other. A fixed-sequence for the similar constructs has been also 




used commonly by Cole et al. (2009) and Carlson et al. in various studies (2007; 2001). 
Moreover, a fixed-order was necessary to create a meaningful setting of a play with the 
children. For example, the gift was needed to be given in order to set up the Disappointment 
Paradigm at the end of session as it is customary to make such presentations as a thank you 
for the other tasks that have been completed. The Delay and the ER measures were presented 
to children in the second of the testing sessions (recall that both ‘sessions’ occurred on the 
same morning/afternoon). Thus, the children’s performance on these tasks may have reflected 
their fatigue, particularly in Study 5, where there were 3 Delay tasks that may collectively 
have undermined the child’s patience in later ER tasks. From this possible point of view, the 
fixed-order may appear as a weakness. However, the testing took place in the child’s usual 
surrounding. The immediate contextual variables have been known to have a crucial impact 
on the young children’s behaviours (Bronfenbrenner, 1986). Most of the research on self-
regulation has been conducted in laboratory assessments. Testing in the nurseries was 
necessary for the environmental validity of my research. In the hectic daily schedule of a 
nursery, a fixed-order was important for pragmatic reasons.   
7.3 Broadening our grasp of the relationship between social understanding and 
inhibitory control  
The relationship between mental state understanding, as I defined SU, in this thesis 
and Conflict has been widely reported including in various cultural settings (see e.g. the 
review in Chapters 1 and 2). This thesis extends this literature in two ways.  First, the studies 
replicate the SU-Conflict link in a group of participants who are not usually the focus of 
studies on EF-SU links, Turkish children. Secondly, and more importantly, a less explored 
connection between EU (as measured in Pons et al.’s measure of children’s reaction to 
emotional experience) and Conflict has been established in the series of studies reported here. 




Children’s emerging beliefs about others’ mental states and emotions seems to be intricately 
related to their control over their behaviours, as measured in Conflict Inhibition tasks. Indeed 
the regression models presented in this thesis suggest that SU and the two different 
dimensions of EU contributed unique variance in these latter measures. 
     We can conclude from these links that the child’s self-regulation gains a momentum 
when the need for control is internalized. The reason for investigating SU, EU, and SURE 
together is understand to gather whether the control of behaviour is linked to how much and 
in what ways a child figures out about the nature of thoughts, emotions, and emotion-related 
social displays. I am not alone in attempting to forge such links, Blankson et al. (2013), in 
particular, searched for a link between control and understanding in a very similar framework 
to the design of the studies in this thesis.  
The fact that I looked at three aspects of social understanding in the later studies of 
the thesis allows me to draw some tentative conclusions about its nature. As mentioned in 
Chapters 4 and 5, Wellman and Liu’s (2004) approach to ‘theory of mind’ has received 
widespread attention over the past decade, as indeed Wellman’s (1990) earlier theory drove 
the research on pre-schoolers grasp of belief. Throughout his series of papers on this topic 
Wellman has proposed that the children’s predictions of the potential emotional states of 
others does not emerged until later in ‘preschool’ years in the US or indeed the primary 
school years in the UK and Turkey. According to Wellman and Liu’s scale, a young child is 
able to comprehend false belief in a ‘not emotionally charged’ context earlier than making 
predictions about someone’s emotional state. The implication is that a child should see others 
as mental entities earlier than she or he sees them as beings feelings, or rather that emotions 
are more complex because they decay at different rates and have conflicting effects on one 
another.  




However, others, like Pons and Harris, have argued for a more nuanced and 
developmentally sensitive approach to the development of emotion understanding. They 
created an emotion-comprehension scale which consisted of various components. They 
demonstrated that performance in the comprehension of false belief and identification of 
emotions were closely linked. The findings of Studies 3 and 5 supports this view that SU and 
EU are interlinked. Together they appear to play a statistically meaningful role for one 
another. The data collected in Turkey supports Pons and Harris’s ideas in a cross-sectional 
setting.  
Chapter 4 set up the reasons why we need to study the possible connections between 
the control and the comprehension of emotions when I introduced EU as a topic. This was 
considered as a construct that is considered as part of ER and an additional means of 
assessing it. However, Studies 3 and 5 suggested that the regulation of negative or positive 
emotions may play a different role regarding their association to EU. Very few studies, 
notably Liebermann et al. (2007), have addressed the link between SU and ER. They reported 
a lack of relationship between SU and ER (negative) which was also assessed using the 
Disappointment Paradigm.   
The quotation from James at the beginning of this chapter highlights the importance 
of mental flexibility over the experience of emotionality. Even holding a certain thought 
creates a state of feeling.  As mentioned, in Chapters 1 and 2 particularly, the children’s grasp 
of others’ mental states has been claimed to responsible for their control over their mental 
activities (Perner & Kloo, 2003; also see Carlson et al., 2002; and Zelazo et al., 2003). In 
Perner’s view, the reason behind the failure in the false belief is not merely the lack of 
children’s inhibitory skills that both tasks (IC and FB) are claimed to require. Similar to 
Perner, Lang, and Kloo (2002), the correlations between SU and IC were reported but it was 




broadened with the understanding of control of emotions. The cross-sectional studies in this 
thesis reported links between SU, EU, and Conflict, the final study showed that on rule-based 
control of behaviour, the effect of the understanding of ER was stronger.  The SURE measure 
predicted unique variance in conflict even when we controlled for age and both other social 
cognition tasks (FB and TEC).  The counter theories claim that the power of control over 
understanding was also introduced (from Russell, 1996). Only longitudinal, studies will 
enable us to tease apart the relative influences of SU and executive skills like inhibitory 
control or, in the case of Zelazo’s research, attentional flexibility. Kloo and Perner’s (2003) 
training study strongly supports the possibility that there might be a functional inter-
dependence between these skills. However, the studies presented here suggest that the 
network of inter-connecting skills should be extended to a broader range of social 
understanding including deeper a grasp of EU. I turn to this issue next. 
7.4 A new approach to the study children’s (grasp of) ER? 
Much of the second half of the thesis has developed an alternative means of studying 
children’s emotional responsivity.  The SURE test assesses preschoolers’ ability to attribute 
regulated emotional displays to protagonists in socially demanding situations. In keeping with 
the 3 to 4 shift that is witnessed in inhibitory control, attentional flexibility and social 
understanding, a development was observed at the ages of 4-5. Three-year-olds attribute true 
emotional displays to a protagonist who has been let down by a familiar adult or a 
peer/sibling. Children’s performance in response to the stories may differ according to 
whether the protagonist was disappointed by an adult or a peer. However, in this thesis, I 
have overlooked this potential difference. Later in development, children (at age 11-years-
old) tend to produce more logical arguments in their discussions with peers than their mothers 
(Kruger & Tomasello, 1986). The reliability of the scale with mixed items (adult and peer) 




was sufficient to enable me to claim that this collection of stories may not have a direct 
effect. However, in the future applications of SURE, the setting of the narrative, particularly 
whether an adult or a peer was the source of distress, should be manipulated and tested. 
Unlike school-age children, young children may find it easier to choose a regulated 
emotionality strategy when an adult is the reason for them to adapt an emotional expression. 
In face of conflicting information, young children tend to seek out and trust the guidance of 
an adult rather than a peer (Harris & Corriveau, 2011). Thus, the manipulation of 
emotionality for the sake of protecting an adult’s feelings in a disappointing situation might 
be more likely for young children.    
 The SURE demonstrates that they understand the predicament that a child faces in 
such circumstances. After their fourth birthdays, on the other hand, children are able to grasp 
that an emotional display should not necessarily match their true feelings. Given that, the 
results from the multivariate analyses in Study 5 show that the SURE and the TEC seem to 
tap different skills, they point towards a need to study these in more depth, including 
longitudinal links between each other and between each measure and other related emotion 
regulation tasks. 
We can conclude from the findings of the SURE that we need to understand how 
preschoolers come to understand appropriate behaviour in particular contexts. Children’s 
prospective emotional attributions indicated that they were able to appreciate the necessity of 
hidden or altered display of feelings in social contexts. Study 5 suggested a close association 
between SU, EU, and SURE which lead to consider a common underlying mechanism. The 
stronger relationship between Conflict and SURE may indicate a different explanation. SURE 
was designed to document children’s anticipation of emotional expression. Each choice they 
make towards a positive emotion was considered as the reflection of ER. In terms of 
reflecting ER performance, SURE was not related to situational ER assessments in Study 5. 




However, the lack of association of SURE and both negative and positive ER performance 
should not be considered as SURE did not appear to underlie emotional processes. The 
association between SURE and EU though may reveal the fact that this new scale is high on 
the demand of comprehension.   
Thus, the role of SURE in social cognition as an understanding measure is 
complementary but it is not synonymous with conflict inhibition. The relationship between 
these constructs suggests that the awareness for control (of emotional displays) is strongly 
related to the control of behaviour in rule-based settings. The demands of Conflict and SURE 
were unpacked. Both tasks require the child to solve a dilemma. Although SURE presents 
situations that are high in emotion, the child may pick the natural reaction (negative 
emotionality) that the situation is set up to elicit a knowledge that expressing such feeling 
would not exercise any inhibitory control to suppress this salient response. The child might 
also suppress this salient response by stating falsely suppressing her or his own wishes. Thus, 
in ER and/or SURE, the inhibition of initial emotional reaction might both involve a first step 
of self-regulation. In the next step, affective processes might be more involved to seize the 
situation and come up with less salient but accurate emotional display.  
When SURE items are seen in term of making two steps (suppressing feelings and 
initiating socially appropriate action). Such dual processes may occur with reference to other 
feelings. For example, hiding a giggle when a friend had a bad fall resulting in injury might 
mimic the disappointment conditions in SURE trials.  A future study should consider a 
greater variety of emotions that may be presented in a context of suppressing socially 
inappropriate emotions as well the production of more acceptable emotional expressions.  
 




Future Directions  
Regardless of where testing takes place, such a laboratory or the child’s usual 
surrounding (e.g. home or nursery), SR performance is usually assessed in individual settings. 
SR is mostly necessary for social conflicts and its importance has been mentioned for school-
readiness and classroom behaviours (e.g. Denham, Warren-Khot, Bassett, Wyatt, & Perna, 
2014). Yet, in this study children’s performance in groups was not investigated. It is known 
that the presence of others can be very influential on individual performance (Fitzsimons & 
Bargh, 2004) and for children the peer group is a context that cannot be isolated from their 
developing social skills and behaviours (Chen, Chang, He, & Liu, 2005). The effect of the 
peer group on an individual’s self-regulation was addressed by McCabe and Brooks-Gunn 
(2007) who reported that children were less able to cope with delay in groups than in 
individual contexts.  In addition to a potential performance change in a group context, 
children delay ability modulates by a rational decision making process based on the 
environmental input. Thus, a future study may include a condition where a child’s 
performance in Delay and ER were observed in a group context along with other SR 
constructs.    
The SURE was only tested with Turkish children. There are studies that reported 
children from Eastern culture are less likely to be confrontational and tend to mask their 
feelings (as suggested by Vander Wege, Gonzales, Friedlmeier, Mihalca, Goodrich, & 
Corapci, 2014). Even the display of emotions in media directed at children in different 
cultures shows key differences. For example, children’s books in America are different to 
Turkish or Romanian books based on the presentation of more diverse powerful negative and 
positive emotion in the former culture. Negative emotions were less likely to be presented in 
Turkish storybooks (Vander Wege et al., 2014). The exposure that children receive from their 
cultural surrounding might play a role on the grasp of the function of ER in social interactions 




for Turkish children. 4-and 5-year-olds were attributing positive emotional displays for 
characters in distress.  Culture-specific emotion norms may be needed to be taken into 
account. A training study where children are exposed to different levels of emotional displays 
in storybooks may influence their performance on SURE.  Children who are exposed to 
stories in which the negative emotions were explicitly displayed like in American storybooks 
may tend to choose a masked emotion for the protagonist in the SURE. This may also explain 
why American preschoolers in the scale of Wellman and Liu (2004), children were claimed 
to be grasping others’ feelings later than understanding their desire and beliefs.  Turkish 
children are exposed already regulated displays of emotion in the media, possibly due to 
cultural tendencies. American children are exposed to a variety of emotional displays but not 
enough to hidden emotions. The performance on SURE where 4-year-olds were able to 
attribute regulated emotional displays prospectively may be specific to Turkish children who 
are exposed to others’ hidden emotions more than the display of true feelings. Yet, despite 
the fact that their methodology of understanding ER was different to mine, Cole et al. (2009) 
found that American 4-year-olds were able to attribute functional ER strategies.  My 
suspicion is that the 3 to 4 transition in performance on SURE in Turkish studies would be 
replicated in other cultures, including the US. 
Conclusion 
In the exploration of various aspects of children’s changing ability of controlling emotions 
and behaviours, this thesis showed that the theory in developmental psychology is mostly based on 
the scope of the tasks that research is using.  The assessment of the delay inhibition and the direct 
observations of ER were easily influenced by situational factors and revealed inconsistent findings in 
terms of their relationships with other constructs. Children’s growing awareness of others’ beliefs and 
emotions plays an important role in their control of their behaviours. However, the control of 
emotionality and behaviour interacts in the level where children’s grasp of the requirement of 




alternation of the emotional displays strongly relates the behavioural control. Along with other social-
cognitive abilities, children’s newly explored skill of prospective regulated emotional displays 
attribution in SURE contributes a unique variance to the control of behaviour in Conflict Inhibition 
contexts.
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A PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE TO UNDERSTAND WHAT ‘WILL’ IS OR DOES  
Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s transcendental idealism is useful, because the 
tension between these two important philosophers’ influences on the source of knowledge for 
self in explaining self-regulation. The tendency in developmental psychology to explain 
child’s behaviour based solely on mental faculties comes from Kantian logic that can be seen 
in Piaget’s stage-like explanation of child’s understanding of the knowledge. Child’s 
epistemology of the world could be also viewed from an added window. That window could 
be opened through an analysis of the beginning of child’s volitional being. Schopenhauer’s 
analysis focuses on the volitional act of the human being. His understanding of the 
representational self and his notion of ‘will’ concerns not simply a property of mind but, to 
the contrary, is the driver of the self.  His analysis should reveal the points that are needed to 
be taken forward in the search for a grasp of self-regulation in this thesis. This analysis will 
also build up an account for my decision to start with Russell’s (1996) claim that children’s 
cognitive control is bounded by the development of agency over experience. Russell’s claim 
is an integration of the views of Piaget and Schopenhauer, over and above the Kantian logic 
of Piaget. From Piaget, Russell draws inferences about the child’s mental abilities. These are 
based on the assumption that knowledge is constructed through action, which derives from 
Kantian transcendental idealism.  For Piaget and Kant, the contents of the mind are derived 
from rational inferences. Schopenhauer disagrees. He proposes a uniting feature, ‘will’, that 
combines the knowledge of the body and the ‘mind’, through the intimate relation of how 
‘mind’ cannot be conceptualised without taking into account affective ability.  After the 
discussion of the philosophical roots of the ‘will’ as a construct, whether or not it should be 




used to grasp the basic principles of empirical studies in psychology will be in the focus.  A 
brief description of how self-regulation has been shaped and investigated in recent research 
will be presented.  
Having briefly suggested that the definition and the meaning of a term like 
‘inhibition’ have constantly been affected by historical changes in the economy and 
technology within the previous section, a similar question will be asked towards the ‘self.' It 
is necessary because the hypothesised ‘self’ must employ inhibitory skills can be discussed..  
This is a harder question to answer given the accumulation of knowledge and viewpoints in 
philosophy and psychology. To touch on the limitations, argument on the operation of the 
‘will’ in the context of the abilities that the ‘self’ possesses should be noted. To achieve 
regulation, the ‘self’ must operate within a complex framework, involving behaviour, 
emotion and mental expression. To discuss these regulatory abilities, the views of Kant and 
Schopenhauer should be mentioned. A quotation from Kant’s “anthropology” lectures in the 
late eighteenth century, displayed in Smith’s (1992) work, illuminates how German 
philosophy interpreted the enlightenment view on inhibition and its effect on expressing the 
meaning of ‘self’.  Moral concerns and practical psychological issues were central to these 
lectures of Kant. He focused on issues like the trajectory of “drunkenness, sleep, fainting, and 
asphyxia.” He referred to these attributes as “the inhibition, weakening, and total loss of the 
sense powers” [the meaning of the term ‘sense’ here is to perceive and its clarity the 
perception] to exemplify “an inhibition of the regular and ordinary use of our power of 
reflection” (as cited in Smith, 1992; p. 50). This example that Kant used to illustrate the idea, 
which is lack of inhibition, causes an absence in the power of reflection.  Smith (1992) raises 
the issue of the hierarchal relation between inhibition and the ‘will’ as follows: 




  “Even ‘inhibition’ itself, as a term referring to control, has multiple meanings. It may 
indicate a relationship between two forces, one power, at least for a time, arresting and 
thereby regulating another power. In such circumstances, the inhibitory relationship is 
frequently a hierarchical one, in which a higher power (such as will) controls a lower one 
(such as instincts)” (Smith, 1992; p.8) 
  
 As Janaway (1989) suggests, Kant’s doctrines of experience or empirical knowledge 
require having intuitions and concepts. In Kant’s view, the representations of space and time 
are intuitions and these are a priori. In other words, their justification does not depend on any 
evidence or experience. For Kant, therefore, how the self represents time and space are 
inexplicable. He rules out a role for intuitions (Janaway, 1989). Schopenhauer’s take on the 
matter relies on a different description of the self where the intuitions of time and space could 
be a source for the self in seeking or constructing knowledge.      
 The main reason I wanted to readdress the issues Schopenhauer raises was that, for 
him, the self’s perception of time and space directly relate to the actions we take, their 
underlying value and decisions we make concerning the self. The main function of the term 
‘self’ in Schopenhauer’s theory (see e.g., Janaway, 1989) is to identify the core or essence of 
thehuman being, as opposed to accidental or contingent potential  qualities of them (Zöller, 
1999). Within the tradition that he was working in, the self was the identification of the 
human soul or mind instead of the human body.  In simplistic terms, Schopenhauer disagrees 
with Kant’s general designation of the self. His disagreement was on the idea that the self 
does not rest on top of the core of the intellect or a cognitive faculty. In his account, 
understanding (or reasoning) is not the only main component of the self. In addition to this 
rational side, he adds another essential feature to the self that he defines as the 'will.' What is 
different is that in earlier accounts of the philosophy of the self, the will was represented as 




subordinate to reasoning and considered for its practical purposes, as a restraint on human 
action.  
The claim of Schopenhauer was that the will is the essence of a human, and it is the 
thing that makes it possible for us to have knowledge of the world through ourselves. This 
idea runs contrary to Kant’s idealism where the assumption is that the self is disengaged, with 
limited ways to acquire knowledge of the world. Following from the doctrine above, the 
primary description of the self and its position in the world comes from the subject’s 
experiences (Kant, 1929/1979; as cited in Janaway, 1989). Kant draws a distinction between 
the world that we understand through our perception on one hand and reasoning on the other. 
We cannot process or understand objects with bare reasoning since there is a gap between 
object perception and reasoning. Knowledge of objects is bound to the observer’s experience. 
In contrast, a priori ideas cannot be perceived and are classified as things-in-themselves. 
Acquiring the knowledge of them is not possible as they are impregnable to conscious 
reflection or experience. ‘Will’ was one of those things that contained its knowledge, so the 
reflection of it was only possible in the trajectory of reasoning.  Therefore, its essence is 
unknown to the human mind. Since the contents of the will are incomprehensible to the 
subject, Kant’s definition of this metaphysical view concerns a form of knowledge that 
cannot be empirically studied. 
To get to grips with Schopenhauer’s analysis, let’s consider the following statement: 
“For nothing is more certain than that no one ever came out of himself in order to identify 
himself immediately with things different from him; but everything of which he has certain, 
sure, therefore immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this 
consciousness, therefore, there can be no immediate certainty (...) There can never be an 
existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively 
inconceivable. For the objective, as such, always and essentially has its existence in the 
consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the subject’s representation, and consequently is 




conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject’s form of representation which 
belong to the subject and not to the object” (Schopenhauer, 1844/1966; p.5).  
 
In his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism, Schopenhauer argues that the ‘riddle’ 
of the self should comprise affective qualities. He begins with the realization of the conscious 
self, onto which the essential qualities of the ‘will,’ which emerge, are qualities like urging, 
striving, wanting and desiring. According to his view, the will is the representation of all that 
we desire from the world and everything that we do is to serve what the ‘will’ wants. His 
ontological description would place the primacy of desire over the intellect as for him; 
thought is the follower of desire. Schopenhauer broke the will’s attachment to reason and 
defined it as a blind striving (Janaway, 1989). The ‘will’ designated as the source of the self, 
including our intellectual facilities in Schopenhauer’s redefinition, also include the volitional 
sides of the human self. His complementary conception of selfhood included both how the 
will forms the core of the human being and how the achievement of selfhood occurs through 
the accumulation of intellectual effort. 
 Schopenhauer attains the inner essence quality to the will. Since it has inside 
qualities, everything ‘will’ possess is unobservable yet, only the actions of the ‘will’ is 
observable. Where we accumulate the knowledge of other objects is outside us, and this is the 
only way to acquire knowledge according to Kant. So form same logic, Kant claims that the 
true nature of the self is known due to it not being observable. Schopenhauer, on the other 
hand, points out the intimate nature of one’s bodily actions and its relation with the ‘will’. 
Our actions are the reflection of the will; therefore, the bodily expressions and the mental 
entity of self are united in the presence of ‘will’. As a distributor and the container of all 
urges and desires that one may possess, the psychological presence of ‘will’ can be only 
observed on bodily awareness and action awareness comes with it. Early childhood contains 




the milestones for child’s awareness of his or her influence on own actions. When this 
awareness turns into control behaviour, child’s regulated behaviour and emotion are similar 
to the adult-like control.    
In one way, Schopenhauer’s insight on ‘will’, and his ranking of desire over intellect, 
would explain the developmental trajectory of the children’s interactions with their 
environment. It starts with the physical needs to be fulfilled at an early age. Crying is one of 
the most common responses children give to upsetting events and provides a useful 
demonstration of pleasure- and self- oriented nature of childhood in terms of ‘willing,’ With 
crying, child does not give emotional cues but demonstrates his or her needs at present and 
uses crying as a communicative tool. Such a communicative tool in infancy continues to be 
an emotional signalling in toddlerhood and the rest of the life. Crying is not necessary to 
show how upset the person is, but general people are expected to have some control over 
their emotional outburst. In Schopenhauerian sense, if crying occurs, it can be interpreted as 
an act of crying is willed, and that is why it happens but this interpretation would not be 
complete. The ‘will’ also represents the things that are will be maybe cannot be achieved, 
therefore, crying may occur. His way of redefining the construct of ‘will’ to explain the true 
nature of human behaviour and his unification of the process of desire (and the ability to 
desire) is so inseparable as seen in the statement in his On the Freedom of the Will; 
"You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can only one definite 
thing and nothing other than that one thing” (Schopenhauer, 1841/2005, p.24). 
The illuminating point of the quotation above is how it exemplifies urges and desires 
that one person need to deal with every day, and the ‘will’ is not yet only the ‘desire’ itself, 
but also the ability to satisfy such a desire. Schopenhauer reflects on how the ‘will’ should be 
manipulated, in-famous pessimistic claim sums the cycle of desire to unsatisfactory for 




people since whether desires are fulfilled or not, the happiness may not be leaded by the 
decision of following desires or abstaining from them. Although, his pessimistic view is 
irrelevant, the take-home message here is to seeking equilibrium. Despite this dark outlook, 
the idea of equilibrium, or mental and affective unification of representations presents a clear 
picture of self-regulation. Nevertheless, whether the urges of will are satisfied or not, the will 
is there to strive continuously.  The ‘will’ is the core of the people’s experiences to 
understand the world and more importantly themselves. Schopenhauer’s unified ‘will’ is an 
approach that I would like to apply to self-regulation in relation to its aspects. The urge and 
the control of the urge are combined in the will, so it must be in self-regulation, as well. More 
importantly, emotional, cognitive and motor aspects of regulation should be contributing, 
through the mutual relationships to the concept of self-regulation equally.  
 The definition of the ‘will’ or the source of it might be pre-determined by cultural or 
religious customs. Religious doctrines have the tendency to promote delayed rewards for 
whom wait and stay absent from hedonistic acts. So every society promotes the saving for the 
rainy days. One way or other, children are exposed to such tendencies. However, our 
‘contemporary’ dilemma in developmental psychology in terms of explaining the source of 
‘regulation’ should be isolated from the overall impact of society or religion9. The reason that 
Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ was analysed in this thesis, Schopenhauerian approach to self-
regulation would also point out the importance of the lack of control in early childhood. As 
much as regulated behaviour is the need, a child’ non-regulated nature makes him or her open 
to experiences. The lack of control is one way to explore all the possibilities surrounds the 
child. When a child develops the controlling mechanism, their purpose should be making a 
child’s exploration deeper.  
                                                          
9 Although such isolation should not counted as overlooking the early bootstrapping effect of family and 
language in the present and future self-regulatory development of child (Landry et al., 2000.) The effect of 
language particularly in early development will be discussed in a different line of literature further in this thesis.  




The Kantian distinction that Schopenhauer based knowledge acquisition either from 
the outside world via perception or through inner reasoning can be seen as a stepping stone 
towards an argument  about self and self-knowledge. Since Kant claimed that knowledge of 
things could be acquired when only they are observed, this kind of observation can only mean 
that we can represent the objects around us in our mind and be able to think about them. 
Schopenhauer agreed on the differentiation of kinds of knowledge. In the Critique of 
Practical Reason, Kant says: 
“It may be admitted that if it were possible for us to have deep an insight into man’s character 
as shown both in inner and outer action and all external occasions, that every, even the least, 
incentive to these actions an all external occasions which affect them were so known to us 
that his future conduct could be predicted with as great a certainty as the occurrence of a solar 
or lunar eclipse” (Kant cited in Schopenhauer, 1841/2005, p.82). 
 
In this quotation from his predecessor, Schopenhauer claims the act of will and bodily 
movement cannot be causally connected since the will is expressed in bodily movement and 
this occurs before conscious reflection takes place (see Janaway, 1989). To understand his 
philosophy further, his assumption of one extreme unity should be acknowledged, as a single 
thought that might require further explanation (Janaway, 1999).  In his claim, Schopenhauer 
defines the single thought as the ‘most perfect unity, ’the context that I address the single 
thought is how to approach the abilities of the self in terms of the ‘will’. He proposes that 
communicating one idea involve dividing it into its parts, but these parts need to be 
reconnected again. In this division and reuniting relationship creates a drive, as much as the 
divided parts support the whole, whole also supports its parts. This ‘organic’ relationship is a 
metaphor for the ‘will’ and its unification of desire and the ability to understand the desire 
itself.   This is a unification that should be reflected on redefining self-regulation and how its 
trace in child development should be pursued.  The ‘will’ that child develops is there from the 




beginning when the child first strives for something. Such a strive makes the world 
understandable for the child and to be able to continue understanding the world, child starts to 
control his or her striving.  
 In this section, the depth of the self-regulation construct has been related to the 
construct ‘will’ in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The representation of the outside world as a 
whole can only be acquired through the will based on Schopenhauer’s logic. Therefore, the 
child’s representations are limited the presence of the development ‘will.’ The will combines 
both mental and affective representation to have an inner perspective where a person can 
reflect on the subjective experience.  Schopenhauer’s account of the human being as an 
embodied, active spectator of the world of objects is the basis for an analysis of children’s 
varied abilities in early development. Being an active spectator of the world is the beginning 
of developing self-regulation, and it can be expressed through the development of agency.     
 Children’s ability to understand other people as ‘agents’ arises upon the self-
awareness of their own agency has been argued by Russell (1996). As the ability to make 
explicit judgements about the physical and mental world is one of the main developmental 
trajectories was particularly mentioned in Piaget’s work theory, and its relevance to the 
agency should be mentioned further. Agency can be demonstrated as the first leg of the will 
where the one’s own and other’s needs, belief and desires can be represented which leads to 
act according to those. The actions start to be based on an understanding of agency occurs, I 
claim that the self-regulation takes place where the cycle of Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ closes its 
loop.  
  As one of the few who pay attention to the partially rhetorical question of ‘what does 
it take to have a mind,’ Russell (1996) broadens the scope of the self-world dualism through 
psychological understanding. The knowledge within the self cannot be thought separate from 




the world is represented; therefore consciousness ascends unity of knowledge of the self and 
the world. According to Kant, only observable matters in the world can be represented in 
one’s mind, Russell addresses Schopenhauer’s explanation of representation to explore the 
relationship of the conscious act and cognitive faculties. His starting point is “the ability to 
alter at ‘will’ one’s perceptual inputs” (p.64) is the important component of the developing 
conception of the external world and the mind. To describe the perceptual understanding of 
the world and the self, he uses Kantian arguments. He does this by drawing upon the 
Piagetian process of ‘agency’ in which it is necessary for the child to gain gradual control 
over his or her actions and as the building block for the development of cognition.  Russell 
(1996) employed Schopenhauer’s approach to eliminate the nativist tendencies, which can be 
traced to the Kantian argument in developmental stories of mental process. Russell argued 
that the notions of ‘willing’ and ‘agency’ cannot be separated due to their nature in mind. 
Simply, agency is an individual’s act of intuition towards what is required or desired, whereas 
the willing is the demonstration of a desire. A conception of objects as causally coherent 
within themselves and in relation to other objects, as existing in space and through time, is 
only possible for a unitary consciousness that synthesizes its experience. Russell argues that 
agency achieves such a unitary consciousness that is similar to Schopenhauer’s proposal of 
the ‘will.’ Schopenhauer unifies the ‘act of will’ and the ‘action of the body,’ since the latter 
is the reflection of the former. With the help of agency, Russell defines this unity as the 
‘synthetic mind.’ He also considers that agency (like the ‘will’) is the only way to unify the 
reflective experience of self and the experience itself. The only way to be the owner of your 
experiences is to keep the type of relationship that is a loop between the ability/ 
wanting/desire itself and its consequences. This loop in the first place is because ability to 
exist. So, why does Russell rely on this synthesizing effect of agency? Russell’s 
interpretation of Schopenhauer’s designation of ‘will’ was bound to the fact that the will’s 




particular type of distance to the self, and its effect on the unity of mental faculty. According 
to Schopenhauerian philosophy, ‘will’ is a key to unify mental representations of theworld; 
therefore a developing child requires this fundamentally important skill to own a conscious 
experience of the world. Russell relates consciousness with the bodily awareness in which 
volition arises upon the act of body where the expression of will occurs but the bodily activity 
may not match with the will. To achieve the volitional action, in early years, ‘trying’ occurs.  
Secondly, he draws a link between Schopenhauer’s explanations of the ‘immediate’ 
experience of the self as in the representation of the will. This is the only way to understand 
that we are the subjects of objective experiences. Thus, differentiation between ‘willing’ self 
and ‘knowing’ self is part of conception of belief, where perceiving ‘I’ is the accumulation of 
these mental constructs as similar to the ‘will’ in Schopenhauer’s claim as an unifier of 
mental representations of experiences. From a linguistic perspective though, ‘I,’ can be 
discussed as a reflection of unified ability like agency.  Based on these three points, he 
defines the existence of agency as the interrelation between bodily awareness, will and 
reality, which comes out the thought process from self. Schopenhauer’s account of will is 
also represents all bodily striving since, his conception of ‘will’ was very materialistic, and its 
content and purpose cannot be thought apart from the physical body (Janaway, 1999).  
Russell does not treat the notions of will and agency synonymously in the sense of their 
functional purposes or ontological definitions. However, he points out the similarity between 
their main characteristics of intentionality, and how this relates to both in some extend.  
Schopenhauer argued that the will was not a representation of knowledge or the experience 
but a construct for itself. In a similar way, Russell has also argued that agency is not a 
product of the mind’s representation; instead, it is a contributor mechanism for 
representation. The self within the world would also have its own knowledge since it 




represents itself too. In a progressive explanation of the self is the subject as who has 
knowledge of the ‘inner essence’ of the self. That inner quality was defined as the ‘will’ by 
Schopenhauer (Janaway, 1999). When the conscious knowledge of the world was acquired, 
the will has an identical knowledge as the self. Conscious knowledge of the world is similar 
to having a ‘will.’ According to Schopenhauer, with ‘willing,’ the knowledge is formed 
without representing it since the will has representational qualities embedded.  ‘Will’ is 
represented in the act of body, since it is an expression of the will. Immediate knowledge of 
the event comes from the ‘will’, as the subject’s actions and the object that is the subject’s 
body in an empirical sense (Janaway, 1989). Action situates the subject in the world, by 
providing access to underlying thing-in-itself, which is the ‘will’. 
Based on Schopenhauer’s unitary logic, the underlying drives of self-regulation 
should be equally contributed by emotional, cognitive and motor features, but to see this 
contribution, asking the first question of ‘Is emotional development or cognitive advancement 
the driver to the overall self-regulation?’ is  helpful.  Firstly ,one-directional relationship, 
between them can be examined,andthen the bi-directionality of their relationship can be 
pursued. 
 The recent literature on self-regulation of young children has the tendency to define 
according to its relative components, instead of a single construct. I aim to present a view 
where core of the ability lies in the network of socio-emotional and socio-cognitive abilities 
and presents itself with the behaviour is based on needs or demands of the situation. Self-
regulation can be situated in the three main mechanisms of the early child development of 
emotion, behaviour (psycho-motor skills) and cognition. The organic relationship between 
these aspects (emotion, behaviour, cognition) and the wholeness of the ability to regulate is 
the key to explaining the connections between these separate aspects. All of these aspects 




have been received attention from many researchers in the psychology literature. However, 
whilst explaining the whole construct, literature lacks studies, which combines these three 
aspects together and values them equally.    
Appendix 1.2 
ADDITIONAL REVIEW ON THE HISTORY OF INHIBITION: ARE CONCEPTS OF 
SELF-REGULATION ‘NEW’? 
It is commonly found that psychologists derive descriptions of their subject matter – 
constructs like ‘attention,' ‘memory’ or ‘self-control’ and believe that they are the product of 
the work within their discipline. Terms like ‘self-regulation’, and its parts, are a case in point. 
Not only do psychologists differ in their definitions of this construct and its necessity in the 
development. They also often equate it to the development of similar constructs that are 
‘behaviours’ and their nature is assumed to be based on ‘inhibition.' Apart from the emotional 
or cognitive coverage on self-regulation ability, its core has always been related to inhibition. 
The use of term ‘inhibition’ has been historically tracked down and discussed as how it has 
been used in scientific knowledge by Roger Smith (1992). In his precise evaluation of the 
term that has been utilized by both physiology and psychology over the last two centuries, he 
points out that the meaning of the term has been shaped through the changes in society. The 
following quotation summarises the relation between constructs has been in the focus:  
“The history of inhibition is also part of a wider history of regulation and control, concerns 
that are so fundamental they almost define the scope of the sciences of body, mind and 
behaviour. They are also central to thought about the social nature of the individual and to the 
very continuance of social life.” (Smith, 1992, p.7) 
 
In physiology or psychology, concepts concerning the control of automatic reflexes or 
organized behaviours can be studied under the term of inhibition. Given the diversity of 




origins of the use of the term in the nineteenth century, it is not possible to derive a particular 
source or the range of the diverse definitions of the term. Smith (1992) states that since the 
first usage of the term ‘inhibition’ in the English speaking world at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, the same term was used in divergent ways in religious, political, 
economic and even scientific institutions. To exemplify how technological development and 
industrialization of society led to a shift where the physiological process were directly used to 
explaining mental qualities, Smith (1992) shows how the metaphor of ‘self-regulatory 
capacities’ as a steam engine governor was used along with notions of the regulation of 
production described in terms of factory machinery. He also links these types of regulatory 
concepts to the regulation of the market, finances and the trade cycles.  The political 
economy and changing industry required a new definition of regulation that would be put 
down as “regulation of flesh by spirit and the value of individual grace, autonomy, and 
responsibility” (Smith, 1992, p.238). Where industry and working settings were changing, the 
value of the regulation of an individual became an issue to consider as we see in the case of 
child workers. In a faster working setting, the compliance of a child worker can be seen as 
central to the maintenance of industrial production. In addition to that, where the parents were 
working longer hours and away from home, there were the subject of children who need adult 
supervision or instant control of authority. These two examples links to how definition of 
childhood could have been revisited in the last two centuries – suddenly in the history of 
Western culture the problem  of controlling children’s natural inclinations to seek pleasure 
came under scrutiny. 
Based on Smith’s (1992) evaluations, we can infer that in the course of sustaining 
‘inhibition’ as a term that emerged in a number of political and scientific literatures, a 
longstanding tradition of synthesizing the concepts of physiology, medicine and psychology 




to address the mind and body as synthetic concept was set in motion. In case of creating this 
synthetic science, terms like inhibition are interesting because they cut across different 
disciplines.  In fact, there were scientists like Sherrington and Pavlov as Smith (1992) 
addresses whose theoretical syntheses were aimed at capturing the organized control and the 
regulation of automatic bodily functions, which was a trending topic of the late 1800s; 
however, the control of social interactions was also part of their synthetic theoretical 
understanding. The questioning of a central inhibition mechanism that was associated with 
the workings of the nervous system gave rise to the experimental physiological studies where 
each aspect of inhibition was rather isolated to understand the central mechanism question. 
In summary, there are important questions that need to be discussed, even 
acknowledging the chance of not being able to produce a clear answer to the questions ‘What 
is the source of self-regulation in human beings?’, ‘What can be defined as the ability to self-
regulate in children?’ and ‘How does psychology deal with such a complex construct and 
provide meaningful insights to the mechanism underlying self-regulation?’. Controlling one’s 
urges and desires is not only a question concerning childhood; this is a challenge that each 
one of us needs to face on a daily basis. In this thesis, I am not talking about an ability that is 
achieved in early childhood that continues exactly the same into adulthood. It is a changing 
ability, and it is never stable. Because, I believe, that understanding self-regulation involves 
getting close to understanding the core of development and developmental psychology. If 
self-regulation is subject to constant change, it will be difficult to capture in empirical work 
and even harder to define.  In order to build a concrete understanding of what self-regulation 
could be, a trip to the philosophical roots of it needs to be taken. Philosophy asked questions 
of how a person becomes the owner of her/his life and the master of her/his desires and urges 
prior to psychology. It also defined the world we know through an empirical perspective.  




The empirical approach to constructs, as a form of scepticism, is a concept that became 
central in the enlightenment era. The observed knowledge of the construct has been claimed 
as the one and only source for knowledge. The things that cannot be observed were deemed 
to be unknowable. To know the things that are only represented in the mind was not possible 
from a Kantian perspective.  Although Kant’s transcendental idealism introduced the 
separation of the beyond-reality matters (metaphysics), which are unobservable to human 
beings, and the knowledge comes from observable matters, Schopenhauer comes with the 
solution of affective understanding of the world. His new invention of a tool to understand 
the world is what we do understand are both showing the capability of desiring and also 
trying to be in control of those desires. Wanting something is the first step of the controlling 
the limits of your ability to acquire the desired object. So, children may not be the best to 
control their feelings or thoughts, they are good at wanting. Everything in our lives starts with 
a desire. A child tries to grasp that ‘trying’ is the reflection of a desire that the child possess. 
The limitation of our ability to acquire our desire objects expands with understanding firstly 
our own needs and then the others’ needs and desires.  
Appendix 2.1 
Direct evidentiality marker group: -DI version of the test question 
 Mental Verb: 
Self-false belief question,  
What did you think was inside the box, before I showed you?  
(Turkish)  Bu kutunun icinde sen ne oldugu DUSUN-DU-N?  
(Exact translation) This box inside you what is think-DI (direct experience-past 
reference)-you (2nd person assertive). 
Others’ false belief question, 




I showed this box to your friend, what did he think was inside the box? 
(Turkish)  Sence arkadasina bu kutuyu gosterdigimde; o bu kutunun icinde ne 
oldugunu DUSUN-DU?  
(Exact translation) you think, friend-your(second person assertive)-to this box 
showed; he this box inside what is think-DI(direct experience- past reference)  
Action verb 
Self-false belief question,  
 What did you SAY was inside the box, before I showed you?  
(Turkish) Bu kutunun icinde sen ne oldugu  SOYLE-DI-n?  
(Exact translation) This box inside you what is SAY-DI (direct experience-past 
reference)-you (2nd person assertive) 
Others’ false belief question, 
When I showed this box to your friend, what did he SAY was inside the box? 
(Turkish) Sence arkadasina bu kutuyu gosterdigimde; o bu kutunun icinde ne 
oldugunu  SOYLE-DI?  
(Exact translation) you think, friend-your(second person assertive)-to this box 
showed; he this box inside what is think-DI(direct experience- past reference)  
Belief evidentiality marker group: -DIR version of the test question 
 Mental Verb: 
Self-false belief question,  
 What did you think was inside the box, before I showed you?  
 (Turkish) Bu kutunun icinde sen ne oldugu DUSUN-MUS-SUN-DUR?  
(Exact translation) This box inside you what is think-DUR (DIR) (indirect 
experience-past reference)-you (2nd person assertive) 




Others’ false belief question,  
When I showed this box to your friend, what did he THINK was inside the box? 
(Turkish) Sence arkadasina bu kutuyu gosterdigimde; o bu kutunun icinde ne 
oldugunu DUSUN-MUS-DUR?  
(Exact translation) you think, friend-your (second person assertive)-to this box 
showed; he this box inside what is think-DIR (indirect direct experience- past 
reference)  
Action verb 
Self-false belief question,  
What did you SAY was inside the box, before I showed you?  
(Turkish) Bu kutunun icinde sen ne oldugu SOYLE-MIS-SIN-DIR?  
(Exact translation) This box inside you what is SAY-DIR (indirect experience-past 
reference)-you (2nd person assertive) 
Others’ false belief question,  
When I showed this box to your friend, what did he SAY was inside the box? 
(Turkish) Sence arkadasina bu kutuyu gosterdigimde; o bu kutunun icinde ne 
oldugunu  SOYLE-MIS-TIR?  
(Exact translation) you think, friend-your (second person assertive)-to this box 
showed; he this box inside what is think-TIR(indirect experience- past reference)  
Mental Verb:  
Direct evidentiality marker group: -DI version of the test question 
Tavsan topunun nerede oldugunu dusun-DU?  
Where did Bunny think that the ball was? 
Belief evidentiality marker group: -DIR version of the test question 




Tavsan topunun nerede oldugunu dusun-MUS-TUR?  
Where would Bunny think that the ball was? 
Action verb: 
Direct evidentiality marker group: -DI version of the test question 
  {Topunu bulmak icin} Tavsan ilk nereye bak-TI?  
{to find his ball} Where did Bunny looked first? 
Belief evidentiality marker group: -DIR version of the test question 
{Topunu bulmak icin} Tavsan ilk nereye bak-MIS-TIR?  
{to find his ball} Where has the Bunny looked first? 
Control questions with exact translations:  
Control question of reality control; ‘Where is the ball really?’ 
Direct evidentiality marker group: -DI version of the control question: 
Top aslinda nerede? [Ball really where?] 
Belief evidentiality marker group: -DIR version of the control question: 
Top aslinda nerede-DIR? (Ball really where?] 
Control question of memory; ‘Where did Bunny put the ball at the beginning?’ 
Direct evidentiality marker group: -DI version of the control question: 
Tavsan topu ilk nereye koy-du? (Bunny ball fit where put) 
Belief evidentiality marker group: -DIR version of the control question: 
Tavsan topu ilk nereye koy-mus-tur? (Bunny ball fit where put) 
 
Appendix 3.1 
The Scoring Of Snack Delay Task (In Study 2) 




 The child receives 0 point when s/he eats the snack during the first half of the delay. 
The child receives 1 point when s/he eats the snack during the second half of the 
delay. 
 The child receives 2 points when s/he touches snack/ mat/experimenter during the 
first half of the delay. 
The child receives 3 points when s/he touches snack/ mat/experimenter during the 
second half of the delay. 
 The child receives 4 points when s/he prompts the experimenter during the first half 
of the delay  
The child receives 5 points when s/he prompts the experimenter during the second 
half of the delay  
 The child receives 6 points when s/he moves hand towards snack/ mat/experimenter 
during the first half of the delay  
The child receives 7 points when s/he moves hand towards snack/ mat/experimenter 
during the second half of the delay  
 The child receives 8points when s/he moves body towards snack/ mat/experimenter 
during the first half of the delay  
The child receives 9 points when s/he moves body towards snack/ mat/experimenter 
during the second half of the delay  
 The child receives 10 points when s/he waits until the signal was given. 
Appendix 3.2 
The List of Distractions in the Snack Delay Task (in Study 2)  
 Plays or touches with own clothing 
 Locks arms/Hugs herself 




 Puts hands in pocket 
 Hides arm behind 
 Rocks herself 
 Talks to herself 
 Imitates clapping without prompting 
 Looks away or close her eyes 
 Asks questions or talks to the experiment (about something else not the task or treat) 
 Touches the table on corners 
 Fixates gaze on the treat 
 Laughs or giggle 
Appendix 3.3 
Behaviour Coding List of the Disappointing Gift Task (in Studies 2 , 3, 5)  
Positive Dimension (7-reaction) 
 Broad smile with teeth showing 
 Broad, closed lip smile 
 Enthusiastic thank you 
 Arched brow, as in surprise 
 Smiling eye contact with experimenter 
 Eye wrinkle when smiling 
 Positive vocalization 
Negative Dimension (10-reaction) 
 Nose wrinkle 
 Lowered brow as in frown 




 Omitted thank you 
 Puckered or pursed mouth 
 Tight, straight line mouth 
 Avoid eye contact with experimenter 
 Negative noise emitted 
 Abrupt departure from room 
 Shoulder shrug 
 Bulged eyes, as in negative surprise 
Transitional /Neutral Dimension (13-reaction) 
 Slight smile 
 Faint thank you 
 Knit brows whilst smiling slightly 
 Protruding tongue 
 Two or more gaze shifts 
 Biting or teeth visible on lips 
 Hand to face, head 
 Head tilt or turn 
 Question vocalization 
 Laughing giggling 
 Mouthing (open/shut) 
 Abrupt loss of smile 
 Rolled in lips 





Study 4- SURE: Vignettes and Pictures  
Story1 
Billy/Ali loves funfairs. His grandparents promise to take him to an amusement park this 
weekend. When the day comes, Billy jumps into car with his grandparents. They drive 
through some lovely woods. Grandma says ‘These woods are so lovely. Let’s go for a walk in 
the woods instead! We’ll go to the funfair another time’.  
 






Jasmine/Yasemin loves her turtle. Her turtle dies this morning. Jasmine is going to her 
friend’s birthday party today. Jasmine is very upset about her turtle. It is time to go to her 
friend’s birthday party now. 
 
 






Eileen/Aylin wants go to ice-skating.  Her parents say that they will go to ice-skating after 
her brother’s football match. Sydney watches her brother’s match. However, her brother was 
very tired and a little bit injured after the match. So her parents decided to go back home 
instead. 
 






Amy/Ayse loves cookies and baking them with her mum. She needs her mother to help her 
bake.  Her mother tells her that they can bake the cookies after everybody finishes their 
dinner and they have cleared the table. She finishes her dinner and wants to start baking. Her 
mother says, they can only start baking when everybody in the table finishes their dinner. 
 






Mabel/Merve and her sister buy their mother some nice flowers for her birthday. They hide 
the flowers behind the sofa. Her sister says to wait until he finishes his homework. Mother is 
very tired and is about to fall asleep on the sofa. Now Mabel is very excited. She wants to 
show her mum the flowers. 
 






Max/Umut’s dad promises him to go to shopping for a model train. Max’s loves model trains. 
And today is Max’s birthday. He is so excited. His dad takes him to the toy shop. When they 
get to the shop it is closed. They cannot buy a model train today. Max’s dad is very upset that 
he does not have present for his son’s birthday















Denise/Deniz is looking forward to play with his friend. He plans to play with cars and show 
his hamster to his friend. However, Drew’s mother rings his mother up to say that he feels 









Bob/Bora loves his teacher and friends in the nursery. Every day after lunch they are allowed 
to play with a toy of their choice. The red car is Bora’s favourite. Everybody knows that Bora 
plays with the red car. Ali is a new student in the nursery. He is very quiet.  After lunch, Bora 
comes back to classroom and finds that Ali is next the red car. Ali asks Bora’s to play with 
 
 





John/ Can’s big sister bakes cookies for hours and she gets very tired after. Can tries a 
cookie. The cookie is very hard and not sweet. Can knows that her sister was working on 
these for hours. Can’s sister ask him; ‘Do you like the cookies?’ 
 
 





Marker Delay Scoring (in Study 5)  
 The child receives 1 point when s/he colours with markers. 
 The child receives 2 point when s/he takes markers out of box  
 The child receives 3 points when s/he lifts up box. 
 The child receives 4 points when s/he touches box/marker  
 The child receives 5 points when s/he touches paper  
 The child receives 6 points when s/he does not touch  
Appendix 6.2 
Here, I present the hierarchical regression analysis for EU and SU that was not presented in 
Chapter 6 to not crowd the analysis. The strong bound between SU and EU was an important 
contribution to the literature because the their relationships has not been agreed upon among 
the researcher such as Cutting and Dunn (1999) who claimed that these two constructs were 
not related.  
Predicting Emotional Understanding Performance 
By TEC 
Children’s emotional-comprehension was also predicted in three step hierarchical 
regression model. In Table 6.28.1, the full details of the analysis were presented. In Step 1, to 
predict TEC performance, emotional-regulation measures, understanding of emotional-
regulation scale performance (SURE), and delay performance were inserted. Model 1 was 
significant, R2= .21, F (4,114)= 7.43, p<.001; adjusted R2=.18. Both SURE and Delay 
performance were significant predictors of children’s emotion comprehension performance. 
The relationship between TEC and SURE was apparent in the correlation analysis but Delay 
and TEC relationship was overseen. In Study 3, Delay performance also predicted TEC in a 
significant model along with the positive emotionality suppression (Secret Keeping). The 
latter lacked the significant role in this model. In Step 2, age was added to the model and 
generated model that was significant, R2= .35, F (1,113)= 12.20, p<.001; adjusted R2=.32. In 
Model 2, the significance of the SURE was remained as a predictor, but Delay was no longer 
significant. Instead, age was significantly predicting the emotion comprehension 
performance. As the delta values in Table 6.28.1 suggests, Model 2 was statistically an 




improved model with a higher R2 value. In Step 3, Conflict Composite and False Belief were 
added to the equation. Model 3 was also a significant model with a statistically better R2 
value. However, previously significant predictors were no longer existed. The latest additions 
in Model 3 created that the Conflict and False Belief performances were significantly 
predicting the TEC performance.  In Study 3, final model had False Belief, Age, and Secret 
Keeping as the predictors of emotion-comprehension. The close relationship between Social 
and Emotional understanding is undeniable which may be due to the similarity in the task 
demand as well as the common developmental underpinning they shared (Harris et al., 1989). 
Harris et al. suggests that when children predicting the weight of an emotionally charged 
situation, they employ mental concepts that are also used to predict belief and desires of 
others.  Therefore, the Model 3 that suggests the false belief performance was predicting 
children’s emotion comprehension scores was compatible with their findings. The  
relationship between false belief and conflict performance indicates that instead of the Delay 
ability that  may have share an affective underpinning with emotion comprehension, the 
Conflict skills was also playing a crucial role in explaining children’s understanding 
emotionally charged situations.  
Since the critical effect of children’s language skills on both emotion and social 
understanding was reported (Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Pons et al., 2003) an alternative 
regression analysis was conducted where language ability was added into the equation in Step 
2 as a demographic variable. In Table 6.28.2, the alternative hierarchical regression analysis 
is displayed in detail.   Model 1 was identical with the previous analysis. In Model 2, the 
addition of language performance leads a significant model, R2= .35, F (2,112)= 19.49, 
p<.001; adjusted R2=.49,  that had Age and Language performance as significant predictors. 
Unlike the previous model, the significant position of SURE as a predictor was absent in 
Model 2. Similarly, Model 3 was still significant, R2= .45, F (2,110)= 15.72, p<.001; adjusted 
R2=.50,  but the Conflict and False Belief were not significant predictors of the emotion 
comprehension scores. Instead, Age and Language remained as significant predictors in 
Model 3. Yet, it did not show that the model was statistically improved in the third step.   
Table 6.28.1 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting TEC (N = 120) 
Emotion Comprehension 




 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β B SE B β 
Secret 
Keeping 
.26 .20 .11 .13 .19 .05 -.04 .18 -.02 
Disappointing 
Gift 
-.04 .07 -.05 -.07 .07 -.09 -.07 .06 -.08 
SURE .13 .03 .38*
* 
.06 .03 .18* .02 .03     .05 
Delay Score 
Composite 
.43 2.0 .18* .22 .19 .09 .12 .18     .05 
Age (months)    .08 .02 .44** .03 .02    .13 
Conflict 
Composite  
      .73 .28 .30** 






13.06** F  
∆ R2  .14 .10 
∆F  25.00** 10.25** 










Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting TEC (N = 120) 
TEC 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β B SE B β 
Secret Keeping .26 .20 .11 .06 .16 .02 -.03 .16 -.01 
Disappointing 
Gift 
-.04 .07 -.05 -.01 .06 -.01 -.02 .06 -.02 
SURE .13 .03 .38** .04 .03 .12 .02 .03  .07 
Delay Score 
Composite 
.43 .20 .18* .17 .16 .07 .14 .16 .06 
Age (months)    .08 .01 .45** .05 .02 .29** 
Language    .05 .01 .41** .04 .01 .34** 
Conflict 
Composite  
      1.0 .27 .12 






15.72 F  
∆ R2  .30** .02 
∆F  34.79 2.68 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01. 
 
 




Predicting Social Understanding (False Belief Performance) 
Social understanding that assed via false belief tasks was analysed with three step 
hierarchical regression models. In Table 6.30.1, the full details of the regression model are 
presented. In Step 1, only Conflict score was inserted in the model. False belief performance 
was significantly predicted by the Conflict scores in Model 1 which was significant, R2= .42, 
F (1,117)= 84.88,  p<.001; adjusted R2=.42. In Step 2, age was added to the equation. Model 
2 was significant, R2= .54, F (2,115)= 67.25,  p<.001; adjusted R2=.53, and had a higher R2 
value. Both variables were significant predictors of the false belief performance in Model 2. 
In Step 3, all emotionality measures and delay performance were aggregated. Model 3 was 
significant, R2= .60, F (5,111)= 23.88,  p<.001; adjusted R2=.58 and a statistically better fit 
compared to the previous models . Both age and Conflict remained as significant predictors 
of the false belief performance. In addition to them, emotion comprehension and positive 
emotionality suppression performance were also significant predictors of the social 
understanding. Children’s ability to understand the mental states of their own or the others 
was predicted by the children’s ability to comprehend emotional displays. Moreover, the way 
children cope with the exciting news, whether they kept the exciting secret or not also 
predicted their performance in the false belief tasks.  






Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Social Understanding  (N = 120) 
False Belief Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B Β B SE B β 
Conflict 
Composite  
1.52 .17 .65** .80 .20 .34** .52 .22 .22* 
Age (months)    .08 .02 .47** .07 .02 .38** 
TEC        .20 .07 .22** 
SURE       .02 .02 .07 
Disappointing 
Gift 
      -.08 .05 -.10 
Secret 
Keeping 
      .30 .14 .14* 
Delay Score 
Composite 






23.88** F  
∆ R2  .12 .06 
∆F  29.18** 3.56** 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01. 
 




Alternatively, language performance was added to the second step of the regression along 
with the age. Model 2 was significant and all variables in the model were statistically 
predicting the false belief performance. The age, language, and conflict performance are very 
well documented effects on children social understanding (e.g. Carlson &Moses, 2001) and 
the findings of this study was supporting the previous studies(for a review, see Moses & 
Tahiroglu, 2010). 





Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Variables Predicting Social Understanding  (N = 120) 
False Belief Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B     SE B   β 
Conflict 
Composite  
1.52 .17 .65** .53 .21 .23** .40 .23 .17 
Age (months)    .09 .02 .53** .07 .02 .44** 
Language    .02 .01 .20** .01 .01 .12 
TEC        .14 .08    .16 
SURE       .03 .02   .08 
Disappointing 
Gift 
      -.06 .05  -.08 
Secret 
Keeping 
      .30 .14  .14* 
Delay Score 
Composite 







21.54** F  
∆ R2  .15 .04 
∆F  19.97** 2.29* 
Note: *p  <  .05;  **p  <  .01 
